FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY

Cannabis and Cannabinoids, Cancer Antitumor Effects, Prion prevention, Pain management, Muscle relaxer, and Palliative Medicine

2012-01-06T08:34:00.001-08:00

National Cancer Institute at the National Institutes of Health

Cannabis and Cannabinoids (PDQ®), Cancer Antitumor Effects, Prion prevention, Pain management, muscle relaxer, and Palliative Medicine

Cannabis and Cannabinoids (PDQ®)

Laboratory/Animal/Preclinical Studies

Antitumor Effects Appetite Stimulation Analgesia

Cannabinoids are a group of 21-carbon–containing terpenophenolic compounds produced uniquely by Cannabis sativa and Cannabis indica species.[1,2] These plant-derived compounds may be referred to as phytocannabinoids. Although delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is the primary psychoactive ingredient, other known compounds with biologic activity are cannabinol, cannabidiol (CBD), cannabichromene, cannabigerol, tetrahydrocannabivarin, and delta-8-THC. CBD, in particular, is thought to have significant analgesic and anti-inflammatory activity without the psychoactive effect (high) of delta-9-THC.

Antitumor Effects

One study in mice and rats suggested that cannabinoids may have a protective effect against the development of certain types of tumors.[3] During this 2-year study, groups of mice and rats were given various doses of THC by gavage. A dose-related decrease in the incidence of hepatic adenoma tumors and hepatocellular carcinoma was observed in the mice. Decreased incidences of benign tumors (polyps and adenomas) in other organs (mammary gland, uterus, pituitary, testis, and pancreas) were also noted in the rats. In another study, delta-9-THC, delta-8-THC, and cannabinol were found to inhibit the growth of Lewis lung adenocarcinoma cells in vitro and in vivo .[4] In addition, other tumors have been shown to be sensitive to cannabinoid-induced growth inhibition.[5-8]

Cannabinoids may cause antitumor effects by various mechanisms, including induction of cell death, inhibition of cell growth, and inhibition of tumor angiogenesis and metastasis.[9-11] Cannabinoids appear to kill tumor cells but do not affect their nontransformed counterparts and may even protect them from cell death. These compounds have been shown to induce apoptosis in glioma cells in culture and induce regression of glioma tumors in mice and rats. Cannabinoids protect normal glial cells of astroglial and oligodendroglial lineages from apoptosis mediated by the CB1 receptor.[12]

The effects of delta-9-THC and a synthetic agonist of the CB2 receptor were investigated in hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC).[13] Both agents reduced the viability of hepatocellular carcinoma cells in vitro and demonstrated antitumor effects in hepatocellular carcinoma subcutaneous xenografts in nude mice. The investigations documented that the anti-HCC effects are mediated by way of the CB2 receptor. Similar to findings in glioma cells, the cannabinoids were shown to trigger cell death through stimulation of an endoplasmic reticulum stress pathway that activates autophagy and promotes apoptosis. Other investigations have confirmed that CB1 and CB2 receptors may be potential targets in non-small cell lung carcinoma[14] and breast cancer.[15]

In an in vivo model using severe combined immunodeficient mice, subcutaneous tumors were generated by inoculating the animals with cells from human non-small cell lung carcinoma cell lines.[16] Tumor growth was inhibited by 60% in THC-treated mice compared with vehicle-treated control mice. Tumor specimens revealed that THC had antiangiogenic and antiproliferative effects. However, research with immunocompetent murine tumor models has demonstrated immunosuppression and enhanced tumor growth in mice treated with THC.[17,18]

In addition, both plant-derived and endogenous cannabinoids have been studied for anti-inflammatory effects. A mouse study demonstrated that endogenous cannabinoid system signaling is likely to provide intrinsic protection against colonic inflammation.[19] As a result, a hypothesis that phytocannabinoids and endocannabinoids may be useful in the risk reduction and treatment of colorectal cancer has been developed.[20-23]

Appetite Stimulation

Many animal studies have previously demonstrated that delta-9-THC and other cannabinoids have a stimulatory effect on appetite and increase food intake. It is believed that the endogenous cannabinoid system may serve as a regulator of feeding behavior. The endogenous cannabinoid anandamide potently enhances appetite in mice.[24] Moreover, CB1 receptors in the hypothalamus may be involved in the motivational or reward aspects of eating.[25]

Analgesia

Understanding the mechanism of cannabinoid-induced analgesia has been increased through the study of cannabinoid receptors, endocannabinoids, and synthetic agonists and antagonists. The CB1 receptor is found in both the central nervous system (CNS) and in peripheral nerve terminals. Similar to opioid receptors, increased levels of the CB1 receptor are found in regions of the brain that regulate nociceptive processing.[26] CB2 receptors, located predominantly in peripheral tissue, exist at very low levels in the CNS. With the development of receptor-specific antagonists, additional information about the roles of the receptors and endogenous cannabinoids in the modulation of pain has been obtained.[27,28]

Cannabinoids may also contribute to pain modulation through an anti-inflammatory mechanism; a CB2 effect with cannabinoids acting on mast cell receptors to attenuate the release of inflammatory agents, such as histamine and serotonin, and on keratinocytes to enhance the release of analgesic opioids has been described.[29-31]

References

1.Adams IB, Martin BR: Cannabis: pharmacology and toxicology in animals and humans. Addiction 91 (11): 1585-614, 1996. [PUBMED Abstract]

2.Grotenhermen F, Russo E, eds.: Cannabis and Cannabinoids: Pharmacology, Toxicology, and Therapeutic Potential. Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press, 2002.

3. National Toxicology Program .: NTP toxicology and carcinogenesis studies of 1-trans-delta(9)-tetrahydrocannabinol (CAS No. 1972-08-3) in F344 rats and B6C3F1 mice (gavage studies). Natl Toxicol Program Tech Rep Ser 446 (): 1-317, 1996. [PUBMED Abstract]

4.Bifulco M, Laezza C, Pisanti S, et al.: Cannabinoids and cancer: pros and cons of an antitumour strategy. Br J Pharmacol 148 (2): 123-35, 2006. [PUBMED Abstract]

5.Sánchez C, de Ceballos ML, Gomez del Pulgar T, et al.: Inhibition of glioma growth in vivo by selective activation of the CB(2) cannabinoid receptor. Cancer Res 61 (15): 5784-9, 2001. [PUBMED Abstract]

6.McKallip RJ, Lombard C, Fisher M, et al.: Targeting CB2 cannabinoid receptors as a novel therapy to treat malignant lymphoblastic disease. Blood 100 (2): 627-34, 2002. [PUBMED Abstract]

7.Casanova ML, Blázquez C, Martínez-Palacio J, et al.: Inhibition of skin tumor growth and angiogenesis in vivo by activation of cannabinoid receptors. J Clin Invest 111 (1): 43-50, 2003. [PUBMED Abstract]

8.Blázquez C, González-Feria L, Alvarez L, et al.: Cannabinoids inhibit the vascular endothelial growth factor pathway in gliomas. Cancer Res 64 (16): 5617-23, 2004. [PUBMED Abstract]

9.Guzmán M: Cannabinoids: potential anticancer agents. Nat Rev Cancer 3 (10): 745-55, 2003. [PUBMED Abstract]

10.Blázquez C, Casanova ML, Planas A, et al.: Inhibition of tumor angiogenesis by cannabinoids. FASEB J 17 (3): 529-31, 2003. [PUBMED Abstract]

11.Vaccani A, Massi P, Colombo A, et al.: Cannabidiol inhibits human glioma cell migration through a cannabinoid receptor-independent mechanism. Br J Pharmacol 144 (8): 1032-6, 2005. [PUBMED Abstract]

12.Torres S, Lorente M, Rodríguez-Fornés F, et al.: A combined preclinical therapy of cannabinoids and temozolomide against glioma. Mol Cancer Ther 10 (1): 90-103, 2011. [PUBMED Abstract]

13.Vara D, Salazar M, Olea-Herrero N, et al.: Anti-tumoral action of cannabinoids on hepatocellular carcinoma: role of AMPK-dependent activation of autophagy. Cell Death Differ 18 (7): 1099-111, 2011. [PUBMED Abstract]

14.Preet A, Qamri Z, Nasser MW, et al.: Cannabinoid receptors, CB1 and CB2, as novel targets for inhibition of non-small cell lung cancer growth and metastasis. Cancer Prev Res (Phila) 4 (1): 65-75, 2011. [PUBMED Abstract]

15.Nasser MW, Qamri Z, Deol YS, et al.: Crosstalk between chemokine receptor CXCR4 and cannabinoid receptor CB2 in modulating breast cancer growth and invasion. PLoS One 6 (9): e23901, 2011. [PUBMED Abstract]

16.Preet A, Ganju RK, Groopman JE: Delta9-Tetrahydrocannabinol inhibits epithelial growth factor-induced lung cancer cell migration in vitro as well as its growth and metastasis in vivo. Oncogene 27 (3): 339-46, 2008. [PUBMED Abstract]

17.Zhu LX, Sharma S, Stolina M, et al.: Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol inhibits antitumor immunity by a CB2 receptor-mediated, cytokine-dependent pathway. J Immunol 165 (1): 373-80, 2000. [PUBMED Abstract]

18.McKallip RJ, Nagarkatti M, Nagarkatti PS: Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol enhances breast cancer growth and metastasis by suppression of the antitumor immune response. J Immunol 174 (6): 3281-9, 2005. [PUBMED Abstract]

19.Massa F, Marsicano G, Hermann H, et al.: The endogenous cannabinoid system protects against colonic inflammation. J Clin Invest 113 (8): 1202-9, 2004. [PUBMED Abstract]

20.Patsos HA, Hicks DJ, Greenhough A, et al.: Cannabinoids and cancer: potential for colorectal cancer therapy. Biochem Soc Trans 33 (Pt 4): 712-4, 2005. [PUBMED Abstract]

21.Liu WM, Fowler DW, Dalgleish AG: Cannabis-derived substances in cancer therapy--an emerging anti-inflammatory role for the cannabinoids. Curr Clin Pharmacol 5 (4): 281-7, 2010. [PUBMED Abstract]

22.Malfitano AM, Ciaglia E, Gangemi G, et al.: Update on the endocannabinoid system as an anticancer target. Expert Opin Ther Targets 15 (3): 297-308, 2011. [PUBMED Abstract]

23.Sarfaraz S, Adhami VM, Syed DN, et al.: Cannabinoids for cancer treatment: progress and promise. Cancer Res 68 (2): 339-42, 2008. [PUBMED Abstract]

24.Mechoulam R, Berry EM, Avraham Y, et al.: Endocannabinoids, feeding and suckling--from our perspective. Int J Obes (Lond) 30 (Suppl 1): S24-8, 2006. [PUBMED Abstract]

25.Fride E, Bregman T, Kirkham TC: Endocannabinoids and food intake: newborn suckling and appetite regulation in adulthood. Exp Biol Med (Maywood) 230 (4): 225-34, 2005. [PUBMED Abstract]

26.Walker JM, Hohmann AG, Martin WJ, et al.: The neurobiology of cannabinoid analgesia. Life Sci 65 (6-7): 665-73, 1999. [PUBMED Abstract]

27.Meng ID, Manning BH, Martin WJ, et al.: An analgesia circuit activated by cannabinoids. Nature 395 (6700): 381-3, 1998. [PUBMED Abstract]

28.Walker JM, Huang SM, Strangman NM, et al.: Pain modulation by release of the endogenous cannabinoid anandamide. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 96 (21): 12198-203, 1999. [PUBMED Abstract]

29.Facci L, Dal Toso R, Romanello S, et al.: Mast cells express a peripheral cannabinoid receptor with differential sensitivity to anandamide and palmitoylethanolamide. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 92 (8): 3376-80, 1995. [PUBMED Abstract]

30.Ibrahim MM, Porreca F, Lai J, et al.: CB2 cannabinoid receptor activation produces antinociception by stimulating peripheral release of endogenous opioids. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102 (8): 3093-8, 2005. [PUBMED Abstract]

31.Richardson JD, Kilo S, Hargreaves KM: Cannabinoids reduce hyperalgesia and inflammation via interaction with peripheral CB1 receptors. Pain 75 (1): 111-9, 1998. [PUBMED Abstract]

http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/cam/cannabis/healthprofessional/page4

Cannabidiol inhibits lung cancer cell invasion and metastasis via intercellular adhesion molecule-1

Robert Ramer*, Katharina Bublitz*, Nadine Freimuth*, Jutta Merkord*, Helga Rohde*, Maria Haustein*, Philipp Borchert*, Ellen Schmuhl*, Michael Linnebacher† and Burkhard Hinz*,1

+ Author Affiliations

*Institute of Toxicology and Pharmacology and

†Section of Molecular Oncology and Immunotherapy, Department of General Surgery, University of Rostock, Rostock, Germany

↵1Correspondence: Institute of Toxicology and Pharmacology, University of Rostock, Schillingallee 70, D-18057 Rostock, Germany. E-mail: burkhard.hinz@med.uni-rostock.de

Abstract

Cannabinoids inhibit cancer cell invasion via increasing tissue inhibitor of matrix metalloproteinases-1 (TIMP-1). This study investigates the role of intercellular adhesion molecule-1 (ICAM-1) within this action. In the lung cancer cell lines A549, H358, and H460, cannabidiol (CBD; 0.001–3 μM) elicited concentration-dependent ICAM-1 up-regulation compared to vehicle via cannabinoid receptors, transient receptor potential vanilloid 1, and p42/44 mitogen-activated protein kinase. Up-regulation of ICAM-1 mRNA by CBD in A549 was 4-fold at 3 μM, with significant effects already evident at 0.01 μM. ICAM-1 induction became significant after 2 h, whereas significant TIMP-1 mRNA increases were observed only after 48 h. Inhibition of ICAM-1 by antibody or siRNA approaches reversed the anti-invasive and TIMP-1-upregulating action of CBD and the likewise ICAM-1-inducing cannabinoids Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol and R(+)-methanandamide when compared to isotype or nonsilencing siRNA controls. ICAM-1-dependent anti-invasive cannabinoid effects were confirmed in primary tumor cells from a lung cancer patient. In athymic nude mice, CBD elicited a 2.6- and 3.0-fold increase of ICAM-1 and TIMP-1 protein in A549 xenografts, as compared to vehicle-treated animals, and an antimetastatic effect that was fully reversed by a neutralizing antibody against ICAM-1 [% metastatic lung nodules vs. isotype control (100%): 47.7% for CBD + isotype antibody and 106.6% for CBD + ICAM-1 antibody]. Overall, our data indicate that cannabinoids induce ICAM-1, thereby conferring TIMP-1 induction and subsequent decreased cancer cell invasiveness.

—Ramer, R., Bublitz, K., Freimuth, N., Merkord, J., Rohde, H., Haustein, M., Borchert, P., Schmuhl, E., Linnebacher, M., Hinz, B. Cannabidiol inhibits lung cancer cell invasion and metastasis via intercellular adhesion molecule-1. cannabinoids tissue inhibitor of metalloproteinases-1 experimental metastasis ICAM-1 Received October 17, 2011. Accepted December 5, 2011.

http://www.fasebj.org/content/early/2011/12/21/fj.11-198184.abstract

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22198381

Cannabis in Palliative Medicine: Improving Care and Reducing Opioid-Related Morbidity

Published online before print March 28, 2011, J HOSP PALLIAT CARE August 2011 vol. 28 no. 5 297-303

http://ajh.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/26/1049909111402318.abstract

http://ajh.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/04/07/1049909111402318

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21444324

Cannabis in Palliative Medicine: Improving Care and Reducing Opioid-Related Morbidity

Gregory T. Carter, MD, MS Hospice Services, Providence Medical Group, Olympia, WA, USA, gtcarter@uw.edu Aaron M. Flanagan, MD Providence Medical Group, Olympia, WA, USA Mitchell Earleywine, PhD Department of Psychology, University at Albany State University of New York, Albany, NY, USA Donald I. Abrams, MD University of California, San Francisco, CA, USA Sunil K. Aggarwal, MD, PhD Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, The Rusk Institute of Rehabilitation Medicine, New York University, USA Lester Grinspoon, MD Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, USA, Massachusetts Mental Health Center, Boston, MA, USA

Abstract

Unlike hospice, long-term drug safety is an important issue in palliative medicine. Opioids may produce significant morbidity. Cannabis is a safer alternative with broad applicability for palliative care. Yet the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) classifies cannabis as Schedule I (dangerous, without medical uses). Dronabinol, a Schedule III prescription drug, is 100% tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the most psychoactive ingredient in cannabis. Cannabis contains 20% THC or less but has other therapeutic cannabinoids, all working together to produce therapeutic effects. As palliative medicine grows, so does the need to reclassify cannabis. This article provides an evidence-based overview and comparison of cannabis and opioids. Using this foundation, an argument is made for reclassifying cannabis in the context of improving palliative care and reducing opioid-related morbidity.

cannabis medical marijuana opioids hospice chronic pain palliative medicine

http://ajh.sagepub.com/content/28/5/297

Published online ahead of print August 30, 2010 CMAJ 10.1503/cmaj.091414

Smoked cannabis for chronic neuropathic pain: a randomized controlled trial

Abstract

Background: Chronic neuropathic pain affects 1%–2% of the adult population and is often refractory to standard pharmacologic treatment. Patients with chronic pain have reported using smoked cannabis to relieve pain, improve sleep and improve mood.

Methods: Adults with post-traumatic or postsurgical neuropathic pain were randomly assigned to receive cannabis at four potencies (0%, 2.5%, 6% and 9.4% tetrahydrocannabinol) over four 14-day periods in a crossover trial. Participants inhaled a single 25-mg dose through a pipe three times daily for the first five days in each cycle, followed by a nine-day washout period. Daily average pain intensity was measured using an 11-point numeric rating scale. We recorded effects on mood, sleep and quality of life, as well as adverse events.

Results: We recruited 23 participants (mean age 45.4 [standard deviation 12.3] years, 12 women [52%]), of whom 21 completed the trial. The average daily pain intensity, measured on the 11-point numeric rating scale, was lower on the prespecified primary contrast of 9.4% v. 0% tetrahydrocannabinol (5.4 v. 6.1, respectively; difference = 0.7, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.02–1.4). Preparations with intermediate potency yielded intermediate but nonsignificant degrees of relief. Participants receiving 9.4% tetrahydrocannabinol reported improved ability to fall asleep (easier, p = 0.001; faster, p < 0.001; more drowsy, p = 0.003) and improved quality of sleep (less wakefulness, p = 0.01) relative to 0% tetrahydrocannabinol. We found no differences in mood or quality of life. The most common drug-related adverse events during the period when participants received 9.4% tetrahydrocannabinol were headache, dry eyes, burning sensation in areas of neuropathic pain, dizziness, numbness and cough.

Conclusion:: A single inhalation of 25 mg of 9.4% tetrahydrocannabinol herbal cannabis three times daily for five days reduced the intensity of pain, improved sleep and was well tolerated. Further long-term safety and efficacy studies are indicated. (International Standard Randomised Controlled Trial Register no. ISRCTN68314063)

Conclusion

Our results support the claim that smoked cannabis reduces pain, improves mood and helps sleep. We believe that our trial provides a methodological approach that may be considered for further research. Clinical studies using inhaled delivery systems, such as vaporizers,32,33 are needed.

http://www.cmaj.ca/content/182/14/E694.abstract

http://www.cmaj.ca/content/early/2010/08/30/cmaj.091414.full.pdf

http://www.cmaj.ca/content/182/14/E694.full

Cases J. 2009; 2: 7487.

Published online 2009 May 18

Standardized natural product cannabis in pain management and observations at a Canadian compassion society: a case report

Cases J. 2009; 2: 7487. Published online 2009 May 18. doi: 10.1186/1757-1626-2-7487 PMCID: PMC2740265

Standardized natural product cannabis in pain management and observations at a Canadian compassion society: a case report

A Paul Hornby,1 Manju Sharma,2 and Bree Stegman3 1Department of Medial Cannabis Research, The Green Cross Society of BC, 2127 Kingsway, Vancouver, B.C., V5N 2T4, Canada 2Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Heather Pavilion, Vancouver General Hospital, Vancouver, B.C., Canada 3Canadian Registered Nurses Association of B.C., Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, 2755 Arbutus Street, Vancouver, B.C., Canada Corresponding author. A Paul Hornby: paul@hedron.ca ; Manju Sharma: manjusharma49@gmail.com ; Bree Stegman: breestegman@hotmail.com

Received November 5, 2008; Accepted February 13, 2009.

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

This article has been cited by other articles in PMC.

Abstract

An adult Caucasian male with excruciating pains following multiple traumas was monitored, daily, over one year while managing chronic pain by self-administering quantifiable amounts of natural cannabis. Tetrahydrocannabinol, Cannabidiol, and Cannabinol were all measured in tinctures, capsules, smoke-able product plus some baked goods, prior to their administration. By allowing standardization, the subject was able to develop a daily regimen of pain management that was resistant to a battery of most patent analgesics.

snip...

Conclusions

The case reported here represents one of many observed at the Green Cross Society. With 70% of the members treating chronic pain the same phenomenon is observed over and over that people achieve a significant degree of pain management using standardized natural product cannabis. Often a better quality of life is attained with cannabis use only, or in conjunction with reduced opiate consumption. The subject in this study is nearly one year using only natural product cannabis plus supplements for his severe pain. He recently went through yet another two surgeries to back and hand using only cannabis for post-operative pain.

The roughly 4000 members of the Green Cross Society find similar benefit from standardized natural product cannabis medicine. To follow, will be publication of the Society's demographic data regarding use for various conditions such as arthritis, fybromyalgia, HIV/AIDS, and chronic pain, to name a few. A breakdown of the illnesses, what strains (cannabinoid profiles) is most effective, and at what dosages will be published at a later time.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2740265/?report=abstract

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2740265/

RESEARCH PAPER

Effect of D9-tetrahydrocannabinol, a cannabinoid receptor agonist, on the triggering of transient lower oesophageal sphincter relaxations in dogs and humans

H Beaumont1, J Jensen2, A Carlsson2, M Ruth3, A Lehmann2 and GE Boeckxstaens1,4 1Academic Medical Centre, Department of Gastroenterology and Hepatology, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2AstraZeneca R&D, Integrative Pharmacology, Mölndal, Sweden 3Discovery Medicine, Mölndal, Sweden, and 4University Hospital Leuven, Catholic University of Leuven, Department of Gastroenterology, Leuven, Belgium

Background and purpose: Transient lower oesophageal sphincter relaxations (TLESRs) are the main mechanism underlying gastro-oesophageal reflux and are a potential pharmacological treatment target. We evaluated the effect of the CB1/CB2 receptor agonist D9-tetrahydrocannabinol (D9-THC) on TLESRs in dogs. Based on these findings, the effect of D9-THC was studied in healthy volunteers.

Experimental approach: In dogs, manometry was used to evaluate the effect of D9-THC in the presence and absence of the CB1 receptor antagonist SR141716A on TLESRs induced by gastric distension. Secondly, the effect of 10 and 20 mg D9-THC was studied in 18 healthy volunteers in a placebo-controlled study. Manometry was performed before and for 3 h after meal ingestion on three occasions.

