Spain to cull nearly 100,000 mink after coronavirus outbreak at farm
2020 July 16, Thursday | farming | Environment
The Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment orders the slaughter of minks from the exploitation of La Puebla de Valverde
The Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment, Joaquín Olona, and the General Director of Food Quality and Safety, Enrique Novales, during the press conference.
The Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment of the Government of Aragon has ordered the slaughter of minks from the exploitation of La Puebla de Valverde (Teruel), whose owner is Secapiel SL
The General Directorate of Food Quality and Health proceeded to the precautionary immobilization of the farm on May 22, 2020, when 7 of its workers tested positive for Covid-19. Since then, the animals have been tracked and specimens - or by-products - have not been allowed to enter or leave the farm. However, it was verified that the company complied with all the requirements regarding animal health and the measures related to biosecurity to be communicated were communicated.
The first tests were carried out on May 28 and following the protocol established by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, a random sample of 7 animals was selected and an RT-PCR test was performed at the National Reference Laboratory. for the Diagnosis of Diseases in Animals of the Ministry, located in Algete (Madrid). The results are known on June 3 and were negative.
The Government of Aragon decides to maintain immobilization and continue to monitor the animals on the farm. On June 8, a second sampling is carried out, taking 20 samples of sera and oropharyngeal swabs, rectals and exudates of internal organs, resulting in 1 positive no. conclusive against SARS-Cov-2, given these signs of infection, it was decided to continue testing on the farm
On June 22, a third test is carried out in which a random sample of 30 specimens is selected. The results confirm 5 positives, which is equivalent to 16% of the selected sample.
Before making a decision that would seriously harm the owner of the farm, the Department of Agriculture orders a fourth sample of 90 specimens, to be held on July 7. The results, which are known this Monday, July 13, determine 78 positives, 86.67% of the sample.
After the results obtained, the Government of Aragon establishes as a preventive measure the slaughter of the 92,700 minks that currently exist on the farm. Although, during this time, an abnormal behavior has not been detected in the animals nor has there been an increase in mortality in them.
The slaughter order will be executed directly by the Department of Agriculture itself, with the support of the public company SARGA and adopting all the necessary biosecurity measures.
The compulsory slaughter has been ordered in application of the provisions of Law 8/2003, of April 24, on animal health -which includes compensation-, whose provisions and provisions must be referred to.
It should be clarified that the Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Environment cannot determine if there is transmission from humans to animals or vice versa, since such a conclusion should be the subject of another study and that this decision is taken as a preventive measure.
Audona counselor Olona are attached Full press conference, on the YouTube channel of the Government of Aragon, from minute 22.10:
While many questions about COVID-19 remain, moving forward government agencies are offering guidances. USDA urges an abundance of caution for humans infected with COVID-19 and their interactions with animals.
As this story of the infected tiger goes viral, both the UDSA and FDA have issued guidelines and recommendations regarding both pets and livestock and the risk for infections within animal populations.
According to an official statement from the USDA, “Anyone sick with COVID-19 should restrict contact with animals, out of an abundance of caution including pets, during their illness, just as they would with other people. Although there have not been reports of pets becoming sick with COVID-19 in the United States, it is still recommended that people sick with COVID-19 limit contact with animals until more information is known about the virus. If a sick person must care for a pet or be around animals, they should wash their hands before and after the interaction.”
COVID-19: animals, veterinary and zoonotic links
Ruchi TiwariORCID Icon, Kuldeep DhamaORCID Icon, Khan SharunORCID Icon, Mohd. Iqbal YatooORCID Icon, Yashpal Singh MalikORCID Icon, Rajendra SinghORCID Icon, show all
Pages 169-182 | Received 05 Mar 2020, Accepted 05 May 2020, Accepted author version posted online: 12 May 2020, Published online:25 May 2020
Abstract
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has spread over 210 countries and territories beyond China shortly. On February 29, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) denoted it in a high-risk category, and on March 11, 2020, this virus was designated pandemic, after its declaration being a Public Health International Emergency on January 30, 2020. World over high efforts are being made to counter and contain this virus. The COVID-19 outbreak once again proves the potential of the animal-human interface to act as the primary source of emerging zoonotic diseases. Even though the circumstantial evidence suggests the possibility of an initial zoonotic emergence, it is too early to confirm the role of intermediate hosts such as snakes, pangolins, turtles, and other wild animals in the origin of SARS-CoV-2, in addition to bats, the natural hosts of multiple coronaviruses such as SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV. The lessons learned from past episodes of MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV are being exploited to retort this virus. Best efforts are being taken up by worldwide nations to implement effective diagnosis, strict vigilance, heightened surveillance, and monitoring, along with adopting appropriate preventive and control strategies. Identifying the possible zoonotic emergence and the exact mechanism responsible for its initial transmission will help us to design and implement appropriate preventive barriers against the further transmission of SARS-CoV-2. This review discusses in brief about the COVID-19/SARS-CoV-2 with a particular focus on the role of animals, the veterinary and associated zoonotic links along with prevention and control strategies based on One-health approaches.
Keywords: COVID-19, SARS-CoV-2, animals, veterinary, zoonosis, transmission, one health
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7. Conclusion and future prospects
The live-animal markets, just like the Huanan South China Seafood Market, will continue to act as an ideal point that promotes inter-species contact between the wild and domestic animal species. Hence, the possibility of inter-species transmission of CoV infections at such hot spots is a point of concern to human beings due to the adaptive genetic recombination that occurs in these viruses. The permanent ban on the wild animal trade should not be implemented as it will only shift the trade to the black market. Rather than going for the complete ban, it is better to regulate the trade of wild animal species all around the country. The emergence of newer zoonotic infections like SARS-CoV-2 is inevitable in the future. Hence, local and international regulatory authorities need to develop and implement robust disease control mechanisms that effectively decrease the possibility of human exposure to wild animals. The SARS-CoV-2 outbreak is just another critical example that proves the existence of a close but straightforward interaction between humans, animals, and the environmental health that can potentially result in the emergence of a deadly pandemic. The past decades have shown us the destructive potential of several zoonotic coronavirus infections like SARS, MERS, and now SARS-CoV-2 that calls for the implementation of One Health as a framework to protect humankind from emerging pathogens soon.