Key results: In dogs, D9-THC dose-dependently inhibited TLESRs and reduced acid reflux rate. SR141716A significantly reversed the effects of D9-THC on TLESRs. Similarly, in healthy volunteers, D9-THC significantly reduced the number of TLESRs and caused a non-significant reduction of acid reflux episodes in the first postprandial hour. In addition, lower oesophageal sphincter pressure and swallowing were significantly reduced by D9-THC. After intake of 20 mg, half of the subjects experienced nausea and vomiting leading to premature termination of the study. Other side-effects were hypotension, tachycardia and central effects. Conclusions and implications: D9-THC significantly inhibited the increase in meal-induced TLESRs and reduced spontaneous swallowing in both dogs and humans. In humans, D9-THC significantly reduced basal lower oesophageal sphincter pressure. These findings confirm previous observations in dogs and indicate that cannabinoid receptors are also involved in the triggering of TLESRs in humans.

snip...

In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that D9-THC significantly inhibits the increase in TLESRs evoked by meal ingestion and reduces spontaneous swallowing in both dogs and humans. Furthermore, D9-THC reduces basal LES pressure in humans. These findings confirm previous findings in dogs and indicate that CB receptors are also involved in the triggering of TLESRs in humans.

British Journal of Pharmacology (2009) 156, 153–162; doi:10.1111/j.1476-5381.2008.00010.x; published online 5 December 2008

Keywords: gastro-oesophageal reflux disease; cannabinoid; transient lower oesophageal sphincter relaxation; D9-tetrahydrocannabinol

Abbreviations: GERD, gastro-oesophageal reflux disease; LES, lower oesophageal sphincter; TLESRs, transient lower oesophageal sphincter relaxations; CB, cannabinoid; D9-THC, D9-tetrahydrocannabinol; DMN, dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus; NTS, nucleus tractus solitarius; PPIs, proton pump inhibitors

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1476-5381.2008.00010.x/abstract

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1476-5381.2008.00010.x/pdf

J Neurosci. 2007 Sep 5;27(36):9537-44.

Nonpsychoactive cannabidiol prevents prion accumulation and protects neurons against prion toxicity.

Dirikoc S, Priola SA, Marella M, Zsürger N, Chabry J.

Institut de Pharmacologie Moléculaire et Cellulaire, Unité Mixte de Recherche 6097, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 06560 Valbonne, France.

Abstract

Prion diseases are transmissible neurodegenerative disorders characterized by the accumulation in the CNS of the protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres), a structurally misfolded isoform of its physiological counterpart PrPsen. Both neuropathogenesis and prion infectivity are related to PrPres formation. Here, we report that the nonpsychoactive cannabis constituent cannabidiol (CBD) inhibited PrPres accumulation in both mouse and sheep scrapie-infected cells, whereas other structurally related cannabinoid analogs were either weak inhibitors or noninhibitory. Moreover, after intraperitoneal infection with murine scrapie, peripheral injection of CBD limited cerebral accumulation of PrPres and significantly increased the survival time of infected mice. Mechanistically, CBD did not appear to inhibit PrPres accumulation via direct interactions with PrP, destabilization of PrPres aggregates, or alteration of the expression level or subcellular localization of PrPsen. However, CBD did inhibit the neurotoxic effects of PrPres and affected PrPres-induced microglial cell migration in a concentration-dependent manner. Our results suggest that CBD may protect neurons against the multiple molecular and cellular factors involved in the different steps of the neurodegenerative process, which takes place during prion infection. When combined with its ability to target the brain and its lack of toxic side effects, CBD may represent a promising new anti-prion drug.

http://www.jneurosci.org/content/27/36/9537.abstract

http://www.jneurosci.org/content/27/36/9537.full

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17804615

Drugs: 9 July 2010 - Volume 70 - Issue 10 - pp 1245-1254 doi: 10.2165/11537930-000000000-00000 Review Articles Pharmacological Management of Pain in Patients with Multiple Sclerosis

Solaro, Claudio1; Messmer Uccelli, Michele2

Abstract

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is an inflammatory, demyelinating, autoimmune disease of the CNS. There are currently a number of disease-modifying medications for MS that modulate or suppress the immune system; however, these medications do not directly relieve MS symptoms, which include visual deficits, gait problems, sensory deficits, weakness, tremor, spasticity and pain, among others.

Pain is a common symptom in MS which has recently been estimated to be experienced by more than 40% of patients. Nociceptive pain occurs as an appropriate physiological response transmitted to a conscious level when nociceptors in bone, muscle or any body tissue are activated, warning the organism of tissue damage. Neuropathic pain is initiated as a direct consequence of a lesion or disease affecting the somatosensory system, with no physiological advantage. Nociceptive and neuropathic pain in MS may be present concurrently and at different stages of the disease, and may be associated with other symptoms. Central neuropathic pain has been reported to be among the most common pain syndromes in MS. It is described as constant, often spontaneous, burning occurring more frequently in the lower limbs. Treatment typically includes tricyclic antidepressants and antiepileptic medications, although studies have been conducted in relatively small samples and optimal dosing has not been confirmed. Cannabinoids have been among the few treatments studied in well designed, randomized, placebo-controlled trials for central neuropathic pain. In the largest of these trials, which included 630 subjects, a 15-week comparison between Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol and placebo was performed. More patients receiving active treatment perceived an improvement in pain than those receiving placebo, although approximately 20% of subjects reported worsening of pain while on active treatment.

Trigeminal neuralgia, while affecting less than 5% of patients with MS, is the most studied pain syndrome. The pain can be extreme and is typically treated with carbamazepine, although adverse effects can mimic an MS exacerbation. Painful topic spasms occur in approximately 11% of the MS population and are treated with antispasticity medications such as baclofen and benzodiazepines. Gabapentin has also demonstrated efficacy, but all studies have included small sample sizes.

In general, evidence for treating pain in MS is limited. Many clinical features of pain are often unrecognized by clinicians and are difficult for patients to describe. Treatment is often based on anecdotal reports and clinical experience. We present a review of treatment options for pain in MS, which should serve to update current knowledge, highlight shortcomings in clinical research and provide indications towards achieving evidence-based treatment of pain in MS.

http://adisonline.com/drugs/pages/articleviewer.aspx?year=2010&issue=70100&article=00003&type=abstract

Cannabinoids control spasticity and tremor in a multiple sclerosis model

David Baker1, Gareth Pryce1, J. Ludovic Croxford1, Peter Brown2, Roger G. Pertwee3, John W. Huffman4 & Lorna Layward

Neuroinflammation Group, Department of Neurochemistry, Institute of Neurology, University College London, 1 Wakefield Street, London WC1N 1PJ and the Institute of Ophthalmology, UCL, London EC1V 9EL, UK

The Medical Research Council Human Movement and Balance Unit, National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery , Queen Square, London, WC1N 3BG, UK

Department of Biomedical Sciences, Institute of Medical Sciences, University of Aberdeen, Foresterhill , Aberdeen AB25 2ZD, UK

Department of Chemistry, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina 29634-1905 , USA

Multiple Sclerosis Society of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , 25 Effie Road, London SW6 1EE, UK Correspondence to: Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to D.B. (e-mail: Email: D.Baker@ion.ucl.ac.uk).

Abstract

Chronic relapsing experimental allergic encephalomyelitis (CREAE) is an autoimmune model of multiple sclerosis1. Although both these diseases are typified by relapsing-remitting paralytic episodes, after CREAE induction by sensitization to myelin antigens1 Biozzi ABH mice also develop spasticity and tremor. These symptoms also occur during multiple sclerosis and are difficult to control. This has prompted some patients to find alternative medicines, and to perceive benefit from cannabis use2. Although this benefit has been backed up by small clinical studies, mainly with non-quantifiable outcomes3, 4, 5, 6, 7, the value of cannabis use in multiple sclerosis remains anecdotal. Here we show that cannabinoid (CB) receptor agonism using R(+)-WIN 55,212, 9-tetrahydrocannabinol, methanandamide and JWH-133 (ref. 8) quantitatively ameliorated both tremor and spasticity in diseased mice. The exacerbation of these signs after antagonism of the CB1 and CB2 receptors, notably the CB1 receptor, using SR141716A and SR144528 (ref. 8) indicate that the endogenous cannabinoid system may be tonically active in the control of tremor and spasticity. This provides a rationale for patients' indications of the therapeutic potential of cannabis in the control of the symptoms of multiple sclerosis2, and provides a means of evaluating more selective cannabinoids in the future.

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v404/n6773/full/404084a0.html

Association Between Marijuana Exposure and Pulmonary Function Over 20 Years

Mark J. Pletcher, MD, MPH; Eric Vittinghoff, PhD; Ravi Kalhan, MD, MS; Joshua Richman, MD, PhD; Monika Safford, MD; Stephen Sidney, MD, MPH; Feng Lin, MS; Stefan Kertesz, MD

[+] Author Affiliations

Author Affiliations: Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics (Drs Pletcher and Vittinghoff and Mr Lin) and Division of General Internal Medicine, Department of Medicine (Dr Pletcher), University of California, San Francisco; Asthma-COPD Program, Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine, Chicago, Illinois (Dr Kalhan); Department of Surgery (Dr Richman) and Division of Preventive Medicine (Drs Safford and Kertesz), University of Alabama at Birmingham; Center for Surgical, Medical and Acute Care Research and Transitions, Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Birmingham (Drs Richman and Kertesz); and Division of Research, Kaiser Permanente of Northern California, Oakland (Dr Sidney). Abstract Context Marijuana smoke contains many of the same constituents as tobacco smoke, but whether it has similar adverse effects on pulmonary function is unclear.

Objective To analyze associations between marijuana (both current and lifetime exposure) and pulmonary function.

Design, Setting, and Participants The Coronary Artery Risk Development in Young Adults (CARDIA) study, a longitudinal study collecting repeated measurements of pulmonary function and smoking over 20 years (March 26, 1985-August 19, 2006) in a cohort of 5115 men and women in 4 US cities. Mixed linear modeling was used to account for individual age-based trajectories of pulmonary function and other covariates including tobacco use, which was analyzed in parallel as a positive control. Lifetime exposure to marijuana joints was expressed in joint-years, with 1 joint-year of exposure equivalent to smoking 365 joints or filled pipe bowls.

Main Outcome Measures Forced expiratory volume in the first second of expiration (FEV1) and forced vital capacity (FVC).

Results Marijuana exposure was nearly as common as tobacco exposure but was mostly light (median, 2-3 episodes per month). Tobacco exposure, both current and lifetime, was linearly associated with lower FEV1 and FVC. In contrast, the association between marijuana exposure and pulmonary function was nonlinear (P < .001): at low levels of exposure, FEV1 increased by 13 mL/joint-year (95% CI, 6.4 to 20; P < .001) and FVC by 20 mL/joint-year (95% CI, 12 to 27; P < .001), but at higher levels of exposure, these associations leveled or even reversed. The slope for FEV1 was −2.2 mL/joint-year (95% CI, −4.6 to 0.3; P = .08) at more than 10 joint-years and −3.2 mL per marijuana smoking episode/mo (95% CI, −5.8 to −0.6; P = .02) at more than 20 episodes/mo. With very heavy marijuana use, the net association with FEV1 was not significantly different from baseline, and the net association with FVC remained significantly greater than baseline (eg, at 20 joint-years, 76 mL [95% CI, 34 to 117]; P < .001).

Conclusion Occasional and low cumulative marijuana use was not associated with adverse effects on pulmonary function.

KEYWORDS: FORCED EXPIRATORY VOLUME,

LUNG VOLUME MEASUREMENTS,

MARIJUANA SMOKING,

RESPIRATORY FUNCTION TESTS,

SMOKING,

SUBSTANCE-RELATED DISORDERS,

TOBACCO,

VITAL CAPACITY.

http://jama.ama-assn.org/content/307/2/173.short

bottom line, big brother and pharmaceutical companies i.e. $$$ i.e. Washington. ...

TSS

OIG VULNERABILITIES IN FDA’S OVER SIGHT OF STATE FOOD FACILITY INSPECTIONS

2011-12-16T13:07:00.000-08:00

FDA faulted over state inspections

(Ric Feld/ASSOCIATED PRESS) - A 2009 salmonella outbreak linked to a Georgia peanut plant occurred after several state inspections.

Published: December 14

The Food and Drug Administration is relying more often on states to inspect food plants but is failing to properly monitor those state inspections or follow through on their findings, the Department of Health and Human Services watchdog has concluded.

In a report released Wednesday, the department’s inspector general found that a lack of resources is forcing the FDA to lean more heavily on its counterparts at the state level to inspect plants responsible for everything from packing to processing foods.

More than half the agency’s inspections were done by state officials in fiscal 2009, up from 42 percent four years earlier, according to the report. If these inspections are not done properly, they can expose consumers to sometimes life-threatening illnesses.

A deadly salmonella outbreak linked to a Georgia peanut processing plant in 2009 occurred after the plant had been inspected several times by state officials working on the FDA’s behalf. The incident prompted Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-Conn.) to ask Inspector General Daniel Levinson to examine the FDA’s oversight of its state partners.

Wednesday’s report confirms several weaknesses in that relationship, almost all of which the FDA acknowledged were indeed problems. “The report documents glitches we’re aware of. . . . These are things we are working on,” said Mike Taylor, the FDA’s deputy commissioner for foods.

The report found that the FDA has failed to ensure that the states have completed the number of inspections assigned to them. Of the 41 states the FDA was working with in 2009, eight did not complete 10 percent of the 2,170 inspections they were responsible for that year. The agency paid for 130 of the inspections that were not done.

The report did not specify how much was paid in those instances. But it did state that the FDA spent more than $8 million for state contract inspections in fiscal 2009.

The FDA also did not do its part in monitoring the inspections as required by law, according to the report.

Each year, the FDA has to audit at least 7 percent of a state’s inspections. That means that an FDA official must tag along to observe a state inspector’s performance and identify any systemic issues — such as problems that consistently emerge in multiple audits. But the agency failed to complete the required audits in 14 states, and therefore can’t determine the effectiveness of those state inspections, the report said.

“FDA officials generally attributed their inability to complete the required number of audits to a lack of resources,” the report said. An official in one of the FDA’s 14 districts said his district ran out of travel funds. Another said his district lacked trained auditors.

Even in cases where recurring problems were identified, the problems were not always addressed. Corrective action was taken in only four of the 10 states where systemic problems were found, the report said.

When audits were conducted, the most common problem cited had to do with the state inspectors’ inability to identify violations. At least 32 percent of the 419 inspectors audited had at least one deficiency. The report cited instances in which inspectors failed to note evidence of rodents or a leaky roof above exposed food.

Even when inspectors noted food safety violations, FDA officials who reviewed the inspectors’ reports did not properfly classify all of them, the report said. Officials responsible for 11 states said they did not classify some incidents as serious and in need of official action because they thought they were not allowed to, the report said.

Officials in another 11 states said that FDA was not always notified when actions were taken and therefore could not determine if the violations were properly addressed.

“Taken together, these findings demonstrate that more needs to be done to protect public health and to ensure that contract inspections are effective,” the report concluded.

Aside from the resource issues, FDA officials told investigators that the agency relies heavily on the states in part because states have more enforcement power than the federal government. For instance, state officials can sometimes instantly shut down a plant or seize unsafe food, whereas FDA cannot achieve the same instant results.

DeLauro, the congresswoman who requested the report, said that it “illustrates a vicious cycle of woefully inadequate oversight. It is clear to me that more must be done to ensure that federal inspection and oversight of food facilities best protects the public health.”

The Food Safety Modernization Act, adopted by the previous Congress, would grant the FDA more authority. But it would also demand that the agency take on more inspections and work more with the states to keep the food supply safe.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/2011/12/14/gIQAqBrtuO_story.html

Department of Health and Human Services

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

VULNERABILITIES IN FDA’S OVER SIGHT OF STATE FOOD FACILITY INSPECTIONS

Daniel R. Levinson Inspector General December 2011 OEI-02-09-00430

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OBJECTIVES

1. To determine the extent to which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enters into contracts with States to inspect food facilities.

2. To determine the extent to which FDA ensures that States complete the inspections required by their contracts.

3. To determine whether FDA ensures that State inspections are properly classified and violations are remedied.

4. To determine the extent to which FDA audits State inspections and addresses deficiencies identified by audits.

BACKGROUND

Each year, 128,000 Americans are hospitalized and 3,000 die after consuming contaminated foods and beverages. FDA is responsible for safeguarding the Nation’s food supply and for routinely inspecting food facilities. In addition to conducting its own inspections, FDA relies on State agencies to conduct inspections on its behalf; however, in recent years, concerns have been raised about the rigor of these State inspections. For example, the peanut processing plant responsible for a 2009 salmonella outbreak was inspected multiple times by a State agency working on behalf of FDA. This outbreak resulted in one of the largest food recalls in U.S. history and has led to serious questions about the effectiveness of State food facility inspections. Because of concerns about food facility inspections conducted by State agencies, this review was requested by the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies.

FDA often enters into contracts with State agencies responsible for ensuring food safety. Each contract includes the number of food facility inspections the State will conduct for FDA and the amount the State will be paid for each inspection. During the 2009 contract year, FDA held contracts with 41 States to conduct FDA’s inspections.

FDA oversees State inspections though its Contract Inspection Audit Program. The audit program is designed to verify that States conduct inspections that satisfy the requirements of their contracts. FDA requires that a minimum of 7 percent of a State’s contract inspections be audited each year. This minimum percentage—which is known as the minimum audit rate—ensures that States are conducting adequate inspections that meet the conditions of the contract.

We based this study on several sources of data: (1) FDA’s inspection data, (2) FDA’s documentation of contract inspections and payment data, (3) audit and corrective action documentation, and (4) structured interviews with FDA officials.

FINDINGS

FDA has increasingly relied on States to inspect food facilities. Although the number of food facilties inspected by FDA has decreased since 2004, the number of facilities inspected by States under contract to FDA has increased significantly. In fiscal year (FY) 2009, 59 percent of FDA’s food inspections were conducted by State inspectors, compared to only 42 percent in FY 2004.

In eight States, FDA failed to ensure that the required number of inspections was completed; FDA paid for many inspections that were incomplete. These 8 States were responsible for completing a total of 2,170 inspections; however, these States failed to complete 10 percent of these inspections during the contract year. When States fail to complete the inspections required in their contracts, FDA’s ability to identify facilities with potentially serious food safety violations is diminished. Also, FDA paid for 130 of the 221 inspections that were not completed. In four additional States, FDA paid for inspection visits, even though payment for such visits was not specified in the States’ contracts. FDA did not ensure that all State inspections were properly classified and that all violations were remedied. FDA officials responsible for 11 of 41 States were unclear about how to properly classify contract inspections. In these 11 States, FDA officials reported that they would not assign official action indicated classifications to State inspections under any circumstances, contrary to FDA guidance. If FDA does not correctly classify inspections that reveal serious violations, its ability to assess facilities’ relative risk is impaired. Additionally, FDA officials responsible for another 11 States reported that when States were responsible for correcting violations, FDA was not always informed about actions taken by the States. As a result, FDA was unable to ensure that serious violations had been adequately addressed.

FDA failed to complete the required number of audits for one-third of the States and did not always follow up on systemic problems identified. For 14 of 41 States with contracts, FDA did not complete the required number of audits and therefore failed to meet its minimum audit rate. Additionally, the audits in 10 States revealed systemic problems that needed to be corrected; however, FDA initiated corrective action in only 4 of the 10 States. If FDA does not follow its guidance and complete the required number of audits and address systemic problems, it cannot verify that States are conducting suitable inspections that satisfy the requirements of the contracts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Our report identified significant weaknesses in FDA’s oversight of food facility inspections conducted by States. Taken together, the findings demonstrate that more needs to be done to protect public health and to ensure that contract inspections are effective and prevent outbreaks of foodborne illness. Therefore, we recommend that FDA:

Ensure that all contract inspections are completed, properly documented, and appropriately paid for.

Ensure that contract inspections are properly classified in accordance with FDA guidance.

Ensure that all inspection violations are remedied by routinely tracking all actions taken to correct violations.

Ensure that the minimum audit rate is met in all States.

Address any systemic problems identified by audits.

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL RESPONSE

FDA concurred with four of our recommendations and agreed in part with the fifth.

In response to our first recommendation, to ensure that all contract inspections are completed, properly documented, and appropriately paid for, FDA concurred, stating that it is conducting a systematic review of the State contracting program.

In response to our second recommendation, to ensure that contract inspections are properly classified, FDA concurred and noted that it is revising its directive to emphasize more clearly that classifications must be accurate, timely, and uniform.

In response to our third recommendation, to ensure that all inspection violations are remedied by routinely tracking all actions taken to correct violations, FDA agreed to track most violative inspections and the remedies taken by industry. However, FDA noted that certain violations may not be suitable for inspection followup and that other approaches may be used to track such violations. While we appreciate FDA’s commitment to track certain violations, we encourage it to track all violations, even those that do not warrant followup inspections. FDA can use violation information to help establish the relative risk of facilities and determine how often they should be inspected. In response to our fourth recommendation, to ensure that the minimum audit rate is met in all States, FDA concurred, noting that it is reviewing the current reporting requirements to ensure that audits are completed and tracked to verify compliance with FDA requirements.

Finally, in response to our fifth recommendation, to address any systemic problems identified by audits, FDA concurred and noted that it will continue to develop processes and procedures to ensure that systemic problems are identified and that corrective action plans are implemented.

We support FDA’s efforts to strengthen State contract inspections and address the issues identified in the report. With the implementation of the Manufactured Food Regulatory Program Standards, FDA’s oversight of State inspections is even more critical. As States adopt the standards, it is essential that FDA strengthen not only States’ oversight but also its own oversight to ensure that States conduct high-quality food facility inspections.

snip...

Identifying Inspection Violations

During an inspection, State inspectors may identify potential violations of food safety laws and regulations. These violations are recorded in the inspection report. Based on the inspection report, FDA generally assigns one of three classifications: official action indicated (OAI), voluntary action indicated (VAI), or no action indicated (NAI).10 An OAI classification signifies that the inspector found objectionable conditions in the food facility and that these violations potentially “warrant regulatory action.”11 This type of violation is the most significant identified by inspectors. A VAI classification signifies that the inspector found violations that are serious enough to record but do not cross “the threshold for regulatory action.”12 An NAI classification signifies that the inspector found either no violations of law and regulations or violations that were so insignificant that no action is warranted.13

snip...

http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-09-00430.pdf

PLEASE NOTE, FDA LAST BSE MAD COW FEED REPORT WAS ALMOST A YEAR AGO (they use to come out weekly, then monthly, then quarterly, now I guess only yearly) ;

2011

January 13, 2011 January 2011 Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE

http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm239959.htm

Monday, January 17, 2011

MAD COW Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE January 13, 2011

snip...

Subject: BSE FEED VIOLATIONS UPDATE From 01/01/2009 To 06/10/2009

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 06/06/2009 Search by: Last BSE Insp Date From 01/01/2009 To 06/10/2009 Sort by: FDA District, State, Firm Name

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

ATL-DO 3007582627 Hoffner Brothers Dairy 610 Ketchie Rd Mount Ulla NC 28125-9685 OPR FR, OF, OT NP 02/03/2009 VAI Y

CIN-DO 3002766655 Lester J Stutzman Feed Mill 2811 Mt Zion Rd Marion KY 42064 OPR DR, FR, NL, OF DP 01/05/2009 VAI Y

CIN-DO 3003407434 Direct Action Co Inc 6668 Old SR 39 NW Dover OH 44622 OPR DR, NL, OT HP 05/04/2009 VAI Y

KAN-DO 1000050408 Mid-South Milling Co Inc 213 Central Ave Kansas City KS 66118-1117 OPR OT, PB, TH HP 01/14/2009 VAI N

KAN-DO 3007495971 Midwest Bulk Inc 3404 N Emporia St Wichita KS 67219-3615 OPR TH DP 02/26/2009 VAI Y

KAN-DO 3007458821 Murray Grain Co Inc 900 E 21st St N Ste 201 Wichita KS 67214-1406 OPR TH DP 02/26/2009 VAI Y

KAN-DO 3006292356 Orscheln Farm & Home 1702 W 11th St Coffeyville KS 67337-3115 OPR DR DP 02/02/2009 VAI Y

LOS-DO 2027094 Nestle, USA/ Nestle Prepared Foods Company 9601 Canoga Ave Chatsworth CA 91311-4115 OPR HF HP 05/26/2009 VAI N

NYK-DO 1310558 Birkett Mills 1 Main St Penn Yan NY 14527-1615 OPR DR, HF, NL NP 01/11/2009 RTS Y

Data reported as of: 06/06/2009 Search by: Last BSE Insp Date From 01/01/2003 To 06/10/2009 and Last BSE District Decision = OAI Sort by: FDA District, State, Firm Name

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

KAN-DO 1927975 Hahn & Phillips Grease Co Inc 913 N Odell, PO Box 130 Marshall MO 65340 OPR NL, PB, TH HP 12/22/2008 OAI Y

Legend - Opr.Status:OPR=Operational, SEA=Seasonal, PRP=Pre-Production, Firm Type: AF=Animal Feed/Pet Food Salvager, DR=Distributor/Retailer, FL=Feed Mill (FDA Licensed), FR=Feeder of Ruminants, HF=Human Food Processor, NL=Feed Mill (not FDA Licensed), OF=On-farm Feed Mixer, OT=Other, PB=Protein Blender, PF=Pet Food Manufacturer, RE=Renderer, RO=Feeder of Ruminants and Other Species, TH=Transporter (Hauler), Prgm Risk:DP=Only Distributes Prohib.Mat.(DP), HP=Handles Prohibited Materials(HP), NP=Does not handle Prohib.Mat.(NP), Dist Dcsn:OAI=Official Action Indicated (OAI), VAI=Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), NAI=No Action Indicated (NAI), RTS=Referred to State (RTS),

http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/BSEInspect/bse_excel.jsp

February 6, 2004

To help prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE through feed in the United States, FDA implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, became effective on August 4, 1997.

This is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed (BSE) regulation. FDA's CVM has assembled data from the inspections that have been conducted AND whose final inspection report has been recorded in the FDA's inspection database as of January 23, 2004. As of January 23, 2004, FDA had received over 26,000 inspection reports. The majority of these inspections (around 70%) were conducted by State officials under contract to FDA, with the remainder conducted by FDA officials.

Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented

A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, (here called the Ruminant Feed Ban) became effective on August 4, 1997. Ruminant Feed Ban provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.

A NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions.

The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually exclusive.

http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm048448.htm

Greetings,

THERE were 100s of NAI's, but you get the just. also, please note ;

“A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, (here called the Ruminant Feed Ban) became effective on August 4, 1997. Ruminant Feed Ban provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds. “

PLEASE note, most of the VAIs DID handle feed for ruminant animals. sure would be nice to be able to read the complete report, on a single page, for each violation, on a single day, given once a week, at a simple url, like it use to be. here is an example ;

snip...

please see my full report here ;

Monday, January 17, 2011

MAD COW Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE January 13, 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/01/mad-cow-update-on-feed-enforcement.html

Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation

(g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)

http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html

P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf

North Dakota Firm Recalls Whole Beef Head Products That Contain Prohibited Materials

Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-023-2010 HEALTH RISK: LOW

Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Catherine Cochran

WASHINGTON, April 5, 2010 - North American Bison Co-Op, a New Rockford, N.D., establishment is recalling approximately 25,000 pounds of whole beef heads containing tongues that may not have had the tonsils completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) announced today.

Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.

The product subject to recall includes: Various weight cases of "Beef Heads KEEP FROZEN." Each case bears the establishment number "EST. 18859" inside the USDA mark of inspection and a case code number "16999." "North Dakota Natural Beef" is printed in the bottom left-hand corner of each label.

The recalled products were produced between June 25, 2009, and February 19, 2010. These products were shipped to distribution centers in Md., Mich., and Minn. for further sale.

The problem was discovered during FSIS inspection activities at the establishment. FSIS routinely conducts recall effectiveness checks to verify recalling firms notify their customers of the recall and that steps are taken to make certain that the product is no longer available to consumers.

Media with questions about the recall should contact Philip Wicke, Vice President of Operations, at (701) 356-7723. Consumers with questions about the recall should contact Jeremy Anderson, Director of Customer Service, at (952) 545-2495.

Consumers with food safety questions can "Ask Karen," the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_023_2010_Release/index.asp

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/missouri-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Friday, August 8, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/08/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Saturday, April 5, 2008

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/consumption-of-beef-tongue-human-bse.html

Sunday, October 18, 2009

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html

Thursday, October 15, 2009

Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

NEW URL

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html

Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

and all this was confirmed here ;

C O N F I R M E D

----- Original Message -----

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To:

Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM

Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

Thursday, November 12, 2009

BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html

Monday, March 1, 2010

ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html

Monday, April 5, 2010

Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html

Saturday, July 23, 2011

CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/07/cattle-heads-with-tonsils-beef-tongues.html

Saturday, November 6, 2010

TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/11/tafs1-position-paper-on-position-paper.html

Archive Number 20101206.4364 Published Date 06-DEC-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 2010 (11)

PRION DISEASE UPDATE 2010 (11)

http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=20101206.4364

Monday, October 10, 2011

EFSA Journal 2011 The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

snip...

EFSA and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) recently delivered a scientific opinion on any possible epidemiological or molecular association between TSEs in animals and humans (EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) and ECDC, 2011). This opinion confirmed Classical BSE prions as the only TSE agents demonstrated to be zoonotic so far but the possibility that a small proportion of human cases so far classified as "sporadic" CJD are of zoonotic origin could not be excluded. Moreover, transmission experiments to non-human primates suggest that some TSE agents in addition to Classical BSE prions in cattle (namely L-type Atypical BSE, Classical BSE in sheep, transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and chronic wasting disease (CWD) agents) might have zoonotic potential.

snip...

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/pub/e991.htm?emt=1

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/e991.pdf

see follow-up here about North America BSE Mad Cow TSE prion risk factors, and the ever emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in many species here in the USA, including humans.

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) Prion Disease, aka mad cow disease, are emerging in more ways than one, and the risk factors there from are very disturbing. The TSE Prion disease has morphed into many different strains, and in some cases, with Co-occurrence of multiple Prion Protein Types in one recipient. There are now many more strains of BSE aka Mad Cow Disease, what are termed 'atypical' BSE. atypical BSE is more virulent than the typical UK c-BSE. L-BSE, H-BSE, along with the U.K. C-BSE, have all been documented in North America (IBNC prion disease in cattle has not been documented in North America to date), along with two different strains of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in deer and elk (documented to date), and many typical strains of Scrapie in sheep and goat, with the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie documented and spreading in North America. Over time, all these different TSE prion disease have been rendered and fed back to food producing animals here in the USA. The August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban in the USA was nothing more than ink on paper. The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) aka mad cow disease surveillance program of the USA was terrible flawed (see GAO, OIG reports), and the BSE testing program was just as flawed, and this all a proven fact. With the mad cow feed ban having not been enforceable, 100s and 100s of TONS of banned MBM went on to be fed to USA cattle a decade after the August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary feed ban for BSE was inked on paper. Today, the USA has no idea (in my opinion), just how bad the BSE aka mad cow disease really is. However, the USA has more documented TSE prion disease in different species in the wild, than any other country, all rendered and fed back to food producing animals for man and animal. sporadic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease in humans, with unknown pathology is rising in the USA and Canada. I urge Science to move forward, leaving the politics behind $$$

Monday, October 10, 2011 EFSA Journal 2011

The European Response to BSE: A Success Story

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/10/efsa-journal-2011-european-response-to.html

Monday, September 26, 2011

L-BSE BASE prion and atypical sporadic CJD

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/09/l-bse-base-prion-and-atypical-sporadic.html

Saturday, June 25, 2011

Transmissibility of BSE-L and Cattle-Adapted TME Prion Strain to Cynomolgus Macaque

"BSE-L in North America may have existed for decades"

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/transmissibility-of-bse-l-and-cattle.html

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

snip...

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

Sunday, June 26, 2011

Risk Analysis of Low-Dose Prion Exposures in Cynomolgus Macaque

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/06/risk-analysis-of-low-dose-prion.html

PRICE OF MAD COW TSE PRION POKER GOES UP $$$

Saturday, December 3, 2011

Isolation of Prion with BSE Properties from Farmed Goat

Volume 17, Number 12—December 2011

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/12/isolation-of-prion-with-bse-properties.html

Saturday, November 19, 2011

Novel Prion Protein in BSE-affected Cattle, Switzerland

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2011/11/novel-prion-protein-in-bse-affected.html

Friday, October 28, 2011

CVM Issues Animal Feed Safety System (AFSS) (BSE) Overview October 28 2011

CVM Issues Animal Feed Safety System (AFSS) Overview

Document -

snip...

Historically, FDA’s feed program has focused on specific safety issues, such as unsafe tissue residues resulting from feeding of medicated feeds, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), and Salmonella, but has not addressed feed safety in a comprehensive manner. A comprehensive feed safety program is intended to help identify feed hazards and their potential sources and to enable establishments and FDA to prevent or eliminate the occurrence of unacceptable feed risks from those hazards.

snip...

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalFeedSafetySystemAFSS/UCM277673.pdf

i about choked when i read about the _historically_ part. in truth, FDA historically failed in the BSE mad cow protein feed ban and SRM removal, along with the BSE surveillance program.

strange, i wrote and sent this off earlier today. ...tss

----- Original Message -----

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

To: stephanie.yao@fda.hhs.gov

Sent: Friday, October 28, 2011 1:35 PM

Subject: BSE AKA MAD COW FEED ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES reports ???

Hello Ms. Yao Ma'am and FDA et al,

A kind and warm greetings from Bacliff, Texas.

I have been following the mad cow saga here in the USA, pretty much since it started here in the USA. I lost my mother to the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, an exceedingly rare strain of the sporadic CJD's. as a layperson, i never accepted the myth that 85%+ of all human TSE i.e. the sporadic CJD was just a happenstance of bad luck, a spontaneous happening, no source, no route. just bad luck. i am sorry, i just could never accept that.

anyway Ma'am, I am wondering why there have been NO reports on the Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE since January 12, 2011 ?

http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/ComplianceEnforcement/BovineSpongiformEncephalopathy/ucm117662.htm

SNIP...

SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2011/10/cvm-issues-animal-feed-safety-system.html

Monday, April 12, 2010

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison says NO to safer food and S. 510 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009

http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/2010/04/senator-kay-bailey-hutchison-says-no-to.html

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/

http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/

http://nor-98.blogspot.com/

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/

http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/

TSS

Food safety for whom? Corporate wealth versus people's health

2011-05-10T18:30:00.000-07:00

Food safety for whom? Corporate wealth versus people's health

GRAIN, May 2011

snip...

School children in the US were served 200,000 kilos of meat contaminated with a deadly antibiotic-resistant bacteria before the nation's second largest meat packer issued a recall in 2009. A year earlier, six babies died and 300,000 others got horribly sick with kidney problems in China when one of the country's top dairy producers knowingly allowed an industrial chemical into its milk supply. Across the world, people are getting sick and dying from food like never before. Governments and corporations are responding with all kinds of rules and regulations, but few have anything to do with public health. The trade agreements, laws and private standards used to impose their version of "food safety" only entrench corporate food systems that make us sick and devastate those that truly feed and care for people, those based on biodiversity, traditional knowledge, and local markets. People are resisting, whether its movements against GMOs in Benin and "mad cow" beef in Korea or campaigns to defend street hawkers in India and raw milk in Colombia. The question of who defines "food safety" is increasingly central to the struggle over the future of food and agriculture.

The growing global menace

Food should be a source of health, not harm. But food can maim, cripple, and kill. The leading cause of food poisoning in the United Kingdom today is Campylobacter, a tiny bacterium, rife throughout the country's chicken supply, that causes in humans diarrhoea, fever, abdominal pain and cramping, and in some cases chronic, even life-threatening, conditions. People get it from touching raw poultry or eating undercooked birds. Some 85% of the chicken population in the UK may be infected. In the United States, the top culprits these days are Norovirus, mostly transmitted from dirty hands, and Salmonella, contracted from eating food with faeces on it. Norovirus will give you acute vomiting and diarrhoea, while Salmonella causes vomiting, fever and cramps

snip...

Graph: Data compiled by GRAIN from government and UN sources, 2008-2010 (except Australia=2005)

Among the more notorious food safety incidents in recent years was the melamine scandal in China in 2008. Six babies died and 300,000 others got horribly sick with kidney problems when the industrial chemical melamine got into the commercial milk distribution circuit. There was also a dioxin scandal in Germany in January 2011, where the German authorities shut down more than 4,000 farms after it was discovered that a German company had sold 200,000 tonnes of dioxin-tainted animal feed, which had subsequently entered the food chain. Dioxins are cancer-causing poisons formed in the burning of waste and other industrial processes. 1

How bad is the problem globally? Believe it or not, there are no global statistics or tracking mechanisms on food safety incidents worldwide; reliable data on their frequency and impact are grossly inadequate. Nevertheless, the available data do show that food poisoning is quite common in most countries (see Graph 1). 2 According to the Singaporean authorities, who run a pretty tight food hygiene system, roughly 1.5 billion people worldwide are affected by food-borne disease outbreaks each year, resulting in 3 million deaths. 3

The price of this food safety mess is huge. The UK puts the annual costs to the British economy at US$1.92 billion, which its Food Standards Agency bluntly calls "too much". Australia's annual bill is US$1.23 billion. The World Health Organisation says that the annual cost to Vietnam is US$210 million. In the US, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) has long given the figure of US$35 million per year, but a new study released by the Pew Charitable Trusts at Georgetown University in 2010 puts the figure astronomically higher, at US$152 billion. 4

Food safety in the Fast Food Nation

Does US-style production represent the future of global food? Possibly. Certainly, elite Western opinion shapers and policymakers – the editors of The Economist, the directors of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, certain key elements in the Obama administration – think it should. So it is worthwhile to consider how the US food safety regime has responded to the dilemmas of scale in recent years.

In an industrialised, highly consolidated food system geared to maximising profit by selling vast volumes of cheap food, pressure exists at every phase of the production chain to cut costs by cutting corners, including safe food practices. Moreover, the very scale of modern food production means that seemingly isolated lapses can become quite grave, subjecting millions of people to danger based on the actions of a single production facility.

The case of Peanut Corp. of America demonstrates the perils of scale. Until recently, the company ran two plants: one in Texas, one in Georgia. These two facilities processed 2.5% of the peanuts produced in the United States, and sold "peanut paste" to the entire US processed food industry. By late 2007, the company had evidently given up trying to maintain hygienic conditions at its facilities. In late 2008, people started coming down with salmonella from a dizzying array of products containing Peanut Corp.'s paste, prompting the FDA to initiate a "voluntary recall". By the time all was said and done, the recall affected no fewer than 1,800 supermarket brands. The tainted products killed nine people and officially sickened around 700 – half of them children – in 46 US states. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reckons that for every reported case of salmonella, another 38 cases go unreported – so the real number of people made ill from the output of just two facilities may be up to 26,000. In the wake of the fiasco, US journalists showed that the FDA had "outsourced" inspection of the Georgia plant to state authorities, and then ignored the state inspectors' findings of atrocious hygiene practices. Moreover, it turned out that the company's own testing had found salmonella in huge batches of peanut paste, which it proceeded to send out anyway. i

In another incident in 2009, a company called Beef Packers, owned by transnational agribusiness giant Cargill, had to declare two "voluntary recalls" involving over 500 tonnes of ground beef infected with antibiotic-resistant salmonella. ii The USDA announced that consuming the suspect meat could cause "treatment failure" iii – that is, death – because of its ability to withstand drugs. At least 39 people in 11 states reported getting sick, and more than 200,000 thousand kilos of the tainted meat was served to school children through the National School Lunch program. iv

The official response to such incidents has been minimal. In January 2011, a hotly debated piece of legislation called the Food Safety Modernisation Act was signed into being. The intention of the original Bill was to update and inject some resources into the US food safety system. It basically called for more inspections, gave the government authority to mandate food recalls, and provided some traceability to an otherwise fairly unregulated industrial sector. Who would oppose such a move? The fat cats from the food industry, you might think – the Cargills and the Tysons, who don't want to be controlled. But you would be wrong. The new rules would hardly affect them.

According to an analysis by the US NGO Food & Water Watch, nothing in the Act would have prevented the Peanut Company of America from sending out its tainted paste. Worse, the rules would not even touch the meat sector, the biggest source of food-borne illness in the United States. v The main opponents of the bill throughout the debate were small family farm activists who, because of the way the bill was framed, saw themselves falling under these controls when they are not the problem. So instead of instigating real food safety reform in a country where one out of four people gets sick and 5,000 people die from eating contaminated food each year, the law might do next to nothing.

In the absence of stricter public action around food safety, corporations have moved to fill the void -- sometimes to tragicomic effect. A case in point: in the mid-2000s, a company called Beef Products Inc. had an ingenious idea: it would buy slaughterhouse scraps – which are extremely likely to be infected by bacterial pathogens – from large-scale beef processors at cut-rate prices. It would purée those parts into a paste, which it would then mix with ammonia to kill bacterial pathogens. It would sell the product back the the beef industry as a cheap filler for ground beef, with the added feature that the ammonia in the paste would sterilise the ground beef it was mixed with. The beef industry had found a "solution" to the problem of bacterial pathogens in ground beef! The product, known in the industry as "pink slime" for its distinctive look, could be found in 70% of hamburgers consumed in the United States by the end of the decade. The USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service, which oversees meat safety, applauded -- it recognised "pink slime" as safe without requiring testing, on the grounds that it had been sterilised by ammonia. But in 2009, a New York Times exposé found that pink slime in fact tended to be ridden with pathogens -- and was actively adding to the pathogen load of the ground beef it was mixed with. Beef Products Inc. responded by merely upping the ammonia dose for its mix. To this day, the product remains widely used in the vast US ground beef market, including at fast-food chains nationwide. vi

If the official US response to highly visible manifestations of food poisoning, like Salmonella-tainted meat and peanut butter, has been underwhelming and industry-friendly, then the response to low-level exposure to pathogens that cause cumulative damage has been virtually non-existent. The first kind causes spectacular, impossible-to-ignore symptoms like vomiting and diarrhoea; the second entails subtle, easy-to-ignore ones that can cause significant long-term damage. Corporate-led food safety regimes like the one in the United States have to at least gesture at the first kind; the second kind, not so much.

It turns out that the USDA's Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), which oversees the safety of the US meat supply, routinely endorses meat that it knows to be tainted with residues of "veterinary drugs, pesticides, and heavy metals", the USDA Inspector General revealed in a 2010 report. vii The damning report was met with silence by the US media – probably because small amounts of substances like heavy metals don't cause dramatic immediate symptoms, but rather hard-to-trace, slow-to-develop conditions like cancer. As the report puts it, the "effects of residue are generally chronic as opposed to acute, which means that they will occur over time, as an individual consumes small traces of the residue". In its report, the USDA Inspector General's office expressed confidence that the FSIS would redouble efforts to keep heavy metals and antibiotic traces out of the meat supply going forward. Yet it had expressed the same thing, after exposing the same problem, in its report two years earlier. viii

Another example is the US Food and Drug Administration's refusal to act on mounting evidence that Bisphenol A, an industrial compound found in many food containers, is an endocrine disrupter. If the food safety regime for spectacular pathogens could be described as porous, that for the second, more subtle, kind barely exists at all.

Written with contributions from Tom Philpott, senior writer on food and agriculture for Grist magazine.

i "Peanut Corp. Shipped Product After Finding Salmonella", Bloomberg News, 27 January 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aeXwqlMnIWU0;
and "Peanut Plant Had History of Health Lapses", New York Times, 26 January 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/health/27peanuts.html?_r=1&ref=health

ii "Antibiotic-resistant salmonella, school lunches, and Cargill's dodgy California beef plant", Grist, 10 December 2010, http://www.grist.org/article/2009-12-10-meat-wagon-cargill-salmonella/

iii "California Firm Recalls Ground Beef Products Due to Possible Salmonella Contamination", USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service, 9 December 2009,

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_065_2009_Release/index.asp

iv "Why a recall of tainted beef didn't include school lunches", USA Today, 2 December 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2009-12-01-beef-recall-lunches_N.htm

v Responsibility for food safety in the US is divided between two agencies. The US Department of Agriculture is responsible for meat, poultry and egg products, which accounts for 20% of the US food supply. The Food and Drug Administration, within the US Department of Health, takes care of the rest. The Food Safety Modernisation Act addresses only the work of the FDA. The top sources of food poisoning in the United States are, however, poultry, beef and leafy vegetables (in that order, 2007). See: "Can Congress make a food-safety omelette without breaking the wrong eggs? ", Grist, 25 October 2010.

vi "Safety of Beef Processing Method Is Questioned", New York Times, 30 December 2009,

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31meat.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss&pagewanted=all
; See also, "Lessons on the food system from the ammonia-hamburger fiasco", Grist, 5 January 2010, http://www.grist.org/article/2010-01-05-cheap-food-ammonia-burgers

vii "FSIS National Residue Program for Cattle", Office of the Inspector General, US Department of Agriculture, http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/24601-08-KC.pdf

viii "USDA Inspector General: meat supply routinely tainted with harmful residues", Grist, 15 April 2010: http://www.grist.org/

This is "food safety"?

Government and industry action on food safety gives little indication that they recognise any fundamental problem with industrial food production. Rarely do their regulations or standards hinder corporate practices in any significant way. On the contrary, they tend to reinforce the power of large industry while undermining, or even criminalising, small-scale production and local food cultures. Colombia, for instance, is in the process of implementing legislation to prevent the sale of raw milk in urban areas. Well over two million farmers and vendors depend for their livelihoods on these sales of raw milk, and around 20 million Colombians, most of them poor, depend on raw milk as an affordable and essential source of nutrition, easily made safe by boiling it at home. Hard pressed to justify its moves on public health grounds, the government says that the legislation is part of its commitment to the WTO, and that it will help to "modernise" the dairy sector, making it better able to compete with imports when a looming free trade agreement with the EU kicks in. 5

These days, in Colombia and elsewhere, "food safety" policy has little to do with public health or consumers. It has become a battleground among contesting interests, the site of power struggles for control over food and agriculture, with decisions being increasingly taken far from producers and consumers, in the obscure world of trade negotiations and multilateral agencies, where politics and commerce, not science and public health, are what drive things.