COVID-19: a novel zoonotic disease caused by a coronavirus from China: what we know and what we don’t
John S Mackenzie and David W Smith
Additional article information
At the end of December, 2019, a new disease of unknown aetiology appeared in Wuhan, China. It was quickly identified as a novel betacoronavirus, and related to SARS-CoV and a number of other bat-borne SARS-like coronaviruses. The virus rapidly spread to all provinces in China, as well as a number of countries overseas, and was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern by the Director-General of the World Health Organization on 30 January 2020. This paper describes the evolution of the outbreak, and the known properties of the novel virus, SARS-CoV-2 and the clinical disease it causes, COVID-19, and comments on some of the important gaps in our knowledge of the virus and the disease it causes. The virus is the third zoonotic coronavirus, after SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, but appears to be the only one with pandemic potential.
Final comments
SARS-CoV-2 is the seventh coronavirus known to infect humans, and the third zoonotic virus after SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV. Bats are the reservoir hosts of a number of additional novel coronaviruses, particularly Chinese horseshoe bats, and a number of these novel coronaviruses can efficiently use multiple orthologs of the SARS receptor, human ACE2, and replicate efficiently in primary human airway cells and achieve in vitro titres equivalent to epidemic strains of SARS-CoV48,49. This indicates that other potential cross-species events could occur in the future. There is therefore a strong reason to ban unregulated wild animal sales in Chinese wet markets, particularly exotic species, both from a public health perspective and for ecological reasons. Such a ban would be difficult to instigate for cultural reasons, but China’s top legislative committee on 24 February 2020, passed a proposal to ban all trade and consumption of wild animals. If this is legislated as a permanent ban, it might help reduce the risk of another novel virus emerging from wildlife in China in the future.
A Critical Needs Assessment for Research in Companion Animals and Livestock Following the Pandemic of COVID-19 in Humans
Tracey McNamara, Juergen A. Richt, and Larry Glickman Published Online:26 May 2020https://doi.org/10.1089/vbz.2020.2650
Abstract
Problem: The emergence of novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) in Wuhan, China, in November 2019 and a growing body of information compel inquiry regarding the transmissibility of infection between humans and certain animal species. Although there are a number of issues to be considered, the following points are most urgent:
The potential for domesticated (companion) animals to serve as a reservoir of infection contributing to continued human-to-human disease, infectivity, and community spread.
The ramifications to food security, economy, and trade issues should coronavirus establish itself within livestock and poultry.
The disruption to national security if SARS-CoV-2 and its fairly well-established effects on smell (hyposmia/anosmia) to critical military service animals including explosive detector dog, narcotics detector dog, specialized search dog, combat tracker dog, mine detection dog, tactical explosive detector dog, improvised explosive device detector dog, patrol explosive detector dog, and patrol narcotics detector dog, as well as multipurpose canines used by special operations such as used by the U.S. customs and border protection agency (e.g., Beagle Brigade).
This article presents in chronological order data that both individually (as received independently from multiple countries) and collectively urge studies that elucidate the following questions.
1. What animal species can be infected with SARS-CoV-2, the likely sources of infection, the period of infectivity, and transmissibility between these animals and to other animal species and humans?
2. What are the best diagnostic tests currently available for companion animals and livestock?
3. What expressions of illness in companion and other animal species can serve as disease markers?
Although it is recognized that robust funding and methodology need to be identified to apply the best scientific investigation into these issues, there may be easily identifiable opportunities to capture information that can guide decision and study.
First, it may be possible to quickly initiate a data collection strategy using in-place animal gatekeepers, such as zookeepers, veterinarians, kennel owners, feed lots, and military animal handlers. If provided a simple surveillance form, their detection of symptoms (lethargy, hyposmia, anosmia, and others) might be quickly reported to a central data collection site if one were created.
Second, although current human COVID-19 disease is aligning around areas of population density and cluster events, it might be possible to overlay animal species density or veterinary reports that could signal some disease association in animals with COVID-19 patients. Unfortunately, although companion animals and zoo species have repeatedly served as sentinels for emerging infectious diseases, they do not currently fall under the jurisdiction of any federal agency and are not under surveillance.
Background: Companion Animals
The issue of the need to evaluate companion animals and their status with regards to SARS-CoV-2 was first raised on January 29 when a member of the senior expert team from China's National Health Commission stated on Chinese state television that pet owners should take extra care of their animals because (1) the virus “moves between mammals”; (2) if your animals “come into contact with the outbreak or people infected with the virus, then your pets should be put in quarantine”; and (3) “because the epidemic spreads between mammals, therefore we should take precaution against other mammals” (Safoora 2020). No scientific data were presented to support this statement but, nonetheless, it prompted a severe public response that resulted in many pet dogs and cats being killed and thousands being abandoned (Wan et al. 2020, Daniels 2020, Thomson 2020b).
This prompted the World Health Organization to state that “there is no evidence dogs and cats can be infected with the virus” (Thomson 2020a, Williams 2020). No scientific data were provided to support this statement about a novel zoonotic threat either. Despite this appeal, the culling of pets continued in China through February 21 (Albawaba 2020). On February 26, Hong Kong's Agriculture, Fisheries, and Conservation Department announced that a pet dog of a COVID-19 patient had tested “weak positive” through RT-PCR. The fact that the dog was asymptomatic along with the inability to recover live virus led to this finding being attributed to environmental contamination from the owner (Simin et al. 2020). However, on March 9, ProMED-mail posted the remarks of the associate director for the Joint Institute for Virology at Hong Kong University who stated “the dog's lack of symptoms showed the virus could live inside it, allowing the animal to secrete and spread the virus at the same time” (Simin et al. 2020).
On March 2, the French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety received a formal request from the Directorate General for Food to assess risks—specifically to give an opinion regarding the potential role of domestic animals (livestock animals and pets) in the spread of SARS-CoV-2. With the exception of work on infections undertaken in transgenic mice (Bao et al. 2020) expressing the human form of ACE2 receptor for the SARS-CoV-2, very few studies have described animals experimentally infected with SARS-CoV-2. They concluded that “additional studies on the interactions between SARS-CoV-2 and ACE2 homologues from various animal species, as well as studies on the distribution of ACE2 in tissue, are necessary to further knowledge on the possible transmission of infection to other species. However, cross-species transmission does not rely solely on the presence of the receptor but also on the presence of other cellular factors required for viral replication. Further studies should also be undertaken to identify these factors” (ANSES 2020).