Consider the case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the fatal brain-wasting condition popularly known as mad cow disease. People get the human strain of it by eating the meat of cows that have been fed diseased animals as a cheap source of protein – a practice common in industrial feedlots since the 1970s. The US and Canada lost Japan, Korea and several other major export markets for beef when BSE was found in their herds in 2003, and have had a tough time regaining those markets because risks remain from their industries' feeding practices. 6 Indeed, in March 2011, a new case of BSE was identified in a Canadian cow. 7 But through constant pressure, particularly at the trade negotiating table, both countries have secured some concessions to allow certain parts of the cow, or the meat of younger animals, to cross borders freely. Both countries also went to the Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) in Paris, which has a similar role to Codex Alimentarius Commission in Rome but for the animal kingdom, to get their beef declared generally safe for consumption. Where does that leave Japan? Unmoved. It says that its standards are higher than those of the OIE or the US, and have to be given priority.

Beijing, for its part, has so far refused to budge. But that doesn't mean that Chinese consumers are getting ractopamine-free pork. The same government fighting off ractopamine-laced US pork, is aggressively pushing, in the name of "food safety", a consolidation and modernisation of the country's pig production based on the US factory farm model. China's two largest, vertically-integrated pork producers, Yurun and Shineway, both of whom have been heavily funded by the US bank Goldman Sachs, were implicated in recent food safety incidents involving ractopamine and clenbuterol (another banned drug added to pig feed for the same purposes). 8 In March 2011, Chinese consumers were shocked when a CCTV television report uncovered how ractopamine and clenbuterol are widely used in the farms supplying Shineway in Henan Province. 9 The report found that Shineway was actually offering farmers higher prices for pigs fed ractopamine. 10

Superbugs and megafarms

"Superbug" is a term used to describe bacteria that have acquired the ability to resist commonly used antibiotics. One of the most notorious is Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), which emerged in the 1960s in the UK and has since spread around the world, with deadly consequences. In the US alone, 17,000 people died from MRSA infection in 2005. i

MRSA is typically associated with hospitals, where the superbug has a tendency to get into open wounds and cause difficult-to-heal infections. But in recent years these superbugs have found another place to thrive: industrial pig farms. ii

In 2004, Dutch researchers identified a new strain of MRSA, later labelled ST398 or "pig MRSA", which they found in people in close contact with Dutch pig farms. Within two years ST398 become a leading source of human MRSA infection in the country, accounting for more than one in five human MRSA cases. Studies showed that these cases were closely related with pigs, and further research revealed that ST398 was running rampant in pigs on Dutch farms. A 2007 survey found ST398 in 39% of pigs and 81% of local piggeries. iii

New surveys of farms outside of the Netherlands have turned up similar numbers. iv The first ever EU-wide survey for MRSA on pig farms in 2009, using a method that "largely underestimates MRSA prevalence", found ST398 in more than two-thirds of EU member states. Spain and Germany had the highest incidence, with over 40% of pig holdings testing positive for MRSA. v Not surprisingly, given the European pig industry's heavy exports overseas, ST398 is turning up in pigs beyond Europe's borders, too. A study of pigs in the Canadian province of Ontario, for instance, found ST398 in a quarter of local pigs, as well as in one-fifth of the pig farmers tested. vi Only one study has been conducted in the US so far: it was a pilot study of two large hog operations in the midwest that found ST398 in 49% of the pigs and 45% of the workers. vii

MRSA has the potential to evolve in very dangerous ways in its new home on pig farms. The density of animals in factory farms allows the bacteria to evolve rapidly and in diverse ways. Also, the use of antibiotics on factory farms is ubiquitous. Pigs are routinely fed antibiotics in their feed and water, often as a preventive measure against disease outbreaks and even simply to increase growth rates.

In the US, 80% of all antibiotics consumed annually are consumed by livestock. viii In China, the figure is nearly 50%. ix Even in the EU, where the non-therapeutic use of antibiotics for animals is banned and where the types of antibiotics allowed for livestock are controlled, the use of antibiotics for animals still exceeds their use for humans. In Germany, for example, three times as many antibiotics are given to animals as to humans. x Such widespread use of antibiotics in factory farms speeds up the development of antibiotic resistance among bacteria. Unlike other strains of MRSA, ST398 can already withstand tetracyclines, a group of antibiotics that is given heavily and regularly to pigs in factory farms. The medical profession is getting increasingly worried about what this will mean for the future of human health care, as antibiotics may become useless. The WHO now calls it "the greatest threat to human health". xi

The good news, however, is that ST398 still hasn't shown much virulence in humans, nor is it easily transmitted between people. Not yet, at least.

In 2010, a 14-year-old girl in France, recovering in hospital from pneumonia, was infected with a superbug. She soon began having serious respiratory problems, her lungs started bleeding, and within six days she died. The superbug that killed her was a clone of MRSA ST398 that is known to circulate in humans. The most alarming issue for the French doctors studying the case was that this was the first incident on record in which this strain of MRSA had acquired the capacity to produce a lethal toxin in humans, something that certain other strains of superbugs are able to do. They reasoned that if the clone of MRSA ST398 could do it, then surely "pig MRSA" has the same capacity. xii

It is not much of a stretch to imagine a situation where "pig MRSA" passes from a pig to a farm worker carrying another MRSA strain with virulence to humans, mixes with that strain, and acquires its capacity for virulence. The new virulent strain of ST398 could then easily pass back into the pigs, where it would rapidly amplify and spread. ST398 is transmitted to humans not only through contact with live pigs: the bacteria is also present on meat sold in supermarkets and can be carried over large distances by the insects that pass in and out of farms. xiii

The EU is slowly starting to take action to defend against such a possibility. It has implemented several measures to restrict the use of antibiotics in livestock production and, at national and at EU level, some surveillance of farms is being carried out. In 2009, a panel of the European Food Safety Authority recommended that the EU move towards "systematic surveillance and monitoring of MRSA in intensively reared animals". South Korea, for its part, banned the use of seven antibiotics in animal feed in 2008, and implemented a national programme to reduce the use of antibiotics on livestock farms. But such restrictions on the use of antibiotics for livestock hardly exist in the US, although proposed legislation restricting the non-therapeutic use of certain antibiotics in feed is currently before Congress. As for surveillance, the US National Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring System doesn't even test for MRSA. xiv Outside the industrialised countries, where the meat industry is expanding most rapidly, there is an almost complete absence of controls on the use of antibiotics in agriculture and of surveillance for pathogens such as MRSA.

Enhancing surveillance and cutting back on the use of antibiotics in factory farms are important measures. But they aren't enough to deal effectively with the threat posed by MRSA and the myriad other pathogens that thrive in factory farms. A staggering 61% of all human pathogens, and 75% of new human pathogens, are transmitted by animals, with many of the most dangerous – such as bird flu, BSE, swine flu and the Nypah virus – having emerged from intensive livestock farms. xv It is the way that animals are farmed that is fundamentally at issue. xvi

i E. Klein, D.L. Smith, R. Laxminarayan, "Hospitalizations and Deaths Caused by Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, United States, 1999–2005", Emerg. Infect. Dis. Vol. 13, No. 12, 2007, pp. 1840–46.

ii Ed Yong, "MRSA in pigs and pig farmers", 23 January 2009,

http://scienceblogs.com/notrocketscience/2009/01/mrsa_in_pigs_and_pig_farmers.php

iii X.W. Huijsdens et al., "Community-acquired MRSA and pig-farming", Ann. Clin. Microbiol. Antimicrob., Vol. 5, No. 26, 2006; A.J. de Neeling et al., "High prevalence of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus in pigs", Vet. Microbiol., Vol. 122, No. 3–4, 21 June 2007, pp. 366–72; I. van Loo et al., "Emergence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus of animal origin in humans", Emerg. Infect. Dis., Vol. 13, No. 12, 2007, pp. 1834–9.

iv Danish Integrated Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and Research Programme, http://www.danmap.org/pdfFiles/Danmap_2009.pdf

v "Pig MRSA widespread in Europe", Ecologist, 25 November 2009; Broens et al., "Diagnostic validity of pooling environmental samples to determine the status of sow-herds for the presence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)", Poster presented at the ASM–ESCMID Conference on Methicillin-resistant Staphylococci, in Animals: Veterinary and Public Health Implications, London, 2009.

vi "Guelph Researchers Find MRSA in Pigs", University of Guelph, 8 November 2007, http://www.uoguelph.ca/news/2007/11/post_75.html.

vii T.C. Smith, M.J. Male, A.L. Harper, J.S. Kroeger, G.P. Tinkler et al., (2009) "Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Strain ST398 Is Present in Midwestern US Swine and Swine Workers", PLoS ONE, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2009.

viii See "New FDA Numbers Reveal Food Animals Consume Lion's Share of Antibiotics", Center for a Liveable Future, Johns Hopkins University, 23 December 2010,. http://www.livablefutureblog.com/2010/12/new-fda-numbers-reveal-food-animals-consume-lion%E2%80%99s-share-of-antibiotics
See also Margaret Mellon, Charles Benbrook, Karen Lutz Benbrook, "Hogging it!: Estimates of antimicrobial abuse in Livestock", Union of Concerned Scientists, 2001, http://www.ucsusa.org/

ix "Half of China's antibiotics fed to animals: expert", Xinhua, 26 November 2010.

x Kristen Kerksiek, "Farming out Antibiotics: The fast track to the post-antibiotic era", Infection Research, Germany, 22 March 2010,

http://www.infectionresearch.de/perspectives/detail/pressrelease/farming_out_antibiotics_the_fast_track_to_the_post_antibiotic_era/

xi AAP, "Greatest threat to human health", Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 2011, http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/wellbeing/greatest-threat-to-human-health-20110216-1awai.html

xii Frédéric Laurent, "Les souches de staphylococcus aureus ST398 sont-elles virulents", Bull. Acad. Vét. France, Vol. 163, No. 3, May 2010.

xiii See Aqeel Ahmad et al., "Insects in confined swine operations carry a large antibiotic resistant and potentially virulent enterococcal community", BMC Microbiology, 2011, http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2180/11/23/abstract

xiv Maryn McKenna, "Alarm over 'pig MRSA' – but not in the US", Wired, 30 October 2010, http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/10/alarm-over-pig-mrsa-%E2%80%94-but-not-in-the-us/

xv John McDermott and Delia Grace, "Agriculture-Associated diseases: Adapting Agriculture to improve Human Health", ILRI, February 2011.

xvi GRAIN, "Germ warfare: Livestock disease, public health and the military-industrial complex", Seedling, January 2008, http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=533

Food safety and global trade: Europe and the US impose their standards

snip...SEE FULL TEXT REPORT HERE ;

http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=222

Read the synopsis of this report here.

http://www.grain.org/m/?id=327

http://www.grain.org/front_files/GRAIN_Food_Safety_Synopsis_2011.pdf

Approximately 50.3 million pounds of the beef recalled by HallmarkWestland went to federal nutrition programs, including the National School Lunch Program, and of those 50.3 million pounds, about 19.6 million pounds had already been consumed at the time the recall was issued. Release No. 0054.08, USDA, Transcript of Technical Briefing - HallmarkWestland Meat Packing Company (Feb. 21, 2008).

9. HSUS members that consume meat products, including beef products, are concerned about eating adulterated meat products and the health risks associated with such adulterated meat. Specifically, they are concerned that downed cattle are at an increased risk for harboring and transmitting BSE prions and other pathogens. The consumption of meat products derived from BSE-infected cattle is believed to cause a human neurological disease known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ("vCJD"). The disease is progressive, invariably fatal, and there is no known effective treatment or cure. Downed cattle may also be at higher risk for harboring other foodborne transmissible pathogens, including E. coli 0157:H7, Salmonella, and anthrax. By allowing downed cattle to enter the food supply, USDA's regulatory loophole injures members of The HSUS by placing them at an increased risk of contracting these food-borne illnesses each time they eat beef.

10. Members of The HSUS are also concerned about the meat products provided to their children through the National School Lunch Program. More than 31 million school children receive lunches through the program each school day. To assist states in providing healthful, low-cost or free meals, USDA provides states with various commodities including ground beef.

As evidenced by the HallmarkWestland investigation and recall, the potential for downed animals to make their way into the National School Lunch Program is neither speculative nor hypothetical.

http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/FDA/hsus-v-schafer-usda-complaint.pdf

Sunday, May 01, 2011

STUDY OF ATYPICAL BSE 2010 Annual Report May 2011

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2011/05/study-of-atypical-bse-2010-annual.html

Monday, April 18, 2011

Multidrug-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus in US Meat and Poultry

http://staphmrsa.blogspot.com/2011/04/multidrug-resistant-staphylococcus.html

TSS

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison says NO to safer food and S. 510 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009

2010-04-12T13:22:00.000-07:00

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison says NO to safer food and S. 510 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009

----- Original Message -----

From: Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
To: flounder9@verizon.net
Sent: Monday, April 12, 2010 12:30 PM
Subject: Constituent Response From Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison

Dear Friend:

Thank you for contacting me regarding S. 510, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act of 2009. I welcome your thoughts and comments.

I believe that burdening our nation’s hardworking ranchers and farmers with excessive administrative fees, as well as cumbersome regulations, could adversely impact the agriculture community. Farmers and ranchers are stewards of the land. The agriculture they produce is their livelihood. The agriculture industry is a special and important part of the Texas way of life and must be protected. For that reason, I will not support any legislation that places bureaucratic and cumbersome regulations on our farmers and ranchers.

On March 3, 2009, Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) introduced S. 510, the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act. The bill amends the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) to expand the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) to regulate food, including by authorizing the Secretary to suspend the registration of a food facility. It requires each food facility to evaluate hazards and implement preventive controls. It also directs the Secretary to assess and collect fees related to: (1) food facility reinspection; (2) food recalls; and (3) the voluntary qualified importer program.

Currently, the bill has been placed on the Senate calendar for a later introduction date. Should this bill be brought for consideration before the full Senate, you may be certain I will keep your views in mind.

I appreciate hearing from you, and I hope that you will not hesitate to contact me on any issue that is important to you.

Sincerely, Kay Bailey Hutchison United States Senator

284 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510 202-224-5922 (tel) 202-224-0776 (fax) http://hutchison.senate.gov

======================END...TSS=================

MORE BSe from Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison ;

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON TEXAS

"United States Senate"

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4304

June 15, 2004

COMMITTEES:

APPROPRIATIONS

COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION

RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

VETERANS' AFFAIR;

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr.

PO Box 42

Bacliff, TX 77518-0042

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

Thank you for contacting me regarding bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease. I appreciate your views on this important issue.

I share your concerns regarding BSE and understand the serious impact the disease would have on our state's economy. With nearly fourteen million head of cattle, the Texas cattle industry represents nearly half of our state's agricultural community.

The quality of food in the U.S. is the highest in the world. We have some of the most stringent inspection laws, and no meat comes into the U.S. that is not up to our standards. Federal regulations in place for seventeen years have served to keep our food supply safe by prohibiting the importation of cattle from countries where BSE does exist.

The Senate Agriculture Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 2004 provides $783.8 million in funding for the Food Safety Inspection Service. This is an increase of more than $29 million from fiscal year 2003. I am currently working, as a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee, to ensure funding for food safety and inspections is sufficient, and as the Agriculture Appropriations bill come before the full Senate for a vote, I will monitor this matter closely. I will continue to work with Texas farmers and ranchers to make sure that we are doing all we can to prevent BSE and other livestock diseases from affecting U.S. consumers and producers.

I appreciate hearing from you and hope you will not hesitate to keep in touch on any issue of concern to you.

Kay Bailey Hutchison

KBH-ch =======

====================END...TSS=================

now, let's look at reality ;

North Dakota Firm Recalls Whole Beef Head Products That Contain Prohibited Materials

Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-023-2010 HEALTH RISK: LOW

Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Catherine Cochran

WASHINGTON, April 5, 2010 - North American Bison Co-Op, a New Rockford, N.D., establishment is recalling approximately 25,000 pounds of whole beef heads containing tongues that may not have had the tonsils completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) announced today.

Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.

The product subject to recall includes: Various weight cases of "Beef Heads KEEP FROZEN." Each case bears the establishment number "EST. 18859" inside the USDA mark of inspection and a case code number "16999." "North Dakota Natural Beef" is printed in the bottom left-hand corner of each label.

The recalled products were produced between June 25, 2009, and February 19, 2010. These products were shipped to distribution centers in Md., Mich., and Minn. for further sale.

The problem was discovered during FSIS inspection activities at the establishment. FSIS routinely conducts recall effectiveness checks to verify recalling firms notify their customers of the recall and that steps are taken to make certain that the product is no longer available to consumers.

Media with questions about the recall should contact Philip Wicke, Vice President of Operations, at (701) 356-7723. Consumers with questions about the recall should contact Jeremy Anderson, Director of Customer Service, at (952) 545-2495.

Consumers with food safety questions can "Ask Karen," the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/News_&_Events/Recall_023_2010_Release/index.asp

Thursday, June 26, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/missouri-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Friday, August 8, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/08/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Saturday, April 5, 2008

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/consumption-of-beef-tongue-human-bse.html

Sunday, October 18, 2009

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html

Thursday, October 15, 2009

Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

NEW URL

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html

Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

and all this was confirmed here ;

C O N F I R M E D

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM
Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

Thursday, November 12, 2009

BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html

Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html

Monday, March 1, 2010

ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html

Monday, April 5, 2010

Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html

The future public health threat of vCJD in the UK, Europe and potentially the rest of the world, is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed. ...

http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2003/9241545887.pdf

KEY WORK HERE IS 'DIVERSE'.

what does diverse mean ?

adjective

1.of a different kind, form, character, etc.; unlike: a wide range of diverse opinions.

2. of various kinds or forms; multiform.

1 : differing from one another : unlike

2 : composed of distinct or unlike elements or qualities

URGENT DATA ON ATYPICAL BSE RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS AND ANIMALS OIE REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE $

position: Post Doctoral Fellow Atypical BSE in Cattle

Closing date: December 24, 2009

Anticipated start date: January/February 2010

Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta

snip...

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2

Sunday, April 4, 2010

USDA AND OIE OUT OF TOUCH WITH RISK FACTOR ON ATYPICAL TSE

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/04/usda-and-oie-out-of-touch-with-risk.html

14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf

http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml

14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th

ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html

TSE

http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

snip...

I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.

Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards,

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA

END...TSS

I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html

Wednesday, February 10, 2010

NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html

Saturday, April 10, 2010

TOYOTA VS MAD COW DISEASE USA OIE BSE MRR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WARS

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/toyota-vs-mad-cow-disease-usa-oie-bse.html

March 29, 2010

CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER

http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8

>>> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<< http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html

YOU can be assured they are squirming behind closed doors, and that they are doing there best to squirm right out of this one. they will come up with something, international travel long ago, or some strange PRNP mutation that they might say like sporadic ffi ??? or a case of atypical case of inherited Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) ??? they will make up something. but it will be anything but BSE related here in the USA, in my opinion. sporadic FFI, or sporadic GSS, or sporadic inherited CJD is an oxymoron. it's either familial or not. or even this new novel human disease known as Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (PSPr), they might come up with that. if they cannot do this, it will be an occupational TSE infection, whether they want to admit it or not. and they don't admit those to often, they cover them up.

I suppose the Honorable Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison thinks that feeding DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE to children all across our Nation via the NSLP and the USDA, I guess she thinks this is just o.k., and exposing our children to the prion is an O.K. thing to do ;

'' I believe that burdening our nation’s hardworking ranchers and farmers with excessive administrative fees, as well as cumbersome regulations, could adversely impact the agriculture community. Farmers and ranchers are stewards of the land. The agriculture they produce is their livelihood. The agriculture industry is a special and important part of the Texas way of life and must be protected. For that reason, I will not support any legislation that places bureaucratic and cumbersome regulations on our farmers and ranchers. ''

FACT IS, OUR CHILDREN, AND THEIR PARENTS WILL NOT KNOW FOR YEARS, OR DECADES IF THEY WILL SUCCUMB TO A MAD COW TYPE DISEASE OR NOT, BUT WE KNOW THEY HAVE BEEN EXPOSED NOW ;

FNS All Regions Affected School Food Authorities By State United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service National School Lunch Program March 24, 2008 School Food Authorities Affected by Hallmark/Westland Meat Packing Co. Beef Recall February 2006 – February 2008

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fns/safety/Hallmark-Westland_byState.pdf

Approximately 50.3 million pounds of the beef recalled by HallmarkNVestland went to federal nutrition programs, including the National School Lunch Program, and of those 50.3 million pounds, about 19.6 million pounds had already been consumed at the time the recall was issued. Release No. 0054.08, USDA, Transcript of Technical Briefing - HallmarldWestland Meat Packing Company (Feb. 21, 2008). 9. HSUS members that consume meat products, including beef products, are concerned about eating adulterated meat products and the health risks associated with such adulterated meat. Specifically, they are concerned that downed cattle are at an increased risk for harboring and transmitting BSE prions and other pathogens. The consumption of meat products derived from BSE-infected cattle is believed to cause a human neurological disease known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease ("vCJD"). The disease is progressive, invariably fatal, and there is no known effective treatment or cure. Downed cattle may also be at higher risk for harboring other foodborne transmissible pathogens, including E. coli 0157:H7, Salmonella, and anthrax. By allowing downed cattle to enter the food supply, USDA's regulatory loophole injures members of The HSUS by placing them at an increased risk of contracting these food-borne illnesses each time they eat beef. 10.

Members of The HSUS are also concerned about the meat products provided to their children through the National School Lunch Program. More than 31 million school children receive lunches through the program each school day. To assist states in providing healthful, low-cost or free meals, USDA provides states with various commodities including ground beef. As evidenced by the HallmarkNVestland investigation and recall, the potential for downed animals to make their way into the National School Lunch Program is neither speculative nor hypothetical.

http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/FDA/hsus-v-schafer-usda-complaint.pdf

Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.

snip...

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...

http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

>>> In the papers, the government alleges the meatpacking plant slaughtered and processed downer cows for nearly four years — from January 2004 to September 2007 — at the average rate of one every six weeks...<<< http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/09/suit-meatpacker-used-downer-cows-for-4.html

"The alleged misrepresentations by Hallmark and Westland could have impacted the health of many of our nation’s most vulnerable citizens--our schoolchildren," said Tony West, Assistant Attorney General of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. "Our intervention in this case demonstrates how seriously we will pursue allegations such as these."

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/us-government-sues-westlandhallmark.html

Members of The HSUS are also concerned about the meat products provided to their children through the National School Lunch Program. More than 31 million school children receive lunches through the program each school day. To assist states in providing healthful, low-cost or free meals, USDA provides states with various commodities including ground beef. As evidenced by the HallmarkNVestland investigation and recall, the potential for downed animals to make their way into the National School Lunch Program is neither speculative nor hypothetical.

http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/FDA/hsus-v-schafer-usda-complaint.pdf

SEE IF ANY OF YOUR CHILDREN WERE EXPOSED TO THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR MAD COW DISEASE HERE ;

Beef - Westland/Hallmark Recall OF BEEF WITH DEADSTOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR BSE/TSE AKA MAD COW DISEASE

Additional Products Listing 5-20-08

http://www.cdph.ca.gov/pubsforms/Documents/fdb%20eru%20Hmrk%20Addl%20Prod052008.pdf

http://www.cdph.ca.gov/HEALTHINFO/Pages/FDB%20Beef-WestlandHallmarkRecall.aspx

TOTAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

http://www.cdph.ca.gov/pubsforms/Documents/fdb%20eru%20Hmrk%20All%20Dist042008.pdf

ADDITIONAL PRODUCTS CONTAINING RECALLED BEEF

http://www.cdph.ca.gov/pubsforms/Documents/fdb%20eru%20Hmrk%20Addl%20Prod052008.pdf

SEE FULL LIST OF ALL RECALLED SUSPECT DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW PRODUCTS HERE ;

http://www.cdph.ca.gov/HEALTHINFO/Pages/FDB%20Beef-WestlandHallmarkRecall.aspx

2008 - 2010

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;

5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html

my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd

IF ANY OF YOUR CHILDREN, and or your loved ones, go down with a mad cow type disease i.e. CJD and or the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy and or the PRION disease, either typical or atypical, just call up the Good Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison from Texas and thank her, because she said she did NOT want to BURDEN our Nation's hardworking Ranchers and Farmers $$$

'' I believe that burdening our nation’s hardworking ranchers and farmers with excessive administrative fees, as well as cumbersome regulations, could adversely impact the agriculture community. Farmers and ranchers are stewards of the land. The agriculture they produce is their livelihood. The agriculture industry is a special and important part of the Texas way of life and must be protected. For that reason, I will not support any legislation that places bureaucratic and cumbersome regulations on our farmers and ranchers. ''

Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
(bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf

-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;

(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/02/report-on-testing-ruminants-for-tses-in.html

Saturday, April 10, 2010

TOYOTA VS MAD COW DISEASE USA OIE BSE MRR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WARS

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/toyota-vs-mad-cow-disease-usa-oie-bse.html

Can you say TOYOTA. IT is a sad day when trade trumps human and animal health. as the case with the BSE MRR policy. Behind closed doors, the BSe spin machine is working i.e. Vilsack saying that 'The U.S. has had no cases in the last three years, and only three in two decades.' i can tell you with absolute certainty, that is only part of the story. i can tell you that in fact, the USDA BSE surveillance and testing have failed the consumer here in the USA, and abroad, and that we have been exposed to the TSE agent, i.e. USA atypical BSE, which laboratory studies show is more virulent. i can tell you with absolute certainty they infamous June 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program, where some 800,000+ cattle were tested over many years of testing, was fraught with fraud, and in short, a failed program, and proven to be so by the GAO and the OIG, where it was proven that some of the testing program was using perfectly healthy cattle in their BSE testing program. Where some 9,200+ BSE test on suspect questionable cattle, only the IHC test were used. THE IHC is the least likely test to find BSE. IT only tells you if that part of the tissue sample is in fact infected or not, but it does not tell you about the rest of the brain. By only using the IHC, you miss many cases (Detwiler et al 2003 BSE ROUNDTABLE). i can tell you with absolute certainty, that when pressed, the USDA et al will say that even if we are missing cases of BSE, that the BSE mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997, will stop BSE, but the ban was nothing more than ink on paper. This mad cow feed ban was only partial and voluntary. i can tell you with absolute certainty that in 2010, since 8/4/97, banned mad cow feed is in commerce here in the USA, BY THE TONS. i can tell you with absolute certainty, that when the BSE MRR policy was put in place, that this exposed everyone around the globe with the TSE agent, either by consumption and or friendly fire there from, and that decision was based NOT on science, but on trade. i can tell you with absolute certainty, that SINCE the USDA and the NSLP did in fact expose our children across the Nation with BSE via the NSLP USDA DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, that if they are capable of this, they are capable of exposing any person, in any country with the BSE TSE agent. North America has documented the so called typical c-BSE, l-BSE, and h-BSE. typical scrapie strains are rampant in the USA in sheep and goats, and the atypical Nor-98 scrapie is spreading, and CWD in deer and elk is spreading, with now documented a 2nd strain, and two strains of TME in mink. all this over the years have been fed back to food producing animals for animals and humans. Confucius ask, IF USA sheep Scrapie transmitted to USA cattle does not produce the same pathology as the U.K. c-BSE, why then would human CJD there from look like the U.K. nvCJD ??? what the USA has done defies all science and logic i.e. NO MAD COW DISEASE and or any human TSE there from. Either the BSE Mad Cow outbreak and human infection nvCJD there from, that happened in the U.K. was totally false, or the same thing is happening in the USA as we speak. sCJD of unknown phenotypes are rising in the USA. sporadic CJD is not a single strain, but multiple strains of unknown routes and sources of the TSE agent. IF the federal government can lie for almost a century about asbestos, and or tobacco, just to protect those two industry giants, i can guarantee you that they are doing it with mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. or just ask the Indians. ...TSS

full text ;

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/toyota-vs-mad-cow-disease-usa-oie-bse.html

stupid is, as stupid does, and you just can't fix stupid $$$

Still Disgusted in Sunny Bacliff, Texas

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

Establishing a Fully Integrated National Food Safety System with Strengthened Inspection, Laboratory and Response Capacity

2010-01-26T14:15:00.000-08:00

Draft 09/24/09

Establishing a Fully Integrated National Food Safety System with Strengthened Inspection, Laboratory and Response Capacity

Strategic Vision

Food safety is a core public health issue even though the U.S. food supply is among the safest in the world. With today’s far reaching and complex food supply chain, there is an increasing need to find more effective solutions to better protect American consumers by preventing intentional and unintentional food contamination. Food can become contaminated through many different vehicles at many different steps – at the source on the farm or in harvest water, in processing or distribution facilities, during transit, at retail and food service establishments, and in the home. In recent years, FDA, in cooperation with other food regulatory and public health agencies, has done a great deal to prevent both intentional and unintentional contamination of food at each of these steps. FDA has worked with other federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and foreign counterpart food safety regulatory and public health agencies, as well as with law enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies, and with industry, consumer groups, and academia to strengthen the nation’s food safety and food defense system.

This cooperation has resulted in greater awareness of potential vulnerabilities, the creation of more effective prevention programs, new surveillance systems, and the ability to respond more quickly to outbreaks of foodborne illness. However, changes in consumer dietary patterns, changes in industry practices, changes in the U.S. population, and an increasingly globalized food supply chain and new pathogens and other contaminants pose challenges that are requiring us to continually update our current food protection strategies.

Recognizing these challenges, President Obama has made a personal commitment to improving food safety. On July 7, 2009, the multiagency Food Safety Working Group (Working Group), which he established, issued its key findings on how to upgrade the food safety system for the 21st century. The Working Group recommends a new public-health-focused approach to food safety based on three core principles: prioritizing prevention, strengthening surveillance and enforcement, and improving response and recovery. Preventing harm to consumers is the top priority. Too often in the past, the food safety system has focused on reacting to problems rather than preventing harm in the first place. The Working Group recommends that food regulators shift towards prioritizing prevention and move aggressively to implement sensible measures to prevent problems before they occur.

At the Federal level, a number of Agencies are working together to coordinate their efforts and develop short- and long-term agendas to make food safer. As the federal regulatory agency responsible for most of the food supply, FDA1 is committed to ensuring that the U.S. food2 supply continues to be among the safest in the world. FDA has the responsibility of establishing enforceable standards to ensure the safety of the food the Agency regulates. These standards will reflect the prevention-oriented public health principles embraced by the Working Group. FDA will set new food

1FDA is the federal agency that is responsible for the food supply except for meat, poultry, and processed egg products, which are overseen by our partners at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 2 For purposes of this document, the term “food” includes human food, animal feed, components (i.e. ingredients) of both food and feed, and dietary supplements for humans, except as otherwise noted. Page 1

Draft 09/24/09

safety standards and review existing standards in light of what we have learned over the past decade with regard to prevention strategies. In addition, FDA will work with food industry to establish quantitative metrics for the controlling factors affecting food safety by incorporating appropriate measures of success. These metrics, or measures, will improve our ability to verify that certain measures or practices are being carried out and are effective.

This verification requires a systematic, integrated approach to effective risk control and enforcement strategies. Together with our federal and state, local, tribal and territorial partners, FDA will work to plan and implement an inspection and enforcement program to ensure high rates of compliance with the Agency’s food safety standards. By working with federal, state, territorial, tribal and local regulatory and public health partners, FDA will establish a fully integrated national food safety system, built on collaboration among all of these partners. The system will encompass inspections, laboratory testing, and response and will place priority on preventing foodborne illness, in both food for humans and animals, through the adoption and uniform application of model programs, such as the Manufactured Food and the Retail Food Regulatory Program Standards and other appropriate program standards. This collaboration will result in 1) better ability to assess potential risk at domestic food facilities and greater and more consistent inspectional coverage of these facilities across the entire food supply chain, 2) greater food surveillance through integration of food facility inspection and testing information, and 3) improved rapid response capacity and efficiency.

Under this system, FDA and federal, state, territorial, tribal and local regulatory agencies will conduct food facility inspections under the same set of standards. FDA will work with its regulatory partners to develop uniform national standards, including inspection, investigation, and testing protocols; training and certification requirements; establish program audit criteria; and create performance metrics to ensure program objectives are met. System integrity and credibility will be maintained through regular program oversight and accountability at all levels. Federal and state inspections will be conducted in accordance with a public health risk driven national work plan that FDA will develop with its regulatory partners. An integrated system will result in more coordinated response efforts to better respond to multi-state outbreaks when they occur.

To be fully successful, the national food safety system must be built with continuous input from FDA’s regulatory and public health partners. It must be sustained through multi-year funding that will be provided to state and local regulatory and public health partners to build the necessary state and local infrastructures, contain adequate legislative authorities to facilitate information sharing and communication among all partners, and include infrastructure for a national electronic information-sharing mechanism. These actions will result in a national food safety system that reduces foodborne illness, identifies sources of risk throughout the system, and reduces time to detect and respond to outbreaks. A public health driven, collaborative, and leveraged approach to food safety activities and responsibilities will be reflected in improved public sector resource utilization at a national level, which provides additional capacity for ensuring a safe and secure food supply.

Background

snip...see full text ;

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForFederalStateandLocalOfficials/UCM183650.pdf

http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalFeedSafetySystemAFSS/ucm196795.htm

http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm196822.htm

re-Establishing a Fully Integrated National Food Safety System with Strengthened Inspection, Laboratory and Response Capacity

WHERE did it say they were going to test all cattle for BSE or any strain of TSE ?

WHAT about the August 4, 1997 MAD COW FEED BAN, that never was ?

THE tonnage of suspect tainted mad cow feed in the U.S.A. over the past decade, well, since August 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban is phenomenal, it is absurd, it is astronomical, and for this reason, and past reasons, North America should test all cattle for TSE. I say all North America for the following reason ;

The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf

Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html

C O N F I R M E D

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM
Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html

Thursday, November 12, 2009

BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html

CVM Annual Report Fiscal Year 2008: October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008

PUTTING LIPSTICK ON A PIG AND TAKING HER TO A DANCE...TSS

BSE Feed Rule Enforcement: A Decade of Success OFF TO A FAST START

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html

Sunday, January 17, 2010

BSE USA feed inspection violations 01/01/2009 to 01/17/2010 FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/bse-usa-feed-inspection-violations.html

A band aid approach, to something that needs a tourniquet, like irradiation, and or ammonia, or whatever, same thing, your masking the problem, and in the end, will make it worse, the industry will become more complacent. see below, you can run just the numbers I picked up over the years. i'm talking 100s and 100s of tonnage of mad cow feed. I even remember the token purina mad cow feed mill in Gonzales Texas back in 2001. where the FDA spouted out that ;

''FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.''

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html

you can take that with how ever many grains of salt you wish, but i read that as saying, it was only 5 1/2 grams, and the old cow ways 600 pounds, so know way that even if the feed was tainted, there was not enough to cause disease. the fda, usda et al, knew at that exact moment when they wrote that statement, they knew then that the 5 1/2 grams was enough to kill a small herd of cows. it was old science. but again, they chose to deceive. THIS WAS 2001, and it's now 2009, and they still are choosing to deceive, and the new administration appears willing to continue the USA mad cow charade. NOW, since the charade at the purina mill in 2001, i am going to list a few figures of suspect, banned mad cow feed that went out into commerce, even in 2008, 2007, 2006, back a few years, and you can compare, what enormous amounts of banned suspect mad cow feed and other products continue to go out. when you consider, and they knew all along, that .005 grams is lethal, my God, how much of this poison was consumed?

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

snip...SEE ALL THAT I FOUND HERE ;

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html

WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.

P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study "BSE in primates" supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).

http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf

look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005

http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa

Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose

It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose

levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf

2

6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the

dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf

Re: BSE .1 GRAM LETHAL NEW STUDY SAYS via W.H.O. Dr Maura Ricketts

[BBC radio 4 FARM news]

http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm

2) Infectious dose:

To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)

http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml

Tuesday, January 19, 2010

CVM's OR Develops New PCR-Based Method for Testing Animal Feed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/cvms-or-develops-new-pcr-based-method.html

NOW that we have established that this infamous part of the USA BSE MAD COW TRIPLE FIRE WALL was a farce, let's look further into the historical myth of no mad cows in the USA (well, they estimate at 1 in a million slip by into the food system), but i dispute that by many more. The BSE surveillance program was/is terribly flawed as well.

bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;

PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE

Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM

"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."

PAUL BROWN CDC ET AL COMMENT TO THE MEDIA ON THIS ISSUE ;

"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end

http://www.upi.com/

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/09/japans-new-leaders-seen-tougher-on-us.html

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html

Statement on Texas cow with central nervous system symptoms

Main Category: Public Health Article

Date: 05 May 2004 - 0:00 PDT

The Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.

FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.

FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.

Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).

FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.

To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.

Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.

FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.

Source: FDA http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html

http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/ucm092863.htm

Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html

That Texas mad cow (not that first one documented that was cover-up for good, the stumbling and stagering one that went straight to the render, and did not pass go, not that one), but the second one that sat on the shelf for 8 months before finally an act of Congress it took to confirm and many scientist and other fine citizens to get Congress, to finally make them test that damn cow, and yes, it was finally CONFIRMED. that cow sat on the shelf for 8 months, simply so BSE MRR policy, the legal trading of all strains of mad cow disease could be shoved down the throat of every Country. We are not doing what the U.K. did when they poisoned the globe with mad cow disease, a disease in humans that is 100% FATAL, once clinical. North America is home to more documented TSE in livestock and animals running the wild than any other country I know, and we have been rendering them up for a long, long time, and feeding them to humans and livestock for human and animal food. c-BSE, h-BSE, l-BSE have all been documented in North America in cattle, they may even be in sheep and goats, dogs or cats. scrapie (all the many typical strains), and the atypical Nor-98 scrapie strain have been documented in the USA. TWO strains of CWD in deer and elk i.e. now the Wisconsin strain. Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy as well has been documented. and we have atypical TSE in humans in the USA. ... a bit of history on this topic of concern ;

""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

USDA 2003 BSE ROUNDTABLE

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW fromTEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Carla Everett

References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us>

Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;

Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?

and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?

I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...

can you confirm??? terry

============================================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]>

The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.

Carla

At 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:

Greetings Carla,

i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from

TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?

thank you,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

======================================

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???

Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600

From: Carla Everett

To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us><[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask]us> <[log in to unmask]>

our computer department was working on a place holder we could post USDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonight by NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcement when we hear something.

At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004,

you wrote:

why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:

November 22: Press Release title here

star image More BSE information

terry

Carla Everett wrote:

no confirmation on the U.S.'inconclusive test...

no confirmation on location of animal.

END...TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 00:53:39 +0100 From: Moser Markus Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Regarding your question about Canada's BSE-test choice for their official BSE surveillance, I can confirm that they chose the Prionics-Check Western rapid test. Regards Markus

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 01:11:04 +0100 From: Roland Heynkes Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000553/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Dear Terry,

odd that the USDA et al approves two US-OWNED tests that are _known_ to give false positives, when they know other rapid TSE test are much more reliable.

the BioRad-test seems to be the most sensitive rapid BSE test and it is clear that you "get" false positive results when you try to confirm its results with a less sensitive method like immune histochemistry. Poorly trained technicians of course may produce some false positives with the BioRad-test, but immune histochemistry produces many false negatives especially in the hands of not very experienced people. Generally the false negative and not the much fewer false positive results are the problem of all actually available BSE tests.

It is therefore not so easy to say, if the BioRad-test produced a false positive or if the confirming test produced a false negative result and which of them is more reliable. I for sure would not eat the meat of a cow which was seemingly false positive tested with the BioRad-test.

IT's like they purposely do not want to find any TSE in the USA bovine, so they pick the worst test available.

The BioRad-test is definitively not the worst test available (have a look on the EU results) and when a government does not want to get positive results, it uses immune histochemistry instead.

The USDA own experts think BioRad is not suitable for supposedly BSE/TSE free and low incidence areas, so why did they choose this test and or the IDEXX, which i dont think has even been submitted to the EU for evaluation and has no commercial experiance to my knowledge.

Are you sure that USDA has experts for BSE testing?

You could almost get the feeling they are deliberately skipping over Prionics for the least supperior TSE rapid test. I believe the Canadians finally did choose prionics. maybe paul or marcus might comment?

The Prionics western blot test is also a good rapid test which of course does not produce false positive results. In addition this test allows to see new variants of BSE, which would not be seen with the BioRad. But at least in Europe its positive results become confirmed by the OIE Western blot exactly as the BioRad results. Because of this control step the BioRad test cannot produce significantly more problems.

seems if North America is going to be a consolidated BEEF trading market amongst themselves and expect to export there tainted products everywhere, they could at least come up with the same TSE rapid Test. how can one use a less reliable test and the other use a more reliable test, and it all be the same? i know there is a word Dehaven used, but it slips my mind now, (consolidated markets) that's not it, but you get the just of my thoughts, i think;-)...TSS

Not the minor differences between the rapid tests are the problem, but the much to low testing numbers and the prefered IHC-testing in the USA. In Germany we test every month as many as the USA is going to test per year (mostly with BioRad) - and we have only 13 million cattle.

kind regards

Roland

########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: US CHOICE OF MAD COW TEST QUESTIONED Date: Thu, 25 Mar 2004 02:51:09 +0100 From: Moser Markus Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Dear Roland

Immunohistochemistry, correctly executed, is the gold standard, together with the OIE Western blotting method. It allows detection of infection even in cases where prion aggregates can only be detected in few individual cells. It is certainly not less sensitive than either Bio-Rad or Prionics. In fact, the abundant data on all three methods indicate equal diagnostic sensitivity (if sampling is done appropriate: note that immunohistochemistry has to be conducted on different tissue samples, since the tissue has to be formalin fixed). In case a BSE case obtained with a rapid test cannot be confirmed in a first approach with one of the gold standard methods, the second method will be used. I agree, that the sensitivity of immunohistochemistry can be negatively influenced e.g. by only looking at a limited number of slides or by not carefully examining the slides for prion aggregates. However, if a rapid test is not confirmed by immunohistochemistry due to a sloppy analysis, it will still show up in the OIE Western blot. Nevertheless, it is of course possible, that a true positive result cannot be confirmed e.g. if only the tissue sample used for the initial testing contained prion aggregates, which is theoretically possible, since the aggregates are not evenly distributed in the tissue. This is why it is not formally possible to disproof with 100% certainty an initial positive diagnosis (and you are right: it's certainly wise to rather not eat any suspicious animals). Nevertheless, false positives cannot in general be attributed to faulty confirmatory tests, but to the fact that the ELISA method simply produces a certain rate of false positives, which is why we offer rapid BSE tests on both platforms, the ELISA and the Western technology. And we make it clear to our customers, that when choosing the Prionics-Check LIA (the ELISA based test) coping with occasional false positive results will be inevitable. The LIA is therefore mostly used in European countries, with well established levels of BSE, while the Prionics-Check Western is also used in BSE-free countries (where a maximum positive predictive value is important to support the conclusion of low frequency or absence of BSE, which would otherwise be difficult for the reason you indicated and I mentioned above, i.e. due to the reason that it is hard to formally disprove an initial diagnosis with absolute certainty).

Regards, Markus

-------- Original Message --------

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: USA BIO-RADs INCONCLUSIVEs
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 15:37:28 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: [log in to unmask]

Hello Susan and Bio-Rad,

Happy Holidays!

I wish to ask a question about Bio-Rad and USDA BSE/TSE testing and there inconclusive. IS the Bio-Rad test for BSE/TSE that complicated, or is there most likely some human error we are seeing here?

HOW can Japan have 2 positive cows with No clinical signs WB+, IHC-, HP- , BUT in the USA, these cows are considered 'negative'?

IS there more politics working here than science in the USA?

What am I missing?

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Re: USDA: More mad cow testing will demonstrate beef's safety
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 09:26:19 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." snip...end

Experts doubt USDA's mad cow results

snip...END

WELL, someone did call me from Bio-Rad about this, however it was not Susan Berg. but i had to just about take a blood oath not to reveal there name. IN fact they did not want me to even mention this, but i feel it is much much to important. I have omitted any I.D. of this person, but thought I must document this ;

Bio-Rad, TSS phone conversation 12/28/04

Finally spoke with ;

Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

at approx. 14:00 hours 12/28/04, I had a very pleasant phone conversation with XXXX XXXXX about the USDA and the inconclusive BSE testing problems they seem to keep having. X was very very cautious as to speak directly about USDA and it's policy of not using WB. X was very concerned as a Bio-Rad official of retaliation of some sort. X would only speak of what other countries do, and that i should take that as an answer. I told X I understood that it was a very loaded question and X agreed several times over and even said a political one.

my question;

Does Bio-Rad believe USDA's final determination of False positive, without WB, and considering the new atypical TSEs not showing positive with -IHC and -HP ???

ask if i was a reporter. i said no, i was with CJD Watch and that i had lost my mother to hvCJD. X did not want any of this recorded or repeated.

again, very nervous, will not answer directly about USDA for fear of retaliation, but again said X tell me what other countries are doing and finding, and that i should take it from there. "very difficult to answer"

"very political"

"very loaded question"

outside USA and Canada, they use many different confirmatory tech. in house WB, SAF, along with IHC, HP, several times etc. you should see at several talks meetings (TSE) of late Paris Dec 2, that IHC- DOES NOT MEAN IT IS NEGATIVE. again, look what the rest of the world is doing. said something about Dr. Houston stating; any screening assay, always a chance for human error. but with so many errors (i am assuming X meant inconclusive), why are there no investigations, just false positives? said something about ''just look at the sheep that tested IHC- but were positive''. ...

TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: Your questions
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2004 15:58:11 -0800
From: To: [log in to unmask]

Hi Terry:

...snip

Let me know your phone number so I can talk to you about the Bio-Rad BSE test. Thank you

Regards

Bio-Rad Laboratories 2000 Alfred Nobel Drive Hercules, CA 94547 Ph: 510-741-6720 Fax: 510-741-5630 Email:

=================================

snip...end...TSS

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: RE: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 2005 09:19:49 +0100
From: "Adriano Aguzzi" To: "'Terry S. Singeltary Sr.'"