At the same time, the Ministry of Health in Singapore released a statement discussing the theoretical possibility that COVID-19 could spread from animals to humans or vice versa but that they did not see pets as a “serious vector of transmission” and that there were “no plans to isolate, do contact tracing for pets, or exercise any form of quarantine for animals” (Mahmud 2020). On March 13, the IDEXX veterinary diagnostic laboratory announced that it had tested >3500 dog, cat, and equine specimens from across the United States and South Korea with their COVID-19 RT-qPCR and that they had no positives (IDEXX 2020) What the press release did not make clear, however, is the fact that although animals tested were from affected areas, it is “unknown if any of the animals lived in homes with people that had COVID-19” (ScienceNews 2020). WHO, CDC, and the AVMA accepted IDEXX's assertion that pets posed little risk to public health at face value. On March 13, WHO stated that “pets are generally safe from being infected with coronavirus” (Zhou 2020). But they recently admitted “that pets can get infected, but there is no evidence pets can spread the disease or that the disease can cause an animal to fall ill” (Zhou 2020). On March 16, the AVMA admitted it did not “have a clear answer as to whether SARS-CoV-2 can infect pets at this time…and there is no evidence that pets can become sick. Infectious disease experts, as well as CDC, OIE and WHO indicate there is no evidence to suggest that pet dogs and cats can be a source of infection with SARS-CoV-2, including spread to people” (AVMA 2020). On March 19, a second dog tested positive by RT-PCR in Hong Kong (ScienceNews 2020). The first dog was later found to be positive for SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies confirming the initial test was not a false positive and that the dog had actually been infected (Systematic Reviews for Animals & Food 2020).
On March 27, the first positive cat was diagnosed with COVID-19 in Belgium (Brown 2020, Bryner 2020). Contrary to earlier assertions by health agencies that the virus could not cause illness in pets, the cat developed both respiratory and enteric symptoms and took 9 days to recover. Large amounts of antigen were repeatedly demonstrated in vomit and feces over multiple days, which led scientists to conclude that the cat had indeed been infected by SARS-CoV-2. The Scientific Committee in Belgium said it was “unable to assess the risk” of animal-to-human transmission but did not recommend testing pets until validated diagnostics were available (AFSCA 2020). Between March 27 and 30, scientists still said they considered pets to be “dead end hosts” (Stone 2020) that “the risk of animal to human transmission is very small” and that “animals are not vectors of the epidemic, so there is no reason to abandon your animal” while advising owners “not to rub their nose against their pets” (Brown 2020). On April 3, research was published on the BioRxiv website by Chinese researchers who studied 100 stray and house cats from Wuhan, China, for the presence of SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies. They found ∼15% of them had antibodies in their blood that were specific to the novel coronavirus. On April 18, two cats reportedly tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 in New York. Both cats had owners who were COVID-19 positive, and both animals were exhibiting respiratory signs (Promed mail posted on April 18, 2020) (Zhang 2020).
On April 1, Chinese authors posted several preprint nonpeer-reviewed publications on transmission studies in animals (Shi et al. 2020a), a serological study in cats (Zhang et al. 2020), and ACE2 gene expression in animals (Sun et al. 2020). These studies are the first experimental studies in animals and provide valuable insights into SARS-CoV-2 infection in a variety of species. The transmission study showed that the virus replicates efficiently in cats, that it causes severe disease in juvenile cats, and that there is droplet transmission of the virus from infected to naïve cats. Both, RT-qPCR and immunohistochemistry assays revealed abundant RNA or antigen in respiratory and gut epithelium. The virus did not replicate efficiently in dogs, ducks, chickens, and pigs but did replicate efficiently in cats and ferrets (Shi et al. 2020). The authors said “surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 should be considered as an adjunct to elimination of COVID-19 in humans.” The gene expression study found that ACE2 was “highly expressed in skin, ear tips, lungs and retina of cats and in skin and retina of dogs.” “In addition, we also observed ACE2 expression in the lungs of cats and ferrets, which suggested that these animals may be more suitable for SARS-CoV-2 studies than rodent models” (Sun et al. 2020). As interesting as these studies are, it must be noted that they are small studies and are not peer reviewed at this time. One scientist stated that she doubts the results of the transmission study because they infected cats with very high doses of virus and they do not replicate nature (Zhen 2020).
Background: Working Dogs
Several articles announced an unusual presentation of COVID-19 in asymptomatic people (Young 2020, Yeager 2020, Kwong et al. 2020, Lanse 2020). Patients who subsequently tested positive for COVID-19 reported an early loss of smell and taste. The American College of Otolaryngology proposed adding anosmia, hyposmia, dysgeusia, and ageusia to the list of screening items for COVID-19 patients (Young 2020). This raises the question of whether hyposmia/anosmia and ageusia/dysgeusia occur in animals, specifically in military working dogs, in beagle brigades at CBP and K9 first responder teams?
The U.S. government spends millions of dollars to train bomb-sniffing dogs essential to federal and local law enforcement capabilities (Homeland Security Today 2019, Nelson 2020). Dogs serve many roles in the military and as multipurpose canines as already mentioned. A fully trained bomb detection canine is likely worth over $150,000. Despite decades of trying, researchers have yet to develop a machine as exquisitely sensitive and discerning as a dog's nose (Murphy 2020). Dogs have 220 million scent receptors that is 44 times more than humans. What happens if working dogs lose their sense of smell? Unfortunately, the only susceptibility study published on dogs (Shi et al. 2020a) did not include histopathologic evaluation or immunohistochemical staining of the nasal passages in the experimentally SARS-CoV-2-infected dogs that were necropsied, so this remains an important but unanswered question. If hyposmia/anosmia does occur in dogs, it will have a devastating impact on U.S. national security. In contrast, if an effect of SARS-CoV-2 on smell is conclusively ruled out, perhaps dogs can be trained to detect people with COVID-19 and enhance surveillance for the disease (BBC 2020). Either way, there is a critical need for studies to investigate this issue.
Background: Livestock and Poultry
The COVID-19 pandemic is significantly impacting the U.S. food supply and agricultural systems. There is a need to develop and deploy rapid strategies that allow mitigation of threats from SARS-CoV-2 across the food and agriculture enterprise. It is critical to ensure the availability of a safe, nutritious, and abundant food supply for U.S citizens, and respective tools and technologies have to be developed to protect the food and agricultural supply chain, safety of our foods, health, and security of livestock, as well as the well-being of farmers, food service providers, and rural Americans. Therefore, reliable data are needed on the susceptibility of livestock (cattle, sheep, goats, horses, alternative livestock, and others) and poultry (chickens, turkey, ducks, and others) to SARS-CoV-2 and the potential transmissibility within a species and across species to guide politicians and other decision makers. The susceptibility of livestock and poultry that could act as virus reservoirs, might serve as animal models for COVID-19 or are possibly in close contact with infected humans, is still understudied. Recent work at the Harbin Veterinary Research Institute (Shi et al. 2020b) in China and the Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut (Swine Health Information Center 2020, Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut 2020) in Germany examined SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility of pigs, chickens, and ducks (only studied by Shi et al. 2020b). They reported that pigs, chickens, and ducks could not be productively infected by SARS-CoV-2 under the experimental conditions used in their work.