Dear Mr. Singeltary

I sympathize with your wish to have the most sensitive assay implemented. However, the situation is not as simple as one might think. In the case of homogeneously distributed agent, biochemical detection of PrPSc is indeed likely to be more sensitive than immunohistochemistry. In the case of variegated, punctate distribution of the agent, morphological methods may indeed be an asset.

There are also issues of feasibility. In my laboratory, we routinely run phosphotungstic acid precipitation followed by Western blotting. However, this is an extraordinarily cumbersome procedure. The sensitivity is increased vastly, but the amount of work needed is also amazing. There is no way I could see our own procedure implemented for mass screening of millions of cows - unless one would draft a veritable army of laboratory technicians. For all these reasons, while I see all your points, I feel unable to offer a strong public opinion in favor or against any specific methods. The final decision needs to take into account a variety of complex factors, and that is why I believe that it is best left to a panel of experts rather than to a public discussion.

Best regards Adriano Aguzzi

____________________________

Prof. Adriano Aguzzi (MD PhD hc FRCP FRCPath) Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zürich Schmelzbergstrasse 12, CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland Tel. ++41-1-255 2107 Tel. (direct line): 2869 Fax: ++41-1-255 4402, cellular: +41-79-320 1516

http://www.unizh.ch/pathol/neuropathologie/

-----Original Message-----

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [mailto:flounder@wt.net]
Sent: Thursday, March 10, 2005 20:18 To: adriano@pathol.unizh.ch
Subject: Greetings again Professor Aguzzi ... TSS

Greetings again Professor Aguzzi,

A kind greetings from Texas. I hope you do not mind, but I must ask you several questions that will put you in the hot seat. Someone with credibility must come forward, such as yourself and speak out about the fact of the non scientific approach that USDA et al has take after the first diagnosis of BSE in the USA. This being, the refusal to use Western Blot on any suspicious or inconclusive BSE/TSE test. IHC is like a brain biopsy on trying to diagnose a CJD case. IF you take the sample from a part of the brain that is not that tainted, you will not get a reading. WB is much more sensitive, especially now with the Phospohtugstic acid precipitation step. IF Prusiners CDI was validated, who knows, that might even be more sensitive. Bottom line, we need you to come forward and state publicly ''the facts'' about USDA et al decision not to use WB on not only questionable samples, but on ALL samples. would you be willing to comment on this, to me or someone from the media (under the understanding it will be for the public)? I have several questions for you??? This is very very important in terms of human health (i.e. that nov. pos. pos. incl. neg cow).

P.S. there is one other top TSE scientist that has come forward and said what the USDA et al did with that cow was ''not logical''. (this will not be published for another 3 or 4 weeks). ONE other TOP TSE scientist saying the same thing would be much better for the public to hear and understand. anyway, does not hurt to ask, and i hope you come through here for us. I know this is a very loaded question, but times a wasting, and human health is at risk here...

thank you, with kindest regards,

I am sincerely,

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

CJD WATCH

http://www.fortunecity.com/healthclub/cpr/349/part1cjd.htm

CJD Watch message board

http://disc.yourwebapps.com/Indices/236650.html

Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys

snip...

Date: Fri, 22 Apr 2005 11:53:47 -0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: BSE-L@LISTS.UNI-KARLSRUHE.DE

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

Q&A Dr. Jean-Philippe Deslys

1. What is the standard regime for testing of suspect animals in the EU?

The regime is an initial screening by a high-output test, the Bio-Rad test. If a result raises suspicion, a confirmatory test is conducted with the Western blot test.

2. How long has this been the case?

It s a fairly recent development. Only recently has the Western blot test become sensitive enough, with the addition of phospohtungstic acid precipitation step. The Bio-Rad test (which Deslys helped develop) is extremely sensitive, and the standard Western blot is extremely reliable with high-signal test results. However, it had to be made more sensitive for low-signal (samples with low density of malformed prions) samples. It has been made more sensitive.

Reproducibility is the problem with the IHC test. It is not standardized; depending on the lab and its protocols, or even on the technician involved in the test, one can get conflicting results.

3. Is there a way to measure the three tests in sensitivity, accuracy and objectivity?

Historically, yes. The IHC was the gold standard at one point, but we have shifted to the Western blot. It requires less work, it is more sensitive and its results are reproducible. IHC relies on localization. If you have a weak signal case, you may get lucky and test a spot with a high concentration of prions. But the opposite it true too; you can miss an infection by testing a sample with low concentrations. Western blot is much better for low signal situations.

4. The USDA in 2003 used the Western blot to confirm the BSE case in Washington state, and it sent samples to the U.K. for independent testing. In the case this November, which it announced was negative, it instead used the IHC test and did not send samples to the U.K. Is this good science?

It s not logical. If you have two consecutive questionable screenings, you do another test. I can only advise, it s management s duty at USDA to make the decisions. But when you have a discrepancy between the rapid test and the IHC, it is only logical to confirm it with another test.

5. We are hearing now about a new strain of BSE, atypical BSE or aBSE. Or BaSE. We have heard that IHC, the so-called gold standard, cannot detect the variant. Is this true?

Yes. There have been a few cases, one in Italy, one in Belgium, one here in France. It seems to only affect very old animals. The distribution in the brain is very different than we see with BSE, it looks very different. The IHC test will come back negative.

This his a very recent phenomenon. I have no opinion on its virulence. We do not know where it comes from. It could be a version of sporadic infection. Western blot caught them, but we would not even know it existed if we weren t running systematic testing in the EU.

BSE was around for a long time before we caught it and by then, it was everywhere. It had become highly infectious. It probably amplified due to low-temperature rendering. The disease was recycled through the food chain, and was given time to amplify. By the time it was identified, even good cooking couldn t eliminate it.

I can t stress enough that systematic testing is necessary. Withdrawing all positives from the food chain is the best way to break the cycle.

What can happen with testing of only cattle that are clearly at risk is that several can remain undetected. Canada has tested about 30,000 head of cattle and has three positives. That would indicate that there are probably undiscovered cases. And what happens then is that the disease is allowed to amplify. You have to maintain testing.

When people choose to protect their economic interests over public health, it can have a boomerang effect. It happened all through Europe. They always deny; it s not OUR problem, it is our neighbor s problem. And then a single case is discovered and the public reacts. The economic results are devastating. It would be better to just assume BSE is present and use systematic testing as protection. That way, the public is reassured that it is not entering the food supply.

By systematic testing, I mean doing as we do in the EU, which is to test every animal over 30 months of age when it is slaughtered. In Europe, three times as many cases of BSE have been caught by systematic testing as by clinical testing (of clearly sick animals). In 2004, eight clinical cases were discovered, 29 were discovered at rendering plants, and 17 at slaughter. We should be using these tests as a weapon to protect the public and to give them assurance that the food supply is being protected.

6. USDA s list of specified risk materials excludes some products, like blood and bone meal, that are banned in the EU and UK. Is our feed supply safe?

With SRMs, where do you stop? Tests have found prions in meat, nerves travel through meat, and so on. The main infectivity is in the brain and the spinal cord. A blood and bone meal ban in animal feed is not really necessary, because except in cases of highly infective animals, it is unlikely that they are dangerous in themselves. If you combine systematic testing and targeted SRM removal, the brain and the spinal column in cattle over 30 months, you can have a compromise that is both safer and less costly than expanded feed bans.

Certainly, you can stop the spread of BSE with a total ban on offal. But it has to be a total ban. It can t be given to sheep or swine or poultry. It would be very expensive and virtually impossible to accomplish. You can have farmers using the wrong feed or transportation errors.

Systematic testing makes far more sense. I think of it as a thermometer. It not only allows us to catch the disease, it also allows us to monitor its progress. We can watch the levels of infectivity and if they start going up instead of down, we can take measures.

To an extent, our environment is contaminated. About 10 percent of wild animals test positive for TSEs. If you recycle these agents, they can evolve and get more dangerous. This is probably what happened with BSE. It wasn t very dangerous until it evolved to the disease we know today.

People complain that testing is very expensive. It is much more expensive to kill and test whole herds.

7. In your opinion, is infected feed the sole method of transmission of BSE, apart from the very rare maternal transmission?

Feed is the main problem. However, we are seeing some other possibilities, including through fat and greases. Calves are fed milk extracts, with the cream removed. To make it nutritious, they are using fat and grease from cattle.

(FOLLOW QUESTION: Would that allow BSE to develop into an infective level in cattle younger than 30 months, assuming they might be getting infected at a younger age?)

8. You were involved in a study that tested two primates who were fed infected brain tissue. One eventually died of TSE; the other survived. The press reported that the main finding was that it would take something on the order of 1.5 kilograms of infected matter to create an infection, but that seems to be an oversimplification. Could you explain it further?

The findings suggest that as little as five grams is enough to infect. The 1.5 kilo figure is the amount of infected tissue that would have to be ingested from an animal that would be below the threshold of infection, and would test negative. In other words, even though a younger animal may be developing the disease, it would take a considerable amount of tissue to transmit the disease.

An animal could be just below the testing level, and not be particularly dangerous. But that is why you have to keep testing. Once it reaches the threshold, it can become highly infective.

9. BSE is a pretty horrifying disease, but overall, it has killed less than 200 humans, and only a handful in recent years. Listeria, by comparison, kills thousands every year. Overall, how do you rate the threat from BSE?

The overall risk is not particularly high. Over two million infected animals went into the food chain in Europe, 400,000 of them before the SRMs, the brains and spinal column, were removed from the carcass. Less than 200 died, and less than 4,000 are at risk of developing the disease. What we know now is that one particle is not going to kill you. There has to be condensation of the prions to be truly dangerous.

This is not a sterile world. But the danger is that now that the crisis appears to be over, attention will turn elsewhere and that will allow the disease to amplify again. Just as we stopped paying attention to AIDS when medication seemed to control it, then were surprised when a new and more infectious and aggressive strain appeared, we could be surprised by a more serious strain of BSE. That is why I support systematic testing for the long term. The object is to keep levels of BSE low, and to recognize the danger if it suddenly pops back up. ...END

TSS

######### https://listserv.kaliv.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ##########

http://lists.iatp.org/listarchive/archive.cfm?id=126139

Texas even had a 'secret' test that showed that mad cow positive; experimental IHC test results, because the test was not a validated procedure, and because the two approved IHC tests came back negative, the results were not considered to be of regulatory significance and therefore were not reported beyond the laboratory. . A Western blot test conducted the week of June 5, 2005, returned positive for BSE.

http://www.usda.gov/documents/vs_bse_ihctestvar.pdf

48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS

-------- Original Message --------

Subject: re-USDA's surveillance plan for BSE aka mad cow disease

Date: Mon, 02 May 2005 16:59:07 -0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000265/!x-usc:mailto:paffairs@oig.hhs.gov, mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000265/!x-usc:mailto:HHSTips@oig.hhs.gov, mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000265/!x-usc:mailto:contactOIG@hhsc.state.tx.us

Greetings Honorable Paul Feeney, Keith Arnold, and William Busbyet al at OIG, ...............

snip...

There will be several more emails of my research to follow. I respectfully request a full inquiry into the cover-up of TSEs in the United States of America over the past 30 years. I would be happy to testify...

Thank you, I am sincerely, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 xxx xxx xxxx

snip... see full text ;

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/10/idiopathic-brainstem-neuronal.html

From: TSS Subject: Re: Feds skipped key mad cow disease test in 2004 case USDA changes its protocols after animal initially had been cleared Date: June 17, 2005 at 10:35 am PST

In Reply to: Re: Feds skipped key mad cow disease test in 2004 case USDA changes its protocols after animal initially had been cleared posted by TSS on June 17, 2005 at 5:03 am:

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

I would like to add to the first paragraph of Adriano Aguzzis comments. We have seen cases in Europe, where a positive result obtained with our Western blot rapid test(Prionics-Check WESTERN)could not be confirmed with IHC, but with the OIE-Western blot procedure, and we have also seen cases where the result could be confirmed by IHC but not by OIE-Western blot. As Adrino Aguzzi pointed out both IHC and OIE-Western have their limitations, but when combined and when performed well they pick up BSE reliably. In case of doubt, i.e. if a rapid test comes out consistently positive but an initial attempt of confirmation with IHC (or OIE-Western) fails, we recommend to routinely do a second test with the respective alternative method. This is the procedure most national reference centers, which are responsible for final confirmation of BSE cases, are following.

Regards Markus Moser Prionics

-----Original Message-----

From: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [mailto:BSE-L@aegee.org] On Behalf Of Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Sent: Freitag, 17. Juni 2005 14:07 To: BSE-L@aegee.org Subject: Re: [CJDVoice] Feds skipped key mad cow disease test in 2004 case USDA changes its protocols after animal initially had been cleared

##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/

THEY SKIPPED THIS KEY TEST, AND HAD THAT MAD COW ON THE SHELF FOR 8 MONTHS FOR A REASON; and that was to get the BSE MRR policy in full force FIRST ;

Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151

Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8

IN A NUT SHELL ;

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,

http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf

Sunday, September 6, 2009

MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO

SEE ANOTHER VIDEO THAT SHOWED IN CANADA, BUT NOT USA, ABOUT ANOTHER USA TSE COVER-UP MORE BRAINS NOT TESTED PROPERLY, key brain parts missing. ...

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html

SEE THIS DAMNING VIDEO AT BOTTOM OF ;

Monday, July 27, 2009

U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ?

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html

DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN

''nobody has ever ask''

''they dont want our comment''

''they don't want to know, the don't care''

''i have tried repeatedly''

''level of absolute ignorance''

''Entire policy was driven...heard from mr. laycraft, so now, after time has passed, it's ok for Canada, cattle under 30 month, to the USA, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED!

PRUSINER ASKED : IF FROM YOUR TESTIMONY, A DEMONSTRATED THREAT TO PUBLIC HEATH ?

''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''

http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE

snip...

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and tertiary customers of the recalling company.

Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again to verify product disposition.

On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDA s Recall Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall, and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA considered the recall to be complete.

Recall Was Complicated by Inaccurate Distribution Lists and Mixing of Potentially Contaminated and Noncontaminated Beef USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the recalling company s three primary customers was slow in providing its customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that primary customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which specific customers received the product.

Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments, such as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they supply. To deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores that were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef. The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003, and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on December 10, 2003. The recalling company s carcasses were tagged to identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be distinguished, the recall included all 43 carcasses at the primary customer.

After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef. Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to complicate USDA s identification of where the product went. Specifically, on December 23, 2003, USDA s initial press release stated that the recalling company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December 26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to facilities in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of eight states and one territory.

On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined that the beef went to only six states Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana and that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that 176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef, including the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDA s review also indicated that recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that was the case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713 customers on the lists. USDA s initial checks identified an additional 45 customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4 summarizes USDA s verification efforts during the recall.

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

Figure 4: USDA s Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with BSE

Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers plus the recalling company, for a total of 582 verification checks.

USDA s press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the

D = Distributor R = Retailer SF = Storage facility P = Processor

Primary customers (15 total) Recalling slaughterhouse (WA) 1 R (OR) 1 P (WA) 1 P (OR) 1 P (OR) 11 R (WA) Secondary customers (40 total) Tertiary customers (526 total) 1 R (OR) 1 SF (OR) 3 D (OR) 3 D (WA) 2 dual D (OR) 59 R (OR) 79 R (WA) 5 R (ID) 3 R (UT) 4 R (MT) 161 R (WA) 8 R (ID) 15 R (OR) 2 R (AK) 31 R (OR) 8 R (WA) 10 R (NV) 5 R (ID) 10 R (CA) 2 R (CA) 17 R (OR) 5 R (WA) 1 D (NV) 11 R (CA) 85 R (NV) 3 D (OR) 11 R (OR) 2 D (CA) 26 R (CA) 2 R (WA)

( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state. Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents.

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than 64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers, and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000 pounds that were recovered.

FDA s Role in USDA s Recall

Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, were not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into raw materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used for many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdiction over renderers.

When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, the agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent an inspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow. Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cow were on the premises. FDA later identified a second company that potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Both renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from the diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and local authorities.

On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, rendered material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and on January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The renderer initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposed of as directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the material returned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material was disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004.

On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntary holds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, through January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat or trim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreed to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderers voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDA confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered material entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDA

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

reported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributed commercially by the rendering companies.

USDA and FDA Worked Together on the Recall USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notified each other if their investigations yielded any information about products within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conducting the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition of the product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the product went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5 percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated they regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agencies actions.

Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related to the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE

Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions

12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered.

12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE testing. " Recalling company sends carcasses to primary customer for processing.

12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat products to two other primary customers for further processing.

12/12 -

12/23/03 " Other primary customers distribute recalled product to secondary customers. " Secondary customers distribute recalled product to tertiary customers.

12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively positive. " Recall meeting. " Initiation of voluntary recall. " Press release. " FDA notified of BSE test results. " FDA dispatches investigation teams.

12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1. " FDA determines some rendered material from Renderer 1 is intended for Indonesia. " FDA discovers some material may have been sent to Renderer 2. " Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining rendered material. " Recalling company contacts primary customers. " Primary customers contact their customers.

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from reference lab in England that cow in question is BSE positive.

12/26/03 " Verification checks begin " USDA announces recalled product in Washington State and Oregon. " FDA begins process of comparing records to ensure all products from Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for. " Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material that may have been derived from BSE cow. None of the rendered material has been distributed.

12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, and Nevada. " FDA issues statement confirming that the rendering plants that processed all of the nonedible material from the BSE cow have placed a voluntary hold on all of the potentially infectious product, none of which had left the control of the companies and entered commercial distribution.

12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam.

12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service determines that the recalled meat products were distributed to 42 locations, with 80 percent of the products distributed to stores in Oregon and Washington State.

12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to complete recall verification checks.

1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product was only distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, and Idaho.

1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that some of the rendered material on hold from Renderer 1 was inadvertently shipped to Asia. Renderer 1 commits to isolate and return the rendered material. " Rendering company notifies FDA of shipment of product on hold.

(Continued From Previous Page)

Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions

Appendix II

Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE

Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs

Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information.

1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that they may have rendered meat or trim subject to recall from retail stores. " FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to place all rendered material from December 23 to January 9 on hold. " FDA determines neither renderer had shipped rendered material manufactured after December 23, 2003.

2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of in landfill, except material shipped to Asia.

2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material returns to U.S. port.

2/25/04 " Verification checks complete. " USDA Boulder District Office concludes recall is effective.

3/1/04 " Recall is closed.

3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of remaining rendered material...

snip...

REPORTS

1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss

http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51

Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf

Appendix C. Agents that require specific government approval for scientific investigations within the USA.a

Select agents, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services onlyb High consequence pathogens and agents, U.S. Department of Agriculture onlyc HIgh consequence livestock pathogens and toxins, overlap agents and toxinsd

(NO HUMAN TSE LISTED ???...tss) BSE agent

http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/publications/disease_emergence/AppendixC.pdf

QFC sued over mad cow case

Grocer negligently exposed them to beef, family claims

Friday, March 5, 2004

By LEWIS KAMB SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER

An Eastside family who says they ate beef linked to the nation's only known case of mad cow disease yesterday filed a class-action lawsuit against QFC, claiming the grocery store chain negligently exposed them and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them that they had bought it. ...

snip...

full text ;

http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2009/12/nais-cool-from-farm-to-fork-mad-cow.html

WITH an incubation period of over 50 years in some cases, let's pray that no one becomes clinical. once clinical, TSE is 100% fatal. ...TSS

Tuesday, July 14, 2009

U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

WHERE did we go wrong $$$

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html

Sunday, December 28, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html

Monday, May 11, 2009

Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

Thursday, January 07, 2010

Scrapie and Nor-98 Scrapie November 2009 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2010 and FISCAL YEAR 2008

http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/01/scrapie-and-nor-98-scrapie-november.html

Thursday, January 14, 2010

SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM FSIS NOTICE 05-10 1/12/10

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/sample-collection-from-cattle-under.html

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CREEKSTONE FARMS PREMIUM BEEF, L.L.C., Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, et al., Defendants. ::::::::::: Civil Action No. 06-0544 (JR)

snip...

JAMES ROBERTSON United States District Judge

The government’s additional argument, that private testing 14 somehow would interfere with USDA’s surveillance program, is unexplained and therefore rejected. Of greater concern is the possibility that private testing 15 could produce a false positive result, which might trigger unnecessary public alarm. USDA has asserted this possibility as a reason to avoid private testing. Indeed, the Bio-Rad kits that Creekstone proposes using are used throughout the world, including as part of the USDA’s own surveillance testing. - 18 -

https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2006cv0544-22

Friday, August 29, 2008

CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html

Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544 Date: September 4, 2007 at 9:47 am PST

USDA

AUGUST 21, 2007

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Post Office Box 42 Bacliff, Texas 77518-0042

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

This is in response to your e-mails to Secretary Johanns concerning private testing for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia involving Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC. We regret the delay in responding.

As you may know, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) filed an appeal of the U.S. District Court's order on June 15,2007. While we recognize your views, we cannot comment on any matters at issue in the pending litigation. However, we can assure you that USDA remains committed to ensuring effective, scientifically sound testing for significant animal diseases and to protecting U.S. animal and public health from BSE.

We understand that the effects of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) are devastating, and we are sorry to learn of the loss of your mother. Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD and other degenerative neurological diseases. Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide. However, no cases of vCJD-the form of BSE that can be transmitted from animals to humans-are known to have originated in the United States. Because the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for addressing concerns about CJD and other human health issues, you may wish to contact that agency directly. The address is CDC, HHS, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20201.

We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE. Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr. Page 2

materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present, and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level. These additional controls include the Food Safety and Inspection Services' ban on nonambulatory cattle from the human food chain; a prohibition on air-injection stunning of slaughter cattle; the requirement of additional process controls in advanced meat recovery systems; and, a prohibition on the use of mechanically separated beef in human food. Additionally, protection from BSE and other diseases is achieved by conducting antemortem inspections of slaughter cattle and excluding any animals that display clinical signs of neurological disease or other abnormalities.

We appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns. To learn more about USDA's BSE surveillance and safeguarding activities, please visit our Web site at www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/index.shtml.

Sincerely,

Jere L. Dick Associate Deputy Administrator National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services

============================END=========================

>>>We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE.<<< ?

DISTRIBUTION Ohio. QUANTITY 12.46 tons were distributed. REASON Product contained protein derived from mammalian tissue and according to regulation must bear the statement "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants" on the label. This regulation is designed to prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE through feed. This statement does not appear on the label. http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/ENF00623.html

REASON The products contain protein material derived from bovine mammalian tissues; however, the bags are not labeled with the required BSE cautionary statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 14,000 to 15,000 gallons.

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00719.html

FIRM INITIATED RECALL: Ongoing.

DISTRIBUTION: IL QUANTITY: 169 tons of ruminant feeds and 27 tons of non-ruminant feeds

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR October 10, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00714.html

FIRM INITIATED RECALL: Complete

DISTRIBUTION: KY, GA, NC, FL WV QUANTITY: 568 tons

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR August 29, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00708.html

FIRM INITIATED RECALL: ONGOING

DISTRIBUTION: KY, VA, MD, WV, NC, SC, GA, AL, DE, FL, MS and TN

QUANTITY: 962 tons

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR August 1, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00704.html

Customers were asked to complete and return a recall response form that was included with each letter documenting the numbers of bags and varieties of products for which the customers affixed the BSE sticker-labels. The firm expanded their recall on May 10, 2001, and mailed recall letters with BSE labels and response forms to the affected customers.

FIRM INITIATED RECALL: Ongoing

DISTRIBUTION: KY, GA, NC, TN, VA QUANTITY: 933 tons

_______________________________

RECALL NUMBER, PRODUCT AND CODE: V-377-1, Renner’s brand 45% meat and bone meal, packed in 100 pound bags. REASON: The product contained protein material derived from bovine mammalian tissues; however, the bags are not labeled with the required BSE cautionary statement. MANUFACTURER/RECALLING FIRM: F. W. Renner & Sons, Inc., Canton, Ohio RECALLED BY: The recalling firm contacted the consignees by telephone on June 19, 2001. FIRM INITIATED RECALL: Complete DISTRIBUTION: OH QUANTITY: 2,500 lbs

_______________________________

FIRM INITIATED RECALL: Complete

DISTRIBUTION: PA QUANTITY: None. The product turn over is two weeks or less.

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 25, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00703.html

REASON: The cattle feed (for ruminant animals)may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues. MANUFACTURER/RECALLING FIRM: Champaign Landmark, Inc., Urbana, Ohio RECALLED BY: On 5/24/2001, the firm's Feed Manager personally visited the sole farmer/consignee, at which time, he hand-delivered the firm's recall letter.

FIRM INITIATED RECALL: Complete

DISTRIBUTION: Ohio QUANTITY: 2,000 LBS

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 11, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00701.html

REASON: The product is not labeled with the required caution statement “Do not feed to Cattle or other Ruminants.” MANUFACTURER/RECALLING FIRM: International Proteins Corporations (IPC), St. Paul MN RECALLED BY: Recalling Firm, Revised labeling by letter on April 17, 2001.

FIRM INITIATED RECALL: Ongoing.

DISTRIBUTION: MN, IL, MO, AR and TX

QUANTITY 3,094 tons

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 04, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00700.html

DISTRIBUTION: MN, IL, MO, AK, TX. QUANTITY: 3,094 tons.

REASON: The product is not labeled with the required caution statement "Do Not Feed to Cattle or Other Ruminants."

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR June 20, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00698.html

DISTRIBUTION: Al, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, IA, KY, ME, MD, MA, MO, MN, MS, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, TN, VA, WV, and WI.

QUANTITY: 2,790 tons of ruminant feed products and 14,000 tons of non-ruminant feed products.

REASON: The animal feed products may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00696.html

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00694.html

PRODUCT: Custom Vaquero Supplement for Cattle identified by Purina Mills. Recall #V-027- 1. CODE: 7V87. MANUFACTURER: Purina Mills, Inc., Gonzalez, Texas. RECALLED BY: Manufacturer, contacted the one consignee on January 17, 2001.

DISTRIBUTION: Texas. QUANTITY: 44,355 pounds.

REASON: The ruminant feed product contains meat and bone meal (MBM) of bovine origin.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00692.html

DISTRIBUTION: California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Kansas, Colorado, Georgia, and Florida.

QUANTITY: 27,300 pounds of Catfish Food and 86,100 pounds of Freshwater Fish. REASON: The products, which contain meat by-products, were shipped without the required BSE warning label.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00691.html

DISTRIBUTION: Ohio.

QUANTITY: Approximately 350 pounds of hog feed (7/50 pound bags).

REASON: The animal feed contains protein derived from mammalian tissues and must bear the statement "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants" on the label to prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE through feed. This statement does not appear on the label.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00690.html

DISTRIBUTION: Ohio.

QUANTITY: Approximately 900 pounds of feed (9/100 pound bags).

REASON: The animal feed contains product derived from mammalian tissues and must bear the statement “Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants” on the label to prevent the establishment and amplification of BSE through feed. This statement does not appear on the label.

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR APRIL 11, 2001.

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2001/ENF00688.html

i'm tired here of listing all these mad cow feed in commerce recalls, that was just of what I had documented for 2001. You can see 2002 and up to 2006 here ;

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/cvms-or-develops-new-pcr-based-method.html

and this whopper here in 2007 ;

In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

NEW URL

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm

see from 2006 and up here ;

FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY

http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/

MY point of the above listing was simple, it was a refute of what was said here by ;

Jere L. Dick Associate Deputy Administrator National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services

We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE. Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk

Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr. Page 2

Jere L. Dick Associate Deputy Administrator National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services

===

This person was either terribly misinformed, or simply does not have a clue. ...TSS

CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;

5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html

my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

TSA AIRPORT SECURITY

2009-12-30T13:00:00.000-08:00

----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: TSA.Ombudsman@dhs.gov
Cc: comments@whitehouse.gov ; jacksonlee@mail.house.gov ; viewpoints@chron.com ; heber.taylor@galvnews.com
Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2009 1:29 PM
Subject: TSA AIRPORT SECURITY

TSA AIRPORT SECURITY

Continental Airlines Case number xxxxxxx

Greetings Mr. President, Congresswoman Jackson Lee, and TSA et al,

I would like to kindly share our recent experience with the Bush Intercontinental airport and TSA. My wife's parents were recently down for Christmas, they are both in their 80's, both needed wheelchairs, and my Father-in-law is on oxygen 24/7. He had his Inogen oxygen concentrator machine with 3 batteries. So, you can imagine the rigorous search he had. complete body search, where he had to hold his arms up in the air for several minutes. NOW, let me be perfectly clear, I completely understand this, and Continental airlines could have not been any better in helping with them getting them back to the gate. I applaud Continental airlines on this, and in fact called them and complemented them on this. Here is what I don't understand, confucius is confused again. Why is it that my 82 year old father-in-law and my 84 year old mother-in-law were so stringently searched, but yet I (or anyone once through security), my wife and I were also searched, and again, totally understandable. BUT once back in the Gate area, I was able to buy a long neck glass bottle of beer? Do you know how many people in Bars all across Texas, are cut with broken beer bottles? A broken long neck (Corona beer bottle or any broken beer bottle) is considered a lethal weapon in the court of law, if used in this manner. I (or anyone), could have put that long neck in my pants and carried aboard a plane, or, gone in the bathroom at the gate, broke the bottle, and then stuffed it in my pants. I not only had one, but two of those expensive long necks while waiting at the gate. IF I wanted, I could have had a six pack of lethal weapons to carry on board a plane. But yet TSA will take my little bitty pocket knife. I found this deeply disturbing, and I called Continental, and they too found it deeply disturbing, however they could not do anything about it, due to the fact it was the vendors, and the TSA is over the vendors. THEY gave me another number to TSA and ask that I call them as well, in which I did. After speaking with someone at TSA, I found that this was of NO concern to them. I was told

''that's nothing, have you ever been in a restaurant back in the gate area, they use real silverware, with real forks and knives.''

''We cannot stop everything''.

yep, that's exactly what I was told. now don't get me wrong, I am not writing this so they will stop serving up cold long neck beer, but they have what they now call plastic and or aluminum bottles. daaa. ...

I SUPPORT FULL BODY SCANS, however WARNING, i just don't look pretty naked anymore. ...TSS

Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648027c28e

Greetings FDA and public,

if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.

[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]

if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me. ...SNIP...END

http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648027c28d&disposition=attachment&contentType=xml

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
xxx-xxx-xxxx

2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html

Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry [FDMS Docket Number FSIS-2005-0028]

2008-07-17T14:29:00.000-07:00

[Federal Register: July 17, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 138)] [Rules and Regulations] [Page 40939-40948] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr17jy08-1]

======================================================================== Rules and Regulations Federal Register ________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.

The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each week.

========================================================================

[[Page 40939]]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Food Safety and Inspection Service

9 CFR Part 390

[FDMS Docket Number FSIS-2005-0028] RIN 0583-AD10

Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees During Meat or Poultry Product Recalls

AGENCY: Food Safety and Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is amending the Federal meat and poultry products inspection regulations to provide that the Agency will make available to the public the names and locations of the retail consignees of meat and poultry products that have been recalled by a federally-inspected meat or poultry establishment if the recalled product has been distributed to the retail level. This rule will apply only where there is a reasonable probability that the use of the recalled product will cause serious adverse health consequences or death (Class I recalls). FSIS will routinely post this information on its Web site as it compiles the information during its recall verification activities. FSIS is taking this action to provide an additional mechanism for prompting consumers to examine products stored in their refrigerator, freezer, or cupboard when there is a reasonable probability that the product will cause adverse health consequences. The retail consignee information will complement the product identification information that FSIS already makes available and will provide additional opportunities for local media outlets and State and local health officials to transmit more targeted information about the recall to consumers.

EFFECTIVE DATE: August 18, 2008.

snip...see full text ;

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/E8-16221.htm

ONE GIANT LEAP FOR MAN, one small step by mankind, and another fumble by our government, and just another band aid approach with something that needs tourniquets. another win win for tort reform. another win win for USDA/FDA et al on mad cow disease and the consumers that consume suspect mad cow beef. if anyone would have any stones at all, they would have included class 1, 2, and 3, recalls. but i guess as usual, anything that poisons you and kills you slowly, over a period of time, i guess that is still acceptable here in the good old USA, and the saddest part is, the consumer accepts it. ...

still disgusted in sunny, hot, baycliff, texas, where galveston bay is so polluted, you cannot eat the crabs, specs, or catfish anymore, where the deadly flesh eating bacteria Vibrio vulnificus lives, so you cannot get in the water today, where fresh tomatoes and fresh jalapeños are linked to salmonella outbreak, home, home on the range, where the air is so polluted you cannot go outside anymore, home, home on the range, where here in Texas, we have atypical mad cow disease, where we also feed cows to cows, and 5.5 grams is acceptable safe level via FDA? where highly suspect downers get rendered without any mad cow test some days, where the deer and antelope play, and where CWD is spreading in the USA, home, home on the range, where the downer cow school lunch program exposed thousands and thousands of kids all across the nation over a long period of time to dead stock downers, each day, the most highly likely to have BSE, and where sCJD is rising, and mutating. home, home on the range, Oh, give me a home where the buffalo roam, Where the deer and the antelope play, where there is seldom heard, a discouraging word, where you can see the clouds through the yellow haze, all day. and where people just sit idly by, day by day. ...

Date Filed: March 5, 2004 Court: King County Superior Court (Washington) Location: Seattle Ticker Symbol: NYSE:KR

Join This Suit Tell a Friend

Consumers filed a proposed class-action lawsuit against Quality Food Centers (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger (NYSE: KR), claiming the grocery store chain should have used information gathered through its customer loyalty program to warn those who purchased beef potentially tainted with ?mad cow disease.? The USDA issued a recall notice for the meat on December 23, 2003. QFC sold the meat through its approximately 40 stores across Washington.

The suit claims that even though QFC had the ability to quickly warn every customer who purchased the potentially deadly meat if they used the QFC Advantage Card at the time of purchase, the grocery store neglected to do so.

The suit seeks to represent every consumer in Washington state who purchased the recalled meat from QFC.

Recent Updates

June 14, 2004 - the King County Superior Court gave the green light to a suit claiming QFC didn't do enough to warn customers about beef potentially tainted with 'mad cow disease,' finding enough questions about the beef and QFC's responsibility to explore in the courtroom.

Read the court order.

http://www.hagens-berman.com/frontend?command=Lawsuit&task=viewLawsuitDetail&iLawsuitId=653

QFC - 'Mad Cow' Frequently Asked Questions

The Suit

What is the key issue in this suit? On December 23, 2003, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) recalled more than 10,000 pounds of raw beef that could have been exposed to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Humans consuming BSE-tainted meat can contract Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), an always-fatal condition.

QFC sold this meat throughout its stores in Washington. Even though QFC had the ability to quickly warn every customer who purchased the potentially deadly meat if they used the QFC advantage card at the time of purchase, the grocery store neglected to do so, the suit alleges.

Who does the suit seek to represent? The suit seeks to represent all persons who purchased recalled meat from any QFC store in the state of Washington.

Who are the defendants? Quality Food Centers, or QFC. Once a local, Northwest company, QFC is now a wholly owned subsidiary of the grocery chain giant, Kroger.

What does the suit seek? The suit asks the court to order QFC to establish a medical monitoring fund which would allow those who purchased and consumed the meat to seek medical care, checking for ? and if necessary, treating --- the infection of vCJD. The suit also seeks the creation of a medical notification system, allowing those who may have been exposed to the disease to receive periodic updates on research and treatment of vCJD. The suit also seeks unspecified damages for the plaintiffs.

Does the suit claim QFC violated specific laws? Yes. The lawsuit claims QFC violated the Washington Product Liability Act. In addition, the suit claims QFC was negligent by not warning consumers of the dangers associated with the affected meat.

Where was the lawsuit filed? The suit was filed in King County Superior Court on March 4, 2004.

How do I determine if I qualify to join the lawsuit? If you have a QFC Advantage card and believe that you bought recalled meat from a QFC store, you may be eligible to join the lawsuit. Click here to fill out the sign-up request form, or you can contact Hagens Berman attorneys.

QFC

What is the QFC Advantage Card? The Advantage Card is known in the grocery industry as a Customer Loyalty Card. Customers who sign up for QFC?s Advantage Card receive special discounts on selected items, but gives the grocery store chain the ability to track consumers? purchases in order to enhance their marketing efforts. In addition, grocery chains which offer affinity card programs often use the database and shopping pattern data to send users coupons and other marketing material. According to the complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by consumers presenting the Advantage Card, including product description, date of purchase, store of purchase and the price, and saves that data with customer contact information.

What was QFC?s response to the meat recall? On Dec. 23, 2003, QFC received notice from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) of a recall of approximately 10,410 lbs. of raw meat that may have been contaminated with the infectious agent that causes ?mad cow? disease. QFC did not act immediately on the recall notice but initially responded by denying that it had any of the tainted meat. On December 24 QFC pulled the meat from its shelves, but the company took no steps to directly warn consumers. It was not until Dec. 27 that QFC posted small signs in its stores recalling the tainted beef, according to the complaint. During that four day period when QFC was silent hundreds of consumers may have eaten the meat.

Can QFC determine if an Advantage Card holder purchased the potentially dangerous meat? Yes. In fact, consumers can now contact QFC directly and the company will provide information about meat purchases ? but only if you ask. Hundreds of other consumers who purchased the meat and are unaware of the situation have not heard from QFC, the complaint states.

Why was QFC sued even though they pulled the meat? Under Washington law since QFC ground the meat it is deemed a manufacturer and is strictly liable for any unsafe product. In addition QFC possessed specific and easily obtainable information on which customers purchased the recalled meat, but did not act to inform customers, the suit states. Considering the potential danger and risk of worry for consumers, and the ease of contacting consumers using database information, simply pulling the meat from the shelves and belatedly posting small signs was not an adequate response, according to the complaint.

What information on customer purchases does QFC track with the Advantage Card? QFC tracks every purchase that a customer with an Advantage Card makes, regardless of whether discounts are offered or not, according to the complaint.

Does the recently announced larger-than-expected recall of beef affect the lawsuit? No. Regardless of the size of the beef recall, attorneys believe the facts in the case remain the same.

How can I find out if I bought recalled meat from QFC? If you believe that you may have purchased recalled meat from a QFC store, and you have an Advantage Card, you can contact QFC and ask if your record shows you purchased recalled beef. You can contact QFC at 866-221-4141.

Isn?t QFC prohibited by privacy laws from contacting consumers with warnings like this? No ? the suit notes that the company will return car keys returned to the store if the keys have an Advantage Card attached. According the complaint, If QFC can return car keys by mail, why can?t they send a notice saying the meat a customer purchased in their store could cause an incurable, fatal disease? Further privacy laws would prevent QFC from disclosing information to third parties, disclosing the information to the customer whose card it is does not violate privacy laws. For example, if a trade group wanted to know the names of consumers who purchased a given drug sold at QFC, disclosure of that private information might be a privacy concern. However, disclosure to a consumer of his own records is not.

?Mad Cow? Disease

What is Mad Cow disease? In cows, mad cow disease is defined as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), and is a progressive neurological disease. The human disease variant is know as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), which is a rare brain disorder that causes a rapid, progressive dementia and is always fatal, according to the complaint.

Where can I get more information on Mad Cow disease? The USDA provides information on the disease at www.usda.gov/.

What should I do if I believe that I?ve eaten recalled meat? According to the complaint, no screening tests or treatments have been found for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Those who suspect they?ve eaten recalled meat should contact their physician for more information.

http://www.hagens-berman.com/files/madcowfaq1-13-051105661006369.html

Do Stores That Offer Loyalty Cards Have a Duty to Notify Customers of Product Safety Recalls? A Recent Suit Raises This Novel Question By ANITA RAMASASTRY ----

Thursday, Aug. 05, 2004

An interesting new Washington state court suit raises an important question: If a retailer benefits from collecting personally identifiable information about its customers, does it have a corresponding duty to use such data to alert its customers that products they've bought have been recalled for health or safety reasons? And if so, could turning over private data to companies actually create benefits, as well as privacy risks, for the consumer?

In the suit, consumer Jill Crowson is suing her grocery store -- Quality Food Center (QFC), a subsidiary of Kroger -- for negligent infliction of emotional distress and disregard of a "duty to warn" under the Washington Product Liability Act. Crowson alleges in her complaint that QFC failed to alert her family that ground beef it had sold them had been recalled in December's mad-cow scare.

Yet, Crowson says, QFC easily could have done so through information it maintained connected with her Advantage card - a "loyalty card" that meant QFC had Crowson's name, address and purchasing information. According to her complaint, QFC tracks every purchase made by consumers presenting the Advantage Card, including product description, date of purchase, store of purchase and the price, and saves that data alongside customer contact information.

Now, Crowson says, her family members "feel like walking time bombs" knowing they may be infected with the human form of mad-cow disease which the complaint states may have an up-to-30-year incubation period. And they are not the only ones: Crowson is seeking class action status for herself and what she believes are "hundreds" of similarly-situated Washington customers at QFC's approximately 40 stores in the state.

Some lawyers think Crowson's suit is a stretch. Federal law does not impose on companies a specific duty to notify consumers when tainted meat is recalled under the direction of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), as was the case here. Also, Crowson and her family, and the class she seeks to represent, are suing based on fear (and possible future harm), not current illness. Moreover, the chance they will actually get Mad Cow Disease some time in the future are apparently remote.

Nevertheless, the lawsuit has strong intuitive appeal: QFC could have saved the Crowsons and others like them a lot of worry, and perhaps sleepless nights, with what appears would have been minimal effort, using information at its digital fingertips. And the court has already once refused to dismiss it - finding that there were sufficient factual questions about the beef and about QFC's responsibility to the Crowsons, to merit further exploration of the evidence, through discovery and in the courtroom.

Regardless of the outcome of Crowson's suit, it underscores the need for retailers and policymakers to examine what sort of responsibilities come with private data gathering under loyalty card schemes.

The Lawsuit: The Chronology of Facts Alleged, and the Loyalty Card at Issue

On December 22 and 23, 2003, Crowson bought ground beef from a QFC store. Also on December 23, 2003, the USDA recalled Washington beef after it confirmed that a cow slaughtered in Washington had been infected with Mad Cow Disease. But Crowson says QFC did not pull the affected meat from its shelves until December 24, and did not post signs in its stores announcing the recall until December 27. By then, the Crowson family had eaten the meat.

Crowson states that she only learned of the recall by reading an article in her local newspaper. She said she subsequently called the supermarket chain, then faxed QFC a letter asking that her purchase be traced through her QFC Advantage card. On January 10, she was notified that her ground beef purchase was indeed from the recalled batch.

Crowson says that what QFC allegedly did in response to the recall - pulling the beef from shelves the next day, and posting signs three days after that -- was far from enough. She says it should have immediately warned customers who had bought possibly tainted meat through newspaper, radio and television advertising -- and by contacting individually those who, like her, had Advantage cards. Its failure to do so, she says, is what makes the company liable to her and other shoppers.

The Advantage Card is known in the retail industry as a customer "loyalty card" - providing discounts on specific items, in exchange for consumer information that will aid in better tailoring the company's marketing efforts. Combining the data from one's loyalty card application with data from other commercial databases or public records (for examples, mortgage records, or court filings) can often allow a very specific profile of each consumer.

Some states limit the types of information that a grocery store can collect from you when you register for a loyalty card. For example, California state law prohibits a grocery store from requiring that you turn over your social security or your driver's license number.

Companies, of course, stress the potential savings that might result from use of a loyalty card. Consider, for instance, the sales pitch on the QFC website it reads: "If you don't have a QFC Advantage Card, you're missing out! The Advantage Card is a powerful new way to save on the groceries you buy every day. It gives you the best of all possible worlds: premium quality, superb service and lower prices. That's something no other grocery store can match. So make sure you take advantage of the big savings."

Privacy advocates complain that loyalty cards result in the improper use - and, often, sale to third parties - of customers' private information. QFC apparently doesn't sell customers' data to third parties, however. Its website promises that "QFC will not release your name to any list service or manufacturer, and that such information will be held in the strictest of confidence-even within our company."

Privacy advocates also warn, however, that even if third-party sales of data are not allowed, the data compiled can always be accessed with a subpoena or warrant and used against the customer in court proceedings. Meanwhile, consumer advocates claim that certain loyalty cards don't really offer the savings they promise. Nevertheless, numerous stores employ loyalty cards.

Turning the Privacy Debate on Its Head: With Great Information, Comes Great Responsibility?

The Crowson lawsuit turns the privacy debate on its head. Typically, privacy advocates ask retailers to safeguard the personal information they collect about their shoppers. In this case, in contrast, plaintiff is asking that QFC delve into its database to notify her about a meat recall.

QFC does this very thing if a consumer loses his or her keys with an Advantage Card attached to them - returning the keys free of charge. So Crowson's attorney, Steve Berman, asks: "If they can contact you over a lost set of car keys, why couldn't they contact you and tell you that the beef you purchased could kill you?"

According to some news reports, QFC was reluctant to call customers regarding the recall based on privacy concerns. But in this case, the concerns seem misplaced. No privacy law is violated when a consumer communicates with the customer herself regarding private information - indeed, every offer the customer receives is, in a sense, this kind of communication. When the customer is receiving personalized discounts based on her purchase history, why can't she receive personalized health and safety warnings based on that history, too?

Was There a Duty to Warn Here?

From the law's perspective, the question will be not whether QFC ideally should have warned the Crowsons - of course it should have. The question will be if it had a legal duty to do so. Such a duty would come from either the common law of torts, which allows claims where there is a duty to behave reasonably to prevent foreseeable harm to others. . Or it might come from the Washington product liability statute - which, as noted above, creates a "duty to warn" in certain situations.

And of course, if there is no current duty, the legislature may see fit to pass a statute creating such a duty. :It may seem more prudent, however, for retailers to voluntarily assume such a responsibility. When companies benefit from collecting customer information, shouldn't they also assume a duty to protect customers from known risks associated with that very information? Some risks, of course, may be a matter of opinion. But this one was not: The fact of the risk was acknowledged by the USDA recall of the meat. With this kind of clear notice of the risk, it seems that QFC either does - or ought to - have a duty to protect customers from this risk.