This raises many questions: What is the susceptibility of livestock and poultry to SARS-CoV-2? Do we know the potential transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to livestock/poultry and among different livestock/poultry species? Do we have methods for detection and surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 in livestock/poultry?
Background: Zoo Species
As of today (April 19, 2020), a Malayan tiger, her sister, three African lions, and two Amur tigers at the Bronx Zoo developed clinical disease and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. It is hypothesized that they contracted the virus from an asymptomatic COVID-19 positive keeper. This raises a host of questions. Did the large cats develop a dry cough? Given their large size, how much virus will they shed through the respiratory route? Will they shed virus in feces and urine? What will be the duration of shedding? The reports attribute their infection to the keeper but, once infected, will the cats be able to transmit the virus to other people? Will SARS-CoV-2 have an impact on reproduction of captive endangered species? What other species in a zoological collection can be infected by SARS-CoV-2? Are there potential reservoirs of SARS-CoV-2 in animals maintained in zoological collection? How can surveillance of zoo species be performed on a national basis? What diagnostic tests should be used to diagnose zoo species? These are many questions and many of them also apply to other animal species including companion animals and livestock.
Summary
Concerns about the need to investigate SARS-CoV-2 in companion animals was first shared with the “Red Dawn Breaking” COVID-19 group of federal officials and academics on February 13, 2020, by one of the authors (T.M.). It was then discussed with members of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) between mid-March and early April by all authors. This information was pulled together in response to an informal e-mail from DHS and was submitted to DHS on April 6, 2020.
A thorough review of the literature concerning SARS-CoV-2 as it relates to companion animals was conducted. Although there was early indication that cats might be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection based on their ACE2 receptor structure (Wan et al. 2020), no investigations were performed. Instead, there have been repeated assertions by WHO, CDC, and several veterinary entities that companion animals were “unlikely” to get infected with SARS-CoV-2. But then dogs and cats tested positive in Hong Kong and Belgium and recently cats in the United States (NY Times 2020). Although these same organizations also had stated that pets would not become ill, the cat in Belgium presented with clinical signs. More cats and dogs have since tested positive in Hong Kong and ∼15% of stray and house cats in Wuhan, China, have been found seropositive (Zhang, 2020). In addition to domestic cats and exotic felids, natural infections have now also been confirmed in mink at two farms in the Netherlands (ProMED 2020c). Along the way, the public messaging about companion animals has shifted from “there is no threat” to “in an abundance of caution, be sure to wash your hands after petting your animals and be careful not to let your dog lick your face.” Less than a week ago, Chinese researchers published a nonpeer-reviewed study that, if accurate, indicates that juvenile cats can not only become infected and develop serious disease but that they also efficiently transmit the infection to adjacent uninfected cats. If these findings can be replicated and verified, they raise serious implications for pet cats, cats in shelters, exotic felids in zoos, and possibly people. Tigers and lions in a U.S. zoo have tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, raising more questions about species susceptibility, duration of infection, viral shedding, and asymptomatic reservoirs.
In its February 3 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan on COVID-19, WHO lists the need to “identify and reduce transmission from the animal source; address crucial unknowns regarding clinical severity, extent of transmission and infection, treatment options, and accelerate the development of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines; and communicate critical risk and event information to all communities and counter misinformation” as strategic objectives (World Health Organization 2020b). In the situation reports of February 5 and 22 (World Health Organization 2020a), WHO again states there is a need to “identify and reduce transmission from the animal source.” On April 3, OIE reported another positive cat in Hong Kong that has been quarantined and put under veterinary surveillance for 14 days. Under “Zoonotic impact” the report says “Zoonotic potential unknown at this time.” The recent Chinese studies conclude that “surveillance (in cats) for SARS-CoV-2 should be considered an adjunct to the elimination of COVID-19 in humans” (Shi et al. 2020a) and that “more studies are needed” (Zhang et al. 2020). We agree.
With regard to diagnostics, molecular diagnostic kits used for human COVD-19 testing can be easily adapted to animal testing—as long as the SARS-CoV-2 does not dramatically mutate after cross-species transmission from humans to animals. To determine whether such mutations are occurring, it is critical that next-generation sequencing technology be applied on SARS-CoV-2 samples recovered from animals. In terms of serological tests, the high-throughput indirect ELISA systems available already for humans cannot be used for animals. Novel validated indirect ELISA tests for individual animal species, and importantly competitive ELISA tests that can be used independent of the animal species are badly needed. Neutralization antibody tests, which are unfortunately labor and time consuming, can be adapted for animal sera. In addition, antigen detection assays for the presence of SARS-CoV-2 antigens in animal samples should be developed, since they can be used independent of animal species. The potential to use serological and antigen-based SARS-CoV-2 assays in a point of care environment, that is, in veterinary practices, zoos, kennels, at ports, airports, and border crossings, is enormous.
In the immediacy of the COVID-19 crisis, the focus has understandably been on human health. But we have ignored the opposite side of the coin of emerging zoonotic disease threats—the animals themselves. This lack of a One Health approach has resulted in an unnecessary delay in the investigation of important veterinary issues as they pertain to public health. Had we taken a proactive approach, we could have gotten ahead of this.
We are now faced with many urgent questions that can only be answered through investigative studies and surveillance. In the September 2000 GAO report “West Nile Virus Outbreak—Lessons for Public Health Preparedness” (GAO/HEHS-00-180 West Nile Virus Outbreak), the authors emphasized the need to “expect the unexpected.” With regard to SARS-CoV-2 in animals, this admonition seems to have been forgotten. Anecdotal information and assumptions are no substitute for stringent studies. Absence of evidence is not the same thing as evidence of absence.
Acknowledgments
The authors express sincere thanks to Stephen Higgs, Elin Gursky, and Bob McCreight for their suggestions and help in reviewing this article.
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 8, 2020
Texas TAHC Household Dog Confirmed with Virus That Causes COVID-19
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2020
APHIS Confirmation of COVID-19 in Two Pet Cats in New York
REPORT
Susceptibility of ferrets, cats, dogs, and other domesticated animals to SARS–coronavirus 2
View ORCID ProfileJianzhong Shi1,*, View ORCID ProfileZhiyuan Wen1,*, View ORCID ProfileGongxun Zhong1,*, View ORCID ProfileHuanliang Yang1,*, View ORCID ProfileChong Wang1,*, View ORCID ProfileBaoying Huang2,*, Renqiang Liu1, Xijun He3, Lei Shuai1, Ziruo Sun1, Yubo Zhao1, View ORCID ProfilePeipei Liu2, Libin Liang1, Pengfei Cui1, Jinliang Wang1, View ORCID ProfileXianfeng Zhang3, Yuntao Guan3, View ORCID ProfileWenjie Tan2, View ORCID ProfileGuizhen Wu2,†, View ORCID ProfileHualan Chen1,†, View ORCID ProfileZhigao Bu1,3,† See all authors and affiliations
Science 29 May 2020: Vol. 368, Issue 6494, pp. 1016-1020 DOI: 10.1126/science.abb7015 Article Figures & Data Info & Metrics eLetters PDF Alternative hosts and model animals The severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic may have originated in bats, but how it made its way into humans is unknown. Because of its zoonotic origins, SARS-CoV-2 is unlikely to exclusively infect humans, so it would be valuable to have an animal model for drug and vaccine development. Shi et al. tested ferrets, as well as livestock and companion animals of humans, for their susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 (see the Perspective by Lakdawala and Menachery). The authors found that SARS-CoV-2 infects the upper respiratory tracts of ferrets but is poorly transmissible between individuals. In cats, the virus replicated in the nose and throat and caused inflammatory pathology deeper in the respiratory tract, and airborne transmission did occur between pairs of cats. Dogs appeared not to support viral replication well and had low susceptibility to the virus, and pigs, chickens, and ducks were not susceptible to SARS-CoV-2.
Science, this issue p. 1016; see also p. 942
Abstract
Severe acute respiratory syndrome–coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) causes the infectious disease COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019), which was first reported in Wuhan, China, in December 2019. Despite extensive efforts to control the disease, COVID-19 has now spread to more than 100 countries and caused a global pandemic. SARS-CoV-2 is thought to have originated in bats; however, the intermediate animal sources of the virus are unknown. In this study, we investigated the susceptibility of ferrets and animals in close contact with humans to SARS-CoV-2. We found that SARS-CoV-2 replicates poorly in dogs, pigs, chickens, and ducks, but ferrets and cats are permissive to infection. Additionally, cats are susceptible to airborne transmission. Our study provides insights into the animal models for SARS-CoV-2 and animal management for COVID-19 control.
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In summary, we found that ferrets and cats are highly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2; dogs have low susceptibility; and pigs, chickens, and ducks are not susceptible to the virus. Unlike influenza viruses and the other SARS-coronavirus known to infect humans (SARS-CoV-1), which replicate in both the upper and lower respiratory tract of ferrets (20, 22–24, 26, 27), SARS-CoV-2 replicates only in the nasal turbinate, soft palate, and tonsils of ferrets. SARS-CoV-2 may also replicate in the digestive tract, as viral RNA was detected in the rectal swabs of the virus-infected ferrets, but virus was not detected in lung lobes, even after the ferrets were intratracheally inoculated with the virus. It remains unclear whether the virus causes more severe disease in male ferrets than in female ferrets, as has been observed among humans (13, 28).
Several studies have reported that SARS-CoV-2 uses angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) as its receptor to enter cells (3, 29–31). ACE2 is mainly expressed in type II pneumocytes and serous epithelial cells of tracheo-bronchial submucosal glands in ferrets (25). Ferrets and cats differ by only two amino acids in the SARS-CoV-2 spike-contacting regions of ACE2 (table S1); therefore, the underlying mechanism that prevents the replication of SARS-CoV-2 in the lower respiratory tract of ferrets remains to be investigated. The fact that SARS-CoV-2 replicates efficiently in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets makes them a candidate animal model for evaluating the efficacy of antiviral drugs or vaccines against COVID-19.
The cats we used in this study were outbred and were susceptible to SARS-CoV-2, which replicated efficiently and was transmissible to naïve cats. Cats in Wuhan have been reported to be seropositive for SARS-CoV-2 (32). Surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 in cats should be considered as an adjunct to elimination of COVID-19 in humans.
TUESDAY, JUNE 2, 2020
USDA APHIS Confirmation of COVID-19 in Pet Dog in New York
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2020
APHIS Confirmation of COVID-19 in Two Pet Cats in New York
Coronavirus can survive long exposure to high temperature, a threat to lab staff around world: paper
The new
can survive long exposure to high temperatures, according to an experiment by a team of French scientists.
Professor Remi Charrel and colleagues at the Aix-Marseille University in southern
heated the virus that causes Covid-19 to 60 degrees Celsius (140 Fahrenheit) for an hour and found that some strains were still able to replicate.
The scientists had to bring the temperature to almost boiling point to kill the virus completely, according to their non-peer-reviewed paper released on bioRxiv.org on Saturday. The results have implications for the safety of lab technicians working with the virus.
Coronavirus can survive long exposure to high temperature, a threat to lab staff around world: paper
The new coronavirus can survive long exposure to high temperatures, according to an experiment by a team of French scientists.
Professor Remi Charrel and colleagues at the Aix-Marseille University in southern France heated the virus that causes Covid-19 to 60 degrees Celsius (140 Fahrenheit) for an hour and found that some strains were still able to replicate.
The scientists had to bring the temperature to almost boiling point to kill the virus completely, according to their non-peer-reviewed paper released on bioRxiv.org on Saturday. The results have implications for the safety of lab technicians working with the virus.
Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities ― United States, April–May 2020 Early Release / July 7, 2020 / 69
Michelle A. Waltenburg, DVM1,2; Tristan Victoroff, MPH1; Charles E. Rose, PhD1; Marilee Butterfield3; Rachel H. Jervis, MPH4; Kristen M. Fedak, PhD4; Julie A. Gabel, DVM5; Amanda Feldpausch, MPH5; Eileen M. Dunne, PhD1,2,6; Connie Austin, DVM7; Farah S. Ahmed, PhD8; Sheri Tubach, MPH8; Charles Rhea, MPH9; Anna Krueger, MS10; David A. Crum, DVM11; Johanna Vostok, MPH12; Michael J. Moore, MS12; George Turabelidze, MD13; Derry Stover, MPH14; Matthew Donahue, MD1,2,14; Karen Edge, MPH15; Bernadette Gutierrez15; Kelly E. Kline, MPH16; Nichole Martz17; James C. Rajotte, MS18; Ernest Julian, PhD18; Abdoulaye Diedhiou, MD19; Rachel Radcliffe, DVM19; Joshua L. Clayton, PhD20; Dustin Ortbahn, MPH20; Jason Cummins, MPH21; Bree Barbeau, MPH22; Julia Murphy, DVM23; Brandy Darby, DVM23; Nicholas R. Graff, MPH24; Tia K. H. Dostal, MPH24; Ian W. Pray, PhD1,2,25; Courtney Tillman, MPH26; Michelle M. Dittrich, MPH1; Gail Burns-Grant1; Sooji Lee, MSPH1; Alisa Spieckerman, MPH1; Kashif Iqbal, MPH1; Sean M. Griffing, PhD1; Alicia Lawson, MPH1; Hugh M. Mainzer, DVM1; Andreea E. Bealle, MPH1; Erika Edding1; Kathryn E. Arnold, MD1; Tomas Rodriguez, MA1; Sarah Merkle, MPH1; Kristen Pettrone, MD1,2; Karen Schlanger, PhD1; Kristin LaBar, MPH1; Kate Hendricks, MD1; Arielle Lasry, PhD1; Vikram Krishnasamy, MD1; Henry T. Walke, MD1; Dale A. Rose, PhD1; Margaret A. Honein, PhD1; COVID-19 Response Team (View author affiliations)
View suggested citation Summary What is already known about this topic?