Of course, should a retailer not wish to take on this responsibility, it can also change its loyalty program. QFC and other retailers could still track consumer purchases without asking them for personally identifiable information.

http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20040805.html

FindLaw's Writ - Ramasastry: Mad Cow in the USA

http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20031230.html

Family to sue grocery chain

A Seattle family that ate beef linked to the US's only known case of BSE has filed a classaction

lawsuit against the grocery chain QFC, claiming the company negligently exposed

them and others to "highly hazardous" meat and did not properly notify them that they had

bought it.34 The suit contends that Jill Crowson and her family bought and later ate ground

beef from their local QFC that was part of a batch processed at Vern's Moses Lake Meats on

9 December 2003 and included meat from the diseased Holstein. The beef was later shipped

to wholesalers and retailers in Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Montana and Nevada.

After government scientists confirmed on 23 December that the Holstein was infected with

BSE, businesses began pulling potentially affected beef from store shelves under a voluntary

recall. But, the family's suit claims, although QFC was aware of the recall, the store did not

begin pulling the beef from about 40 of its stores until 24 December. The company also did

not try to warn customers about the recalled beef until 27 December – and only then with

small, inconspicuous signs inside the stores, the suit claims. The family only learned QFC had

9

sold any of the beef in question after reading a news story on 10 January about a man who

discovered his family had eaten affected beef that he bought at a local QFC store, Crowson

said. She later called QFC and faxed the company a signed letter asking that it track

purchases made on her QFC Advantage Card, and on 12 January the company notified

Crowson that the beef she bought and served to her family was, in fact, part of the recalled

batch, she said.

The family seeks unspecified damages for emotional distress and medical monitoring costs.

Crowson said her reason for bringing the lawsuit is not about money. "The more I've thought

about this, the angrier I've gotten," she said. Neither the company nor its parent corporation,

Kroger, have commented.

http://www.which.net/campaigns/food/safety/bse_reports/bserep0304.pdf

* GAO-05-51 October 2004 FOOD SAFETY (over 500 customers receiving potentially BSE contaminated beef) - TSS 10/20/04

October 2004 FOOD SAFETY USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food

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Page 38 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs To examine the voluntary recall of beef products associated with the December 2003 discovery of an animal infected with BSE, we analyzed the distribution lists USDA collected from companies and the verification checks it conducted to develop a diagram illustrating the location and volume of recalled beef that reached different levels of the distribution chain. We compared the distribution lists and verification checks to identify how many customers listed on the distribution lists did not receive the recalled beef and the number of customers not listed on distribution lists that received the recalled beef. We interviewed USDA and FDA staff involved with the recall to understand the timing of recall actions and the challenges encountered during the recall. To develop information on the 2002 recall of ground beef by a ConAgra plant in Greeley, Colorado, we reviewed USDA s recall file and other documents on the recall. We also met with the department s Office of Inspector General and reviewed the Inspector General s September 2003 report.1 We conducted our review from May 2003 through August 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 1U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General, Great Plains Region Audit Report: Food Safety and Inspection Service: Oversight of Production Process and Recall at ConAgra Plant (Establishment 969), Report No. 24601-2-KC (September 2003). Page 39 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Appendix II On December 23, 2003, USDA announced that a cow in the state of Washington had tested positive for BSE commonly referred to as mad cow disease. This appendix describes the actions USDA took to recall the meat and the actions FDA took with respect to FDA-regulated products, such as animal feed and cosmetics, made from rendered parts of the animal. Beef Recall Was Triggered by a BSEPositive Sample from One Cow On December 9, 2003, the recalling company slaughtered 23 cows. USDA, in accordance with its BSE surveillance policy at the time, took a sample of 1 cow that was unable to walk, although the condition of the tested cow is now disputed. USDA did not process the sample in its Ames, Iowa National Veterinary Services Laboratory in an expedited manner because the cow did not show symptoms of neurological disorder. USDA test results indicated a presumptive positive for BSE on December 23, 2003. Recall Begun in December 2003 Was Completed in March 2004 On December 23, 2003, after learning about the positive BSE test, USDA headquarters notified the Boulder District Office, which is the field office with jurisdiction over the recalling firm. The Boulder District began gathering information about the recalling company s product distribution. Field staff telephoned the recalling company and were on-site at 7:00 p.m. The Boulder District initially thought 3 days of the recalling company s production would have to be recalled, but further examination of facility cleanup and shipping records revealed that it was only necessary to recall 1 day of production. USDA recall staff convened at 9:15 p.m. and discussed the science related to BSE and whether the recalling company s cleanup practices were sufficient to limit the recall to 1 day of production. Following USDA s determination to conduct a Class II recall that is, the beef posed a remote possibility of adverse health consequences USDA contacted the recalling company to discuss recall details and the press release. The press release and Recall Notification Report were released that evening. On December 24, 2003, USDA s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) sent inspectors to the recalling company s primary customers to obtain secondary customer distribution lists and product shipping records. USDA conducted 100 percent verification checks for this recall it contacted every customer that received the recalled meat. This level of verification checks is well above the percentag of checks conducted by USDA district offices for the Class I recalls we reviewed. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 40 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs On December 26, 2003, USDA began checking the primary and secondary customers of the recalling company that it was aware of, although the entire product distribution chain was unknown. During the checks, USDA tried to determine if the product was further distributed, and it used verification checks to acquire distribution lists for secondary and tertiary customers of the recalling company. Verification checks continued until February 25, 2004. Three USDA districts conducted these verification checks. The Boulder District coordinated the checks and assigned checks to the Minneapolis District Office for customers in Montana and to the Alameda District Office for customers in California. USDA required that 100 percent of the primary checks, 50 percent of the secondary checks, and 20 percent of the tertiary checks be conducted on-site. According to USDA, more than 50 percent of the secondary checks were actually conducted on-site. FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. According to USDA, the recall took a long time to complete because USDA contacted each customer at least twice. USDA first contacted each customer to conduct the check and again to verify product disposition. On February 25, 2004, the Boulder District concluded that the recall was conducted in an effective manner. On March 1, 2004, USDA s Recall Management Division recommended that the agency terminate the recall, and USDA sent a letter to the recalling company to document that USDA considered the recall to be complete. Recall Was Complicated by Inaccurate Distribution Lists and Mixing of Potentially Contaminated and Noncontaminated Beef USDA used distribution lists and shipping records to piece together where the recalled product was distributed. According to USDA, one of the recalling company s three primary customers was slow in providing its customer list. USDA could not begin verification activities for that primary customer without this list. Furthermore, some customers of the recalling company provided USDA with imprecise lists that did not specify which customers received the recalled product. As a consequence, USDA could not quickly determine the scope of product distribution and had to take time conducting extra research using shipping invoices to determine which specific customers received the product. Even when USDA determined the amount and location of beef, the agency still had trouble tracking the beef in certain types of establishments, such as grocery store distributors. USDA could not easily track the individual stores where those distributors sent the beef because of product mixing Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 41 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs and the distributors record-keeping practices. Generally, distributors purchase beef from multiple sources, mix it in their inventory, and lose track of the source of the beef they send to the stores that they supply. To deal with this problem, USDA first identified the dates when recalled beef was shipped to the distributors and then asked for a list of the stores that were shipped any beef after those dates. Consequently, some stores were included in the recall that may never have received recalled beef. The recall was also complicated by repeated mixing of recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, thereby increasing the amount of meat involved in the recall. The recalling company slaughtered 23 cows on December 9, 2003, and shipped those and 20 other carcasses to a primary customer on December 10, 2003. The recalling company s carcasses were tagged to identify the slaughter date and the individual cow. The primary customer removed the identification tags and mixed the 23 recalled carcasses with the 20 nonrecalled carcasses. Because the carcasses could not be distinguished, the reca l included all 43 carcasses at the primary customer. After one round of processing at the primary customer, the meat from the carcasses was shipped to two other processing facilities. Both establishments further mixed the recalled meat from the 43 carcasses with meat from other sources. In all, the mixing of beef from 1 BSE-positive cow resulted in over 500 customers receiving potentially contaminated beef. Imprecise distribution lists and the mixing of recalled beef combined to complicate USDA s identification of where the product went. Specifically, on December 23, 2003, USDA s initial press release stated that the recalling company was located in Washington State. Three days later, on December 26, 2003, USDA announced that the recalled beef was distributed within Washington and Oregon. On December 27, 2003, USDA determined that one of the primary customers of the recalling firm distributed beef to facilities in California and Nevada, in addition to Washington and Oregon, for a total of four states. On December 28, 2003, USDA announced that some of the secondary customers of the recalling company may also have distributed the product to Alaska, Montana, Hawaii, Idaho, and Guam, for a total of eight states and one territory. On January 6, 2004, over 2 weeks from recall initiation, USDA determined that the beef went to only six states Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Idaho, and Montana and that no beef went to Alaska, Hawaii, or Guam. To reach that conclusion, USDA used the distribution lists, shipping records, and sales invoices that it received from companies to piece together exactly where the recalled beef may have been sent. The lists Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 42 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs showed that 713 customers may have received the recalled beef; 6 of those may have received beef from more than one source. USDA determined that 176 customers on the lists did not actually receive recalled beef, including the customers in Guam and Hawaii. USDA s review also indicated that recalled beef was probably not shipped to Alaska or Utah, and USDA checked 2 retailers in Alaska and 3 retailers in Utah to confirm that was the case. In total, USDA conducted verification checks on 537 of the 713 customers on the lists. USDA s initial checks identified an additional 45 customers that may have received the recalled beef that were not included on the distribution lists, for a total of 582 verification checks. Figure 4 summarizes USDA s verification efforts during the recall. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 43 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs Figure 4: USDA s Recall Verification Checks by Location and Customer Type for Meat Associated with the Animal Infected with BSE Note: USDA checked 15 primary, 40 secondary, and 526 tertiary customers plus the recalling company, for a total of 582 verification checks. USDA s press release stated that the recall involved 10,410 pounds of beef products, and the USDA recall coordinator for this recall told us that downstream processors mixed the recalled beef with nonrecalled beef, for a total of more than 38,000 pounds of beef that was distributed at the secondary customer level. According to USDA officials involved with the D = Distributor R = Retailer SF = Storage facility P = Processor Primary customers (15 total) Recalling slaughterhouse (WA) 1 R (OR) 1 P (WA) 1 P (OR) 1 P (OR) 11 R (WA) Secondary customers (40 total) Tertiary customers (526 total) 1 R (OR) 1 SF (OR) 3 D (OR) 3 D (WA) 2 dual D (OR) 59 R (OR) 79 R (WA) 5 R (ID) 3 R (UT) 4 R (MT) 161 R (WA) 8 R (ID) 15 R (OR) 2 R (AK) 31 R (OR) 8 R (WA) 10 R (NV) 5 R (ID) 10 R (CA) 2 R (CA) 17 R (OR) 5 R (WA) 1 D (NV) 11 R (CA) 85 R (NV) 3 D (OR) 11 R (OR) 2 D (CA) 26 R (CA) 2 R (WA) ( ) Acronyms in parentheses are postal abbreviations for each state. Source: GAO analysis of USDA verification check documents. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery f an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 44 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs recall, the precise amount of meat that was sold at the retail level is unknown because retailers at the tertiary level further mixed nonrecalled meat with potentially contaminated meat. USDA told us that more than 64,000 pounds of beef was ultimately returned or destroyed by customers, and that, because of the mixing, it was not able to determine how much of the original 10,410 pounds of recalled beef was contained in the 64,000 pounds that were recovered. FDA s Role in USDA s Recall Parts of the BSE-infected animal slaughtered on December 9, 2003, were not used for food, but they were sent to renderers to be separated into raw materials, such as proteins and blood. Rendered materials are used for many purposes, including cosmetics and vaccines. FDA has jurisdiction over renderers. When USDA learned of the BSE-infected cow on December 23, 2003, the agency immediately notified FDA. On December 24, 2003, FDA sent an inspection team to a renderer that handled materials from the BSE cow. Inspectors confirmed that the parts of the slaughtered BSE positive cow were on the premises. FDA later identified a second company that potentially rendered material from the slaughtered BSE cow. Both renderers agreed to voluntarily hold all product processed from the diseased cow and dispose of the product as directed by FDA and local authorities. On January 7, 2004, 15 containers of potentially contaminated, rendered material (meat and bone meal) were inadvertently loaded on a ship, and on January 8, 2004, the ship left Seattle, Washington, for Asia. The renderer initiated steps to recover the shipped material, so it could be disposed of as directed by FDA and local authorities. The ship carrying the material returned to the United States on February 24, 2004, and the material was disposed of in a landfill on March 2, 2004. On January 12, 2004, FDA asked both renderers to expand their voluntary holds to rendered materials processed from December 23, 2003, through January 9, 2004, because they may have rendered some recalled meat or trim that was recovered from retail establishments. Both renderers agreed to the expanded product hold. In total, FDA requested that renderers voluntarily hold approximately 2,000 tons of rendered material. FDA confirmed that none of the potentially contaminated, rendered material entered commerce, because FDA accounted for all rendered material. FDA Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 45 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs reported that no recall was necessary because no product was distributed commercially by the rendering companies. USDA and FDA Worked Together on the Recall USDA and FDA worked together in two ways. First, both agencies notified each other if their investigations yielded any information about products within the jurisdiction of the other agency. For instance, when conducting the second round of verification checks, USDA tracked the disposition of the product to renderers and landfills and notified FDA when the product went to renderers. Second, FDA officials helped conduct verification checks. FDA conducted 32 of the 582 verification checks (approximately 5 percent) for the USDA recall. Officials from both agencies indicated they regularly interacted and shared information. Table 3 outlines the agencies actions. Table 3: Detailed Timeline of USDA, FDA, and Company Actions Related to the Discovery of an Animal Infected with BSE Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions 12/9/03 " USDA samples cow for BSE. " BSE cow is slaughtered. 12/11/03 " Sample is sent to Ames, Iowa, for BSE testing. " Recalling company sends carcasses to primary customer for processing. 12/12/03 " Primary customer sends meat products to two other primary customers for further processing. 12/12 - 12/23/03 " Other primary customers distribute recalled product to secondary customers. " Secondary customers distribute recalled product to tertiary custome s. 12/23/03 " BSE test results are presumptively positive. " Recall meeting. " Initiation of voluntary recall. " Press release. " FDA notified of BSE test results. " FDA dispatches investigation teams. 12/24/03 " FDA inspects Renderer 1. " FDA determines some rendered material from Renderer 1 is intended for Indonesia. " FDA discovers some material may have been sent to Renderer 2. " Renderer 1 agrees to hold remaining rendered material. " Recalling company contacts primary customers. " Primary customers contact their customers. Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 46 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs 12/25/03 " USDA receives confirmation from reference lab in England that cow in question is BSE positive. 12/26/03 " Verification checks begin " USDA announces recalled product in Washington State and Oregon. " FDA begins process of comparing records to ensure all products from Renderers 1 and 2 are accounted for. " Renderer 2 agrees to hold all material that may have been derived from BSE cow. None of the rendered material has been distributed. 12/27/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, and Nevada. " FDA issues statement confirming that the rendering plants that processed all of the nonedible material from the BSE cow have placed a voluntary hold on all of the potentially infectious product, none of which had left the control of the companies and entered commercial distribution. 12/28/03 " USDA announces recalled product was distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. 12/29/03 " Food Safety and Inspection Service determines that the recalled meat products were distributed to 42 locations, with 80 percent of the products distributed to stores in Oregon and Washington State. 12/31/03 " FDA offers assistance to USDA to complete recall verification checks. 1/6/04 " USDA determines recalled product was only distributed in Washington State, Oregon, California, Nevada, Montana, and Idaho. 1/8/04 " FDA is notified by the renderer that some of the rendered material on hold from Renderer 1 was inadvertently shipped to Asia. Renderer 1 commits to isolate and return the rendered material. " Rendering company notifies FDA of shipment of product on hold. (Continued From Previous Page) Date USDA recall actions FDA actions Company actions Appendix II Federal Actions Associated with the Discovery of an Animal in the United States Infected with BSE Page 47 GAO-05-51 Food Recall Programs Source: GAO analysis of USDA and FDA information. 1/12/04 " FDA advises Renderers 1 and 2 that they may have rendered meat or trim subject to recall from retail stores. " FDA requests Renderers 1 and 2 to place all rendered material from December 23 to January 9 on hold. " FDA determines neither renderer had shipped rendered material manufactured after December 23, 2003. 2/9/04 " All rendered material was disposed of in landfill, except material shipped to Asia. 2/24/04 " Ship carrying rendered material returns to U.S. port. 2/25/04 " Verification checks complete. " USDA Boulder District Office concludes recall is effective. 3/1/04 " Recall is closed. 3/2/04 " FDA observes disposal in landfill of remaining rendered material...

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REPORTS

1. Food Safety: USDA and FDA Need to Better Ensure Prompt and Complete Recalls of Potentially Unsafe Food. GAO-05-51, October 7.tss http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-51 Highlights - http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d0551high.pdf

Appendix C. Agents that require specific government approval for scientific investigations within the USA.a

Select agents, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services onlyb High consequence pathogens and agents, U.S. Department of Agriculture onlyc HIgh consequence livestock pathogens and toxins, overlap agents and toxinsd

(NO HUMAN TSE LISTED ???...tss) BSE agent

http://www.nwhc.usgs.gov/publications/disease_emergence/AppendixC.pdf

GALVESTON BAY FISH CONSUMPTION WARNING DUE TO PCBs

http://galvestonbay.blogspot.com/

Monday, July 14, 2008 Heedless practices of Texas industry and DREDGING OF SHIP CHANNEL, now poisoning sport fishing industry, AND IT'S CONSUMERS

http://galvestonbay.blogspot.com/2008/07/heedless-practices-of-texas-industry.html

http://www.texashuntfish.com/app/forum/19324/GALVESTON-BAY-FISH-CONSUMPTION-WARNING-and-ship-channel-dredging-for-BAYPORT

http://www.txcn.com/sharedcontent/dws/txcn/houston/stories/khou070727_tj_flesheaters.c6661f6e.html

http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2008-07-09-salmonella_N.htm

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5882291.html

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/new01061.html

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html

http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/news/pr/2005/2005Jun30_BSE_Positive_Results.pdf

http://www.usaha.org/committees/reports/2006/report-fe-2006.pdf

Emergence of ‘Atypical’ BSE Raises Questions About Cattle Surveillance Strategies Scientists addressing the U.S. Animal Health Association’s annual meeting last week in Minneapolis confirmed that both native-born U.S. cases of BSE involved an “atypical” strain of the brain-wasting disease different from the “classical” BSE strain diagnosed thus far in Great Britain and most cases occurring in other countries. Dr. Linda Detwiler of the University of Virginia-Maryland Regional College of Veterinary Medicine said scientists now have identified two strains of “atypical” BSE – a “high-molecular” and “low-molecular” – first detected in 2004 in two cattle in Italy and three in France. She said the “high-molecular” strain also was diagnosed in the two native-born U.S. cases, which involved a 12-year-old cow in Texas diagnosed in November 2004 and a 10-year-old Alabama cow diagnosed in March 2006. The two different strains are designated based on the different molecular staining patterns they show on the Western Blot test used to confirm BSE. Detwiler said that in addition to the U.S., Italian and French cases, “atypical” BSE has been diagnosed in Canada (in a 15-year-old cow in Manitoba diagnosed earlier this year), Denmark, Poland, Japan, Belgium, Holland and Sweden. Most of the “atypical” cases involved animals more than eight years old, she said. Significantly, Detwiler said many of the cases exhibited no clinical signs of the disease, which has raised questions about whether countries should conduct BSE surveillance testing on a greater number of older, apparently healthy cattle at slaughter. She said the “high-molecular” atypical BSE strain also has a longer incubation period before clinical signs of the disease are observed than the “low-molecular” variety, based upon experimental trials in mice. Detwiler, a former official with USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, said the origin of “atypical” BSE is unknown at this stage. Speculation has focused on whether it is a variation or mutation of classical BSE, or whether it is caused by a different route of exposure, or exposure of the animal at an older age. There is no definitive evidence that “atypical” BSE occurs sporadically, she said. But scientists have shown that tissues – such as brain and spinal cord – infected with “atypical” BSE are infectious. Based upon what currently is known, she advised that cattle surveillance be maintained, and said it may be necessary to “rethink” the target population of animals tested for BSE to include more apparently healthy older cattle. She also said additional research is needed on the pathogenesis of “atypical” BSE and how it may be transmitted to cattle or other species; and she encouraged countries not to relax BSE-prevention feed restrictions.

http://www.ngfa.org/pdfs/FactsonFeedOct2006.pdf

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Implementation of 2008 Feed Ban Enhancements Questions and Answers July 15, 2008

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/implementation-of-2008-feed-ban.html

SEAC Draft minutes of the 100th meeting held on 25th April 2008

http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/07/seac-draft-minutes-of-100th-meeting.html

Thursday, July 10, 2008 A Novel Human Disease with Abnormal Prion Protein Sensitive to Protease update July 10, 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/novel-human-disease-with-abnormal-prion.html

Thursday, July 10, 2008 A New Prionopathy update July 10, 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/new-prionopathy-update-july-10-2008.html

The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.

http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html

IF you think that the USDA et al ordered the largest beef recall in history (some 143 million pounds), just over a couple abused animals, and that it was not a public health issue, i am hear to tell you, that is incorrect.

USDA DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM i.e. non-ambulatory, the most high risk cow for BSE typical or atypical TSE (last two cows that were documented in the USA i.e. Texas and Alabama both were of the atypical BSE. please note ;

"Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD."

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD April 3, 2008

please see full text with additional comments and links @ ;

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/

Sunday, March 16, 2008

MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html

IS THERE A SCRAPIE-LIKE DISEASE IN CATTLE ?

In April of 1985, a mink rancher in Wisconsin reported a debilitating neurologic disease in his herd which we diagnosed as TME by histopathologic findings confirmed by experimental transmission to mink and squirrel monkeys. The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. She had never been fed.

We believe that these findings may indicate the presence of a previously unrecognized scrapie-like disease in cattle and wish to alert dairy practitioners to this possibility.

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PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL WESTERN CONFERENCE FOR FOOD ANIMAL VETERINARY MEDICINE, University of Arizona, March 17-19, 1986

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09a/tab01.pdf

http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf

USDA DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/04/gao-report-on-humane-methods-of.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/usda-certified-dead-stock-downer-cow.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/usda-still-pandering-to-industry-still_27.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/usda-still-pandering-to-industry-still.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/recalled-beef-from-chino-slaughterhouse.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-typical-vs-atypical.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/downer-cow-blues-senators-want.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/mr-will-hueston-dvm-on-school-lunch.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/california-downer-cow-meat-worker-i-was.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/usda-questions-and-answers.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/usda-to-hallmark-we-want-our-plaque.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/house-committee-subpoenas.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/california-lists-possible-recipients-of.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/03/to-hard-working-employees-of-usda-and.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/beef-recall-nationwide-school-lunch.html

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html

[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle

03-025IFA 03-025IFA-2 Terry S. Singeltary

9/13/2005

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/

[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf

second line of lies... i mean defense i.e. fda mad cow feed ban ;

Friday, April 25, 2008

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html

Thursday, May 1, 2008

DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW BAN i.e. non-ambulatory policy still not changed by USDA May 1, 2008

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/05/dead-stock-downer-cow-ban-ie-non.html

TSS