COVID-19 outbreaks among meat and poultry processing facility workers can rapidly affect large numbers of persons.
What is added by this report?
Among 23 states reporting COVID-19 outbreaks in meat and poultry processing facilities, 16,233 cases in 239 facilities occurred, including 86 (0.5%) COVID-19–related deaths. Among cases with race/ethnicity reported, 87% occurred among racial or ethnic minorities. Commonly implemented interventions included worker screening, source control measures (universal face coverings), engineering controls (physical barriers), and infection prevention measures (additional hand hygiene stations).
What are the implications for public health practice?
Targeted workplace interventions and prevention efforts that are appropriately tailored to the groups most affected by COVID-19 are critical to reducing both COVID-19–associated occupational risk and health disparities among vulnerable populations.
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References Related Materials PDF pdf icon[199K] The figure describes COVID-19 cases among workers in meat and poultry processing facilities and ways to reduce occupational risk.
Meat and poultry processing facilities face distinctive challenges in the control of infectious diseases, including coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). COVID-19 outbreaks among meat and poultry processing facility workers can rapidly affect large numbers of persons. Assessment of COVID-19 cases among workers in 115 meat and poultry processing facilities through April 27, 2020, documented 4,913 cases and 20 deaths reported by 19 states (1). This report provides updated aggregate data from states regarding the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19, the number and demographic characteristics of affected workers, and the number of COVID-19–associated deaths among workers, as well as descriptions of interventions and prevention efforts at these facilities. Aggregate data on confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths among workers identified and reported through May 31, 2020, were obtained from 239 affected facilities (those with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case in one or more workers) in 23 states.* COVID-19 was confirmed in 16,233 workers, including 86 COVID-19–related deaths. Among 14 states reporting the total number of workers in affected meat and poultry processing facilities (112,616), COVID-19 was diagnosed in 9.1% of workers. Among 9,919 (61%) cases in 21 states with reported race/ethnicity, 87% occurred among racial and ethnic minority workers. Commonly reported interventions and prevention efforts at facilities included implementing worker temperature or symptom screening and COVID-19 education, mandating face coverings, adding hand hygiene stations, and adding physical barriers between workers. Targeted workplace interventions and prevention efforts that are appropriately tailored to the groups most affected by COVID-19 are critical to reducing both COVID-19–associated occupational risk and health disparities among vulnerable populations. Implementation of these interventions and prevention efforts† across meat and poultry processing facilities nationally could help protect workers in this critical infrastructure industry.
Distinctive factors that increase meat and poultry processing workers’ risk for exposure to SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, include prolonged close workplace contact with coworkers (within 6 feet for ≥15 minutes) for long time periods (8–12 hour shifts), shared work spaces, shared transportation to and from the workplace, congregate housing, and frequent community contact with fellow workers. Many of these factors might also contribute to ongoing community transmission (1). To better understand the effect of COVID-19 on workers in these facilities nationwide, on June 6, 2020, CDC requested that state health departments report aggregate surveillance data through May 31, 2020, for workers in all meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19, including 1) the number and type of such facilities that had reported at least one confirmed COVID-19 case among workers, 2) the total number of workers in affected facilities, 3) the number of workers with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19, and 4) the number of COVID-19–related worker deaths. States reported COVID-19 cases determined by the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists confirmed case definition.§ States were asked to report demographic characteristics and symptom status of workers with COVID-19. Testing strategies and methods for collecting symptom data varied by workplace. Proportional distributions for demographic characteristics and symptom status were calculated for cases among workers in 21 states after excluding missing and unknown values; data were missing for sex in 25% of reports, age in 24%, race/ethnicity in 39%, and symptom status in 37%. States also provided information (from direct observation or from management at affected facilities) regarding specified interventions and prevention efforts that were implemented. A random-effects logistic regression model was used to obtain an estimate of the pooled proportion of asymptomatic (SARS-CoV-2 detected but symptoms never develop) or presymptomatic (SARS-CoV-2 detected before symptom onset) infections at the time of testing among workers who had positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. Five states provided prevalence data from facility-wide testing of 5,572 workers in seven facilities. Modeling was conducted and 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated, with facilities treated as the random effect, using SAS software (version 9.4; SAS Institute).
Twenty-eight (56%) of 50 states responded, including 23 (82%) that reported at least one confirmed COVID-19 case among meat and poultry processing workers. Overall, 239 facilities reported 16,233 COVID-19 cases and 86 COVID-19–related deaths among workers (Table 1). The median number of affected facilities per state was seven (interquartile range = 3–14). Among 14 states reporting the total number of workers in affected facilities, 9.1% of 112,616 workers received diagnoses of COVID-19. The percentage of workers with COVID-19 ranged from 3.1% to 24.5% per facility.
Twenty-one states provided information on demographic characteristics and symptom status of workers with COVID-19. Among the 12,100 (75%) and 12,365 (76%) patients with information on sex and age, 7,288 (60%) cases occurred among males, and 5,741 (46%) were aged 40–59 years, respectively (Figure). Among the 9,919 (61%) cases with race/ethnicity reported, 5,584 (56%) were in Hispanics, 1,842 (19%) in non-Hispanic blacks (blacks), 1,332 (13%) in non-Hispanic whites (whites), and 1,161 (12%) in Asians. Symptom status was reported for 10,284 (63%) cases; among these, 9,072 (88%) workers were symptomatic, and 1,212 (12%) were asymptomatic or presymptomatic.
Among 239 facilities reporting cases, information on interventions and prevention efforts was available for 111 (46%) facilities from 14 states. Overall, 89 (80%) facilities reported screening workers on entry, 86 (77%) required all workers to wear face coverings, 72 (65%) increased the availability of hand hygiene stations, 70 (63%) educated workers on community spread, and 69 (62%) installed physical barriers between workers (Table 2). Forty-one (37%) of 111 facilities offered testing for SARS-CoV-2 to workers; 24 (22%) reported closing temporarily as an intervention measure.
Among seven facilities that implemented facility-wide testing, the crude prevalence of asymptomatic or presymptomatic infections among 5,572 workers who had positive SARS-CoV-2 test results was 14.4%. The pooled prevalence estimated from the model for the proportion of asymptomatic or presymptomatic infections among workers in meat and poultry processing facilities was 11.2% (95% CI = 0.9%–23.1%).
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Discussion The animal slaughtering and processing industry employs an estimated 525,000 workers in approximately 3,500 facilities nationwide (2,3). Combining data on workers with COVID-19 and COVID-19–related deaths identified and reported through May 31 from 23 states (16,233 cases; 86 deaths) with data from an earlier assessment through April 27 (1,125 cases; five deaths) (1) that included data from six states that did not contribute updated data to this report,¶ at least 17,358 cases and 91 COVID-19–related deaths have occurred among U.S. meat and poultry processing workers.
The effects of COVID-19 on racial and ethnic minority groups are not yet fully understood; however, current data indicate a disproportionate burden of illness and death among these populations (4,5). Among animal slaughtering and processing workers from the 21 states included in this report whose race/ethnicity were known, approximately 39% were white, 30% were Hispanic, 25% were black, and 6% were Asian.** However, among 9,919 workers with COVID-19 with race/ethnicity reported, approximately 56% were Hispanic, 19% were black, 13% were white, and 12% were Asian, suggesting that Hispanic and Asian workers might be disproportionately affected by COVID-19 in this workplace setting. Ongoing efforts to reduce incidence and better understand the effects of COVID-19 on the health of racial and ethnic minorities are important to ensure that workplace-specific prevention strategies and intervention messages are tailored to those groups most affected by COVID-19.
The proportion of asymptomatic or presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections identified in investigations of COVID-19 outbreaks in other high-density settings has ranged from 19% to 88% (6,7). Among cases in workers with known symptom status in this report, 12% of patients were asymptomatic or presymptomatic; however, not all facilities performed facility-wide testing, during which these infections are more likely to be identified. Consequently, many asymptomatic and presymptomatic infections in the overall workforce might have gone unrecognized, and the approximations for disease prevalence in this report might underestimate SARS-CoV-2 infections. Recently derived estimates of the total proportion of asymptomatic and presymptomatic infections from data on COVID-19 investigations among cruise ship passengers and evacuees from Wuhan, China, ranged from 17.9% to 30.8%, respectively (8,9). The estimated proportion of asymptomatic and presymptomatic infections among meat and poultry processing workers (11.2%) is lower than are previously reported estimates and should be reevaluated as more comprehensive facility-wide testing data are reported.
In coordination with state and local health agencies, many meat and poultry processing facilities have implemented interventions to reduce transmission or prevent ongoing exposure within the workplace, including offering testing to workers.†† Expanding interventions across these facilities nationwide might help protect workers in this industry. Recognizing the interaction of workplace and community, many facilities have also educated workers about strategies for reducing transmission of COVID-19 outside the workplace.§§
The findings in this report are subject to at least seven limitations. First, only 28 of 50 states responded; 23 states with COVID-19 cases among meat and poultry processing facility workers submitted data for this report. In addition, only facilities with at least one laboratory-confirmed case of COVID-19 among workers were included. Thus, these results might not be representative of all U.S. meat and poultry processing facilities and workers. Second, delays in identifying workplace outbreaks and linking cases or deaths to outbreaks might have resulted in an underestimation of the number of affected facilities and cases among workers. Third, data were not reported on variations in testing availability and practices, which might influence the number of cases reported. Fourth, industry data were used for race/ethnicity comparisons; demographic characteristics of total worker populations in affected facilities were not available, limiting the ability to quantify the degree to which some racial and ethnic minority groups might be disproportionately affected by COVID-19 in this industry. Reported frequencies of demographic and symptom data likely underestimate the actual prevalence because of missing data, which limits the conclusions that can be drawn from descriptive analyses. Fifth, information on interventions and prevention efforts was available for a subset of affected facilities and therefore might not be generalizable to all facilities. Information was subject to self-report by facility management, and all available intervention efforts might not have been captured. Further evaluation of the extent of control measures and timing of implementations is needed to assess effectiveness of control measures. Sixth, symptom data collected at facility-wide testing was self-reported and might have been influenced by the presence of employers. Finally, workers in this industry are members of their local communities, and their source of exposure and infection could not be determined; for those living in communities experiencing widespread transmission, exposure might have occurred within the surrounding community as well as at the worksite.
High population-density workplace settings such as meat and poultry processing facilities present ongoing challenges to preventing and reducing the risk for SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Collaborative implementation of interventions and prevention efforts, which might include comprehensive testing strategies, could help reduce COVID-19–associated occupational risk. Targeted, workplace-specific prevention strategies are critical to reducing COVID-19–associated health disparities among vulnerable populations Lessons learned from investigating outbreaks of COVID-19 in meat and poultry processing facilities could inform investigations in other food production and agriculture workplaces to help prevent and reduce COVID-19 transmission among all workers in these essential industries.
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Acknowledgments State and local health departments in affected communities; affected facilities; CDC COVID-19 Emergency Response Health Department Task Force field team deployers; Julia Banks, Betsy Bertelsen, Elyse Bevers, Renee Canady, Kris Carter, Alyssa Carlson, Alex Cox, Meredith Davis, Chas DeBolt, Zachary Doobovsky, Marcia Goldoft, Anna Halloran, Lea Hammer, Michelle Holshue, Logan Hudson, Stephanie Kellner, Jennifer Lam, Shawn Magee, Laina Mitchell, Ellie Morgan, Sarah Murray, Laura Newman, Amal Patel, Chelsea Pugh, Jonathan Richardson, Tim Roth, Katrina Saphrey, Betsy Schroeder, Melissa Sixberry, Lisa Sollot, Alison Stargel.
COVID-19 Response Team Keith Amoroso, Rhode Island Department of Health; Yvette Diallo, CDC; Kathie Fazekas, CDC; Phillip J. Finley, CDC; Jennifer Fuld, CDC; Jodie L. Guest, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia; Jocelyn J. Herstein, Global Center for Health Security University of Nebraska Medical Center; Erin D. Kennedy, CDC; James V. Lawler, Global Center for Health Security University of Nebraska Medical Center; John J. Lowe, Global Center for Health Security University of Nebraska Medical Center; Alexander Neifert, Rhode Island Department of Health; Michelle M. Schwedhelm, Global Center for Health Security; Nebraska Medicine; Jonathan M. Steinberg, South Dakota Department of Health; Douglas B. Trout, CDC; Max Zarate-Bermudez, CDC.
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Corresponding author: Michelle A. Waltenburg, mwaltenburg@cdc.gov.
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1CDC COVID-19 Emergency Response; 2Epidemic Intelligence Service, CDC; 3Arizona Department of Health Services; 4Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment; 5Georgia Department of Public Health; 6Idaho Department of Health and Welfare; 7Illinois Department of Public Health; 8Kansas Department of Health and Environment; 9Kentucky Department for Public Health; 10Maine Center for Disease Control and Prevention; 11Maryland Department of Health; 12Massachusetts Department of Public Health; 13Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services; 14Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services; 15New Mexico Department of Health; 16Pennslyvania Department of Health; 17Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture; 18Rhode Island Department of Health; 19South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control; 20South Dakota Department of Health; 21Tennessee Department of Health; 22Utah Department of Health; 23Virginia Department of Health; 24Washington State Department of Health; 25Wisconsin Department of Health Services; 26Wyoming Department of Health.
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All authors have completed and submitted the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors form for disclosure of potential conflicts of interest. No potential conflicts of interest were disclosed.
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* Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
¶ Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas did not contribute data to this report.
** Data produced for 21 of 23 states (Colorado and Kansas did not provide information on demographic characteristics and symptom status of cases) using the Bureau of Census American Community Survey (CMS) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) query tool (https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/data/pums.htmlexternal icon). Employment summaries were based on the American Community Survey 2014–2018 5-year PUMS estimates. Workforce estimates for Bureau of Census Industry Code 1180 (Animal Slaughtering and Processing) were tabulated by race/ethnicity using recoded detailed Hispanic origin and race.
References
snip...see full text;
It is Time to Address Airborne Transmission of COVID-19
Subject: GAO COVID-19 : Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts
https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/51539-gao-highlights-opportunities-to-improve-federal-covid-19-response-recovery-efforts/
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
It is Time to Address Airborne Transmission of COVID-19
Lidia Morawska, Donald K Milton
Clinical Infectious Diseases, ciaa939, https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciaa939
Commentary
We appeal to the medical community and to the relevant national and international bodies to recognize the potential for airborne spread of COVID-19. There is significant potential for inhalation exposure to viruses in microscopic respiratory droplets (microdroplets) at short to medium distances (up to several meters, or room scale), and we are advocating for the use of preventive measures to mitigate this route of airborne transmission.
snip...
We are concerned that the lack of recognition of the risk of airborne transmission of COVID-19 and the lack of clear recommendations on the control measures against the airborne virus will have significant consequences: people may think that they are fully protected by adhering to the current recommendations, but in fact, additional airborne interventions are needed for further reduction of infection risk.
This matter is of heightened significance now, when countries are re-opening following lockdowns - bringing people back to workplaces and students back to schools, colleges, and universities. We hope that our statement will raise awareness that airborne transmission of COVID-19 is a real risk and that control measures, as outlined above, must be added to the other precautions taken, to reduce the severity of the pandemic and save lives.
It is Time to Address Airborne Transmission of COVID-19
TRUMP COVID VIRUS 2020
Subject: GAO COVID-19 : Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts
GAO highlights opportunities to improve federal COVID-19 response, recovery efforts
© Shutterstock
In accordance with the CARES Act containing a provision for the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to report on ongoing COVID-19 monitoring and oversight efforts, six recommendations have been issued.
The GAO indicated its recent analysis examined key actions the federal government has taken to address the pandemic and evolving lessons learned relevant to the nation’s response to pandemics.
Per the GAO, four relief laws were enacted as of June 2020 in response to COVID-19, including the CARES Act, in March 2020, with the measures having appropriated $2.6 trillion across the government.
The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP); Economic Stabilization and Assistance to Distressed Sectors; unemployment insurance; economic impact payments; Public Health and Social Services Emergency Fund; and Coronavirus Relief Fund accounted for 86 percent of the appropriations, the GAO indicated.
GAO identified several challenges related to the federal response to the crisis, officials said, noting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported incomplete and inconsistent data from state and jurisdictional health departments on the amount of viral testing occurring nationwide, making it more difficult to track and know the number of infections, mitigate their effects, and inform decisions on reopening communities; the nationwide need for critical supplies to respond to COVID-19 quickly exceeded the quantity of supplies contained in the Strategic National Stockpile; PPP borrowers and lenders raised several questions about the program and eligibility criteria, but after efforts to address the concerns, questions and confusion remained; and the Department of Labor currently has no mechanism in place to capture information in real-time about unemployment insurance claimants who may receive wages paid from PPP loan proceeds.
The GAO has offered the following recommendations, including urging Congress to take legislative action to require the Secretary of Transportation to work with relevant agencies and stakeholders, to develop a national aviation preparedness plan to ensure safeguards are in place to limit the spread of communicable disease threats from abroad while at the same time minimizing any unnecessary interference with travel and trade; provide agencies access to the Social Security Administration’s more complete set of death data and require that the Department of the Treasury consistently use it; and as a means of ensuring federal funding is targeted and timely, the GAO has urged Congress to use the agency’s Federal Medical Assistance Percentage formula for any future changes to the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage during the current or any future economic downturn.
Executive Action recommendations issued by the GAO include the Secretary of Labor immediately providing information to state unemployment agencies specifically addressing Paycheck Protection Program loans and the risk of improper payments associated with the loans; the Commissioner of Internal Revenue should consider cost-effective options for notifying ineligible recipients on how to return payments; and the Administrator of the Small Business Administration should develop and implement plans to identify and respond to risks in the Paycheck Protection Program to ensure program integrity, achieve program effectiveness and address potential fraud.
Energy and Commerce Chairman Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-NJ) said the GAO’s report provided a detailed accounting of the Trump Administration’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic.
“The report finds routine inconsistencies in the Administration’s testing data, perpetual shortages of critical supplies, and poorly coordinated response efforts that allowed the virus to spread at alarming rates,” Pallone said in response to the report. “The GAO’s findings echo concerns we heard from governors at a hearing earlier this month about how the federal government has hampered state efforts to deal with shortages of critical supplies. It raises questions about allocating supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile and how it will ensure the Stockpile is replenished to continue fighting COVID-19 infections.”
GAO COVID-19 : Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts
Report to the Congress
GAO-20-625; PUBLISHED: JUN 25, 2020 . PUBLICLY RELEASED:JUN 25, 2020
tRump and people of color, and mandated death by executive order?
